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Microclimates

Jonathan Dewald
University at Buffalo, State University of New York

Michael Breen introduces the print version of these essays by noting the collection's two intertwining purposes: first, to present "a cross-section and a sampling of scholarly currents in France today;" second, to introduce non-specialist and Anglophone readers to a younger generation of historians, whose work is only now becoming widely known outside France (pp. 525-26). To be sure, in this domain sampling—whether of scholarly currents or youthful historians—can only be an imperfect science. Although French intellectuals have been worrying for decades about a contemporary "crisis of history,"[1] French early modernists continue publishing in dazzling abundance, addressing a wide range of topics and applying multiple approaches to them. No group of five essays could fully exemplify this exuberant creativity. But if we put sampling problems aside and approach these articles looking for broad tendencies in contemporary historical thinking, what patterns emerge?

As a start in this mapping exercise, it helps to note some absences from the collection, some zones of the historian's territory into which these five scholars do not venture.[2] Thus, none of the essays deals with rural society, demography, deviants and the abandoned, popular culture, or the illiterate—topics that through the 1970s seemed to define the essence of modern French historical scholarship.[3] The paradigmatic methods of mid-twentieth-century historical writing are missing as well: none of these essays refers to "structures" or to the concept of "total history," the idea that the historian can grasp all the forces that shaped a given society, provided at least that s/he selects a properly delimited area for study. That totalizing ambition provided an organizing principle for some of the mid-twentieth century's greatest works, from all points on the historiographical map. Pierre Goubert's study of the Beauvaisis and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's of Languedoc emerged from the *Annales* school, for instance, but regional studies by Jean Jacquart (of the Hurepoix), Abel Poitrineau (of the Auvergne), Pierre Deyon (of Amiens), Jean Nicolas (of Savoy), and many others derived from a more complicated mix of traditions.[4] Each of these studies confined itself (as Le Roy Ladurie described his own work) to "the limited framework of a specific group" within a specific region; Goubert made the same point by titling an abridged version of his book *Cent mille provinciaux au XVIIe siècle*. But within those geographical limits, each also attempted what Le Roy Ladurie called "the adventure of a total history" that combined economic, social, and cultural approaches.[5]

The five essays here take exactly the opposite approach. For all their differences, they all start from essentially microscopic analyses, then tentatively move to suggesting what the specific cases they examine say about French society as a whole. Generalization remains the historian's ultimate goal, the essays suggest, but they do not offer total understanding as even a possibility. No doubt this approach derives partly from the Italian microhistory movement, which has had an especially powerful impact on French scholars, but among the authors only Claire Chatelain

explicitly invokes microhistory and its methodological proposals (p. 552). For the other authors, it seems, the move to microscopic analysis has less to do with theoretical reflection than with what might be termed a common research sensibility, a shared stance toward historical knowledge itself.[6]

That approach emerges most clearly in the essays by Claire Chatelain and Elie Haddad, which both look closely at specific individuals and families. The other three essays all deal with collective practices and groups of people, but they too start from the microscopic level. Hugues Daussy examines the vast topic of Protestant finances during the Wars of Religion but zeroes in on the first seven years of what would become a decades-long struggle. Isabelle Luciani examines an important collective practice: all through the Old Regime, numerous upper-class families recorded their familial, personal, and financial doings in *livres de raison*. She has assembled an impressive corpus of these documents, eighty-seven examples from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Provence, and for some purposes she analyzes them in quantitative terms (for instance, p. 531). But quantitative measures supply mere background to her more central concern, which is to find the forms of self-exploration that lurk in these apparently outward-turning works. That goal, she emphasizes, requires approaching them in microscopic detail, so as to capture “every trace of the self, however small it might be” (p. 530).

Thierry Amalou follows a similar procedure. He examines a still more fundamental collective practice, since preaching offered sixteenth-century men and women some of their most vivid cultural experiences across Europe and in all milieux. Amalou examines an influential group of preachers, those associated with the Sorbonne itself, and he seeks to establish the group’s “collective identity” (pp. 611, 614). But rather than a quantitative group portrait, he provides a series of capsule biographies and close readings, examining in turn eight individual preachers and treating each as essentially a free-standing historical actor with ideas and social experiences of his own.

Why this turn to microhistorical method? At the simplest level, all five authors appear to share Luciani’s appreciation of the method’s heuristic value, her belief (quoted above) that many early modern realities emerge only from careful examination of “every trace” in the historical record. Equally important, she emphasizes, historians need to attend closely to such details in developing their analytical tools, for the prefabricated categories of modern social theory are as likely to obscure as to illuminate the past. Even so simple a term as “*livre de raison*” poses problems. Though it has been favored by modern librarians, contemporaries used a wider array of names for their efforts, and looking closely at those allows us to see the complexity of their intentions. (pp. 532-33).[7]

Elie Haddad urges a similar nominalism. Like Luciani, he underlines the value of investigating apparently trivial practices; choices of names and attendance at family events like marriages provide clues as to the society’s fundamental organization. And he too emphasizes the dangers of relying on modern social categories in trying to understand early modern realities. The danger is especially great where the nobility is concerned. All through the early modern period, France’s terminology of nobility, house, and lineage remained largely unchanged, but, so runs Haddad’s central argument, the realities that those terms designated underwent radical transformation. Through the mid-seventeenth century, he argues, families defined themselves as loosely

organized, relatively egalitarian households; after 1660, that organization yielded to an increasingly strict understanding of patrilineage, with properties ruthlessly concentrated in the hands of oldest sons, and collateral branches often excised from the family's life. But for historians even to detect that change, they must reconstruct how families carried on their activities, in minute detail.

* * *

Alongside their shared commitment to microhistorical research methods, the five essays also display some common substantive features, which seem loosely tied to the method itself. Four such features seem to me especially worth noting here, starting with the social strata on whom these historians focus. I've already mentioned the absence from the collection of the poor and the powerless; instead, these historians all examine the literate, the prosperous, and the influential. Chatelain and Haddad write specifically about the nobility, and nobles and urban patricians were the main players in the war finance issues that Daussy examines. The same groups were among the most likely to compose the self-reflective literature that Luciani examines. One-third of her examples come from the nobility itself and most of the rest from officials, business people, and others of comparable standing. Amalou's clerics constituted an elite of a different kind, one founded on the command of a university-centered, Latinate culture, but they lend themselves to the same kinds of analysis as nobles and urban patricians. The clerics were roughly as small a group as the nobles, and (as Amalou's essay demonstrates) they too struggled to maintain standing and authority amid challenging circumstances. Amalou shows his preachers insisting on lay obedience to clerical guidance (pp. 619-23) and (with less unanimity) asserting their right to criticize kings and magistrates (pp. 616-18). That interest in understanding how well-established groups create and sustain social power—or fail to do so—runs through the entire collection and provides one of its unifying themes.

In theory, of course, nothing prevents the historian from applying microhistorical methods to the lower classes. But in practice the historical record is silent about much of what mattered most in the lives of the powerless, and it was thus an article of faith for mid-twentieth-century historians that (as Carlo Ginzburg summarizes one statement of this view) “the history of the subaltern classes in preindustrial societies can only be studied from a statistical point of view.”[8] In more polemical mode, Pierre Goubert in a 1956 essay imagined “an historian of excessive ingenuity” using “isolated examples to invent a social pattern corresponding to his own pet theories or the fashion of the moment,” but (he concluded) the realities of seventeenth-century peasant life become visible only from statistical aggregates, which reveal ordinary people's experiences of familial disruption and death.[9] Such connections between historians' methods and their choices of subject matter remain just as close in the twenty-first century. Committed to the belief that much knowledge of the early modern past can come only from the nuances of language and the specificities of behavior, these historians have naturally turned to the lives of the literate and prosperous, where language and behavior can be best observed.

A similar connection to the essays' methods can be seen in a second substantive theme that runs through the collection: all five essays attribute a large role to the small-scale actions of individuals in shaping how societies function and all question the determinative force of social structures. Elie Haddad lays out this view with particular clarity. “An array of actions was

required to produce and maintain” the organization of nobility that he detects; it “was not a given resulting simply from the structure of kinship” (p. 580). In the same way, Isabelle Luciani describes her study as fitting with historians’ “rediscovery of the individual as a historical actor” over the last thirty years (p. 529); and she emphasizes the myriad ways in which individuals’ actions generate large social realities. As she puts it, “[d]aily writing insured, even in a basic way, the growing familiarity of a relationship with the self” (p. 536). She adds, “through written rituals and personal judgments, the writing subject becomes the guarantor of his own truth and the author of a singular worldview” (p. 543), even when the writing concerns trivial expenditures and local events and even when the first-person voice appears only in phrases like “I note that.” In comments like these, Haddad and Luciani suggest that microhistorical methods are especially well suited to capturing the microscopic, individual actions that ultimately shape societies.

Claire Chatelain raises similar questions, but she places somewhat more emphasis on societal structures and offers a somewhat darker reading of individuals’ autonomy in dealing with them. She speaks of “the constraints produced by these family networks ... on individuals” and the “contradictions in their personal situation” (p. 550). Her detailed analysis of the nobleman-author Tristan Lhermite centers precisely on the painful failures that individuals might experience as they dealt with constraint and contradiction. Yet ultimately Chatelain too allows her hero a significant degree of autonomy and agency in his dealings with society. Tristan could not escape society’s norms, Chatelain concludes, but he could navigate among them, for the seventeenth century placed complex, often-contradictory demands on individuals and, thereby, created spaces for individual action (p. 565).

Whether in the stronger form that Haddad and Luciani propose or the weaker form suggested by Chatelain, these views again contrast with mid-twentieth-century French historical thinking, which tended to see larger forces determining human actions. Mid-century historians might disagree sharply about which of those forces mattered most; the causal forces they emphasized might be economic (as in the work of C. E. Labrousse), demographic (Goubert and Le Roy Ladurie), climatological (Le Roy Ladurie), or cultural (Lucien Febvre).[10] But whatever their differences in this respect, the mid-twentieth-century historians shared the belief that systems tended to overwhelm individuals. The essays here suggest a different vision of the social order, in which systems are understood as the end products of accumulated individual actions.

That attention to individual action perhaps relates to a third noteworthy feature that the essays share, a mainly positive view of the early modern centuries, which accords a relatively modest place to crisis, disorder, and fear. In this respect as well, of course, these essays contrast sharply with the main interpretive orientations of French historical writing in the mid-twentieth century, which tended to emphasize the period’s intense difficulties. That contrast may seem unsurprising, even tautological. Historians studying social elites inevitably will have less to say about hunger, mortality crises, anxiety, and superstition than historians (like Goubert, Le Roy Ladurie, and so many others from their era) who focus on peasants and workers. What for those groups was “the tragic seventeenth century” (in Goubert’s phrase) was for their social superiors an era of social and cultural flowering, pushed along by the court, urban expansion, and a widening market for culture. A figure like Tristan Lhermite, who (Chatelain shows) worked through his social preoccupations in published fiction and plays, could scarcely have existed

before 1600; it was only after that date that France acquired the public theaters and literary market on which he depended.

Yet the tones in which these studies depict the period cannot be attributed only to their authors' choice of topics, for not all the crises that historians have detected in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries spared the rich. On the contrary, for mid-twentieth-century historians like Roland Mousnier and Jean Meyer, the absolutist state's efforts to reconfigure the nobility generated wrenching social and psychological strains, some of which endured for the rest of the Old Regime.[11] Mousnier and other historians have likewise emphasized the cultural uncertainties of the era, as longstanding religious and intellectual guideposts were swept away in the chaos of the Reformation. Denis Crouzet for instance has recently described the sixteenth century as marked by "anguished fear of damnation, reinforced by belief in signs of the apocalypse" and terror of the Last Judgment; "a structure of anguish had entered the era's imaginary." [12] This was not a merely French mood (Crouzet titles one of his chapters "une Chrétienté panique"), and of course it spilled over into matters of political authority. To many, the later phases of the Wars of Religion raised the possibility that governmental and social authority might collapse altogether.[13]

That multi-layered anguish is mainly absent from the five essays. To be sure, Elie Haddad pursues Mousnier and Meyer's interest in the French nobility's early modern reconfiguration, but he offers an important reinterpretation of that process by noting the ways in which nobles themselves actively participated in it; it was not merely an assault by the modernizing state on a tradition-bound group. A similar stress on practical agency over religious panic may be seen in Hugues Daussy's essay on Protestant finances. Daussy emphasizes the long odds that the Protestants faced as they sought to field an army that could resist the king's, but he also emphasizes the sensible calculations that Protestants brought to this nearly-hopeless situation and implicitly minimizes the role of apocalyptic fears in shaping their decisions. On the contrary, he suggests, urban leaders were essentially pragmatists, who were as concerned with maintaining the health of their own communities as with securing the universal triumph of their movement. Of course Thierry Amalou's preachers were not pragmatists in that sense. They did all they could to prevent the crown from compromising with heresy, however beneficial compromise might have been for French society, and some did indeed believe that the Apocalypse was nigh. Yet (Amalou also shows) they expressed that religious absolutism in a language of self-confidence and self-assertion, rather than fear, and after the mid-sixteenth century they dispensed with Apocalyptic references. Instead, so runs one of Amalou's most striking arguments, after 1560 the preachers based their demands mainly on the status of the priesthood as holding ultimate authority over all of lay society.

The strongest versions of this optimistic view of the period come from Isabelle Luciani and Claire Chatelain, for they both argue that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the emergence of a new, essentially modern form of selfhood. Luciani speaks of "the historically specific processes through which individuals can affirm themselves as subjects and reclaim their dignity—namely, the dignity to speak about the self" (p. 530). However limited the genre, the *livres de raison* thus offered an apprenticeship in individuality, an apprenticeship undertaken by men and women alike. Chatelain uses similar terminology, describing Tristan Lhermite as someone who "contributed to the invention of modern subjectivity" (p. 550). Both Luciani and

Chatelain thus connect their microhistories to larger narratives of European progress; the processes they describe brought Europeans closer to our own ideals of personal dignity and self-awareness—ideals to which both Luciani and Chatelain attach clearly positive value markers.

The final theme to note here is the attention that the essays by Chatelain, Haddad, and Luciani accord to women as historical actors. Again, it's worth noting the novelty of the topic itself within the French historical tradition. The great mid-twentieth-century French historians either said little about women or discussed them only within the context of sexual relations: in statistics concerned with fertility and other aspects of family life or in racy narratives such as those in Le Roy Ladurie's *Montaillou*.^[14] In contrast, Luciani, Chatelain, and Haddad emphasize the social powers that early modern women exercised and say virtually nothing about sexual relations. For Luciani, women participated fully both in constructing the family's collective identity, the primary function that contemporaries assigned to the *livre de raison*, and in the individualizing currents of the age. Chatelain and Haddad go still farther. In both their case studies, women had firm control over family property, enjoying solid positions that their male relatives could only envy. For Chatelain, indeed, Tristan Lhermite's central preoccupation was the weight of women's power within the family, which effectively crowded out the power of the family's men and produced "the ruin of the male lineage" (p. 552). Haddad presents a comparable picture: the survival of the aristocratic family (he shows) depended on the transmission of both material and symbolic capital through female lines of descent, however much ideologues and jurists may have celebrated masculinity, and women could effectively use the law to protect their own interests. They could reclaim their dowries and other rights during their husbands' lifetimes, if these had been mismanaged, and they enjoyed large inheritance shares on their husbands' deaths.

Of course emphasis on women's agency does not mean minimizing the forces that worked against women in early modern society. Thus, Chatelain notes the personal vulnerability that women faced, whatever their control of property: having been placed in the alien environment of their husband's families, they could not count on protection against violence. Haddad offers a similar picture. Even in the eighteenth century, he shows, families could place inconvenient heiresses in convents, thus ensuring that female resources ultimately remained in men's control. Haddad's argument concerns women's importance in early modern social systems, not the extent of their chances for personal fulfillment.

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Early in this essay, I noted that since the 1970s French historians have repeatedly claimed to see crises in their discipline. It can be difficult for an American reader to take those alarms very seriously, given our own society's centuries-old suspicion of historical thinking and its more recent assaults on humanistic scholarship. The essays assembled here only deepen that skepticism. Whatever else they show, they make it clear that early modern studies are alive and well in France today. Young early modernists are addressing important problems, and they are bringing both imagination and scholarly rigor to their analyses. Most of us American early modernists would welcome such "crisis" conditions.

Yet if early modern studies in France remain as lively and innovative as ever, their place within the larger culture has changed since the 1970s, and to that extent it is appropriate to speak at least of challenges, if not of crises. By way of conclusion, then, it's worth asking what these five essays suggest about the historian's place within twenty-first-century culture.

For mid-twentieth-century early modernists, that place was both secure and central because they believed they offered lessons of direct relevance to contemporary life. Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre had enshrined that ideal of relevance in their 1929 manifesto introducing the *Annales*. The journal, they emphasized, would "aid men of action ... by offering them the means of better understanding their own times." [15] That was more than rhetoric; each published numerous articles on contemporary subjects, in the *Annales* and elsewhere. More modest versions of that faith survived among *Annales* historians in the decades after World War II, for it was widely assumed that Europe's pre-industrial experiences illuminated under-developed societies in the twentieth century—not only by historians, but by the French public as well. Early modernists such as Le Roy Ladurie appeared regularly on French television and contributed to mass circulation newspapers and magazines. As experts on pre-industrial family patterns, sexuality, agricultural development, psychology, and the like, they were widely believed to have knowledge of real-life usefulness in the twentieth century. [16]

Probably no early modernist today imagines our discipline returning to such cultural centrality. Even in France, the educated public has become more present-minded and less attentive to whatever insights early modernists might offer. Early modernists themselves have become more reticent about offering opinions. We understand better than our predecessors the immense variety of pre-industrial societies, in the past and the present, and we've left behind the great teleologies—Marxism, modernization theory, and others—that underlay mid-century early modern studies. Having lost those faiths, we no longer see as clearly as we once did where the specific topics we study fit within the forward movement of humanity as a whole.

François Hartog has recently offered an eloquent description of what all this has meant: "the modern concept of history was structurally futurist, since it was a way of designating the articulation of the categories of past and future... It was a concept of action, and implied expectations." Hartog uses the past tense in describing this "modern concept of history," because we in the twenty-first century no longer have such expectations about the future; as a result, we no longer find meaning in the past either. [17] From a more optimistic, less elegiac perspective, one might instead say that mid-century historical writing derived some of its cultural centrality from the illusions (some of them innocent, some not) that historians and public shared. Seen in those terms, our "crisis of history" merely reflects our improving knowledge of both past and present. However we describe them, though, these elements of today's "crisis of history" lie mainly beyond the historian's control. They ensure that no contemporary early modernist can fully share the confidence that our mid-century predecessors so readily expressed.

But there are other complications in the historian's relation to the contemporary world that derive from our own interpretive strategies, and in this respect these five essays seem to share a fundamentally similar position. All five implicitly emphasize the historians' distance from contemporary life and minimize the contemporary implications that might be drawn from early modernist research. If the educated public has become more present-minded than it was in the

mid-twentieth century, these essays suggest that early modernists have become more past-minded, more emphatic about the barriers that separate what we study from the societies we live in.

The essays' explorations of women's history offer one suggestive example. I've already noted that three of the essays argue for women's influence on early modern society and freedom of action within that society. Yet the authors make virtually no reference to feminist theory or gender studies or to women's history in other times and places. Instead, all three present their findings about women as purely empirical, a sub-system within the social mechanism, without implications for other times and places. Similarly, the two essays dealing with sixteenth-century religious conflict almost entirely avoid mentioning comparable struggles in other times and places, and no reader would suspect from them that (at least according to France's Prime Minister) we ourselves live in an age of religious war.[18] And when Luciani and Chatelain invoke "modern subjectivity" and "the self," they make no attempt to explore what that modern subjectivity might be or to reflect on the possible forms that selfhood might take. In short, the essays seem to insist on the insularity of the early modern period rather than to struggle against it or even to reflect on it. They seem voluntarily to have renounced the ambition that for François Hartog defines history itself, that of "holding together the three dimensions of past, present, and future." [19]

That of course is an altogether legitimate interpretive choice, which accords with some of the most basic principles of our profession. The historian's primary duty is to understand the past, and we've all been taught that historians who attend too closely to the present become mere ideologues. Yet we've also all been taught that historians never in fact evade the issues and influences of their times and that the empiricist dream is itself a dangerous illusion. The five essays here all explore issues of direct importance to us in the twenty-first century: religious conflict, individuality and selfhood, the place of gender relations in social systems, the functioning of ruling groups, and many others. Whether we acknowledge them or not, these issues loom over our specialized disciplinary practices. If we examine them more directly, we too can hope to provide our contemporaries with "the means of better understanding their own times."

Notes

[1] Gérard Noiriel, *Sur la "crise" de l'histoire* (Paris: Belin, 1996); and François Hartog, *Croire en l'histoire* (Paris: Flammarion, 2013) both summarize these discussions.

[2] Spatial metaphors and images of the historian as explorer were commonplace in twentieth-century French historical writing; the term territory comes from Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Le territoire de l'historien* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973-1978); more generally, see Jonathan Dewald, *Lost Worlds: The Emergence of French Social History, 1815-1970* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2006), 97-122.

[3] See, for instance, Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth About History* (New York: Norton, 1994), 79, 83-84.

[4] Pierre Goubert, *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis: contribution à l'histoire sociale de la France du 17e siècle* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1960); Emmanuel le Roy Ladurie, *Les paysans de Languedoc*, 2 vols. (Paris: SEVPEN, 1966); Jean Jacquart, *La crise rurale en Ile-de-France, 1550-1670* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1974); Abel Poitrineau, *La vie rurale en Basse-Auvergne au 18e siècle, 1726-1789* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965); Pierre Deyon, *Amiens, capitale provinciale: étude sur la société urbaine au 17e siècle* (Paris: Mouton, 1967); and Jean Nicolas, *La Savoie au XVIIIe siècle, noblesse et bourgeoisie* (Paris: Maloine, 1978).

[5] *Les paysans de Languedoc*, abr. edition (Paris: Flammarion, 1969), 10.

[6] Carlo Ginzburg, "Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It," trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi, *Critical Inquiry*, 20:1 (Autumn, 1993): 10-35; Ginzburg borrows his title from Jean-Luc Godard's 1967 movie about Paris, "Two or Three Things I Know About Her," thus emphasizing microhistory's intimate-but-complicated relationship to French historical culture.

[7] Her skepticism about the application of modern categories to early modern writings accords with those recently expressed by Christian Jouhaud, Dinah Ribard, and Nicolas Schapira, *Histoire, littérature, et témoignage: écrire les malheurs du temps* (Paris: Gallimard, 2009).

[8] Ginzburg, "Two or Three Things," 22.

[9] Pierre Goubert, "The French Peasantry of the Seventeenth Century: A Regional Example," in Trevor Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), 171.

[10] Ernest Labrousse, *La crise de l'économie française à la fin de l'ancien régime* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944); Goubert, *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis*; Le Roy Ladurie, *Les paysans de Languedoc*; Le Roy Ladurie, *Histoire du climat depuis l'an mil* (Paris: Flammarion, 1967); and Lucien Febvre, *Le problème de l'incroyance au 16e siècle. La religion de Rabelais*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1968).

[11] Roland Mousnier, *La plume, la faucille et le marteau: institutions et société en France, du Moyen Age à la Révolution* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970); and Jean Meyer, *La noblesse bretonne au XVIIIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris: SEVPEN, 1966).

[12] Mousnier, *Les XVIe et XVIIe siècles: les progrès de la civilisation européenne et le déclin de l'orient (1492-1715)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 207, 208.

[13] Denis Crouzet, *Dieu en ses royaumes: une histoire des Guerres de Religion* (Seysssel: Champ Vallon, 2008), 10, 43; Roland Mousnier, *L'assassinat d'Henri IV, 14 mai 1610* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964); and Hélène Merlin, *La langue est elle fasciste? Langue, pouvoir, enseignement* (Paris: Seuil, 2003).

[14] Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou, village occitan de 1294 à 1324* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).

[15] Bertrand Müller, ed., *Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre et les Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale, I: la naissance des Annales, 1928-1933* (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 43.

[16] In 1978, for instance, the Socialist Party leader and future President François Mitterand included Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie among the four individuals who would join him on the television show “Apostrophes,” September 15, 1978, accessed October 17, 2015, <http://www.ina.fr/video/CPB78051773>.

[17] Hartog, *Croire en l'histoire*, 30-31.

[18] In June 2015, Prime Minister Manuel Valls described France’s anti-terrorism efforts as “au fond une guerre de civilisation. C’est notre société, notre civilisation, nos valeurs que nous défendons.” « Le jour où Manuel Valls parla de « guerre de civilisation, » *Libération*, June 28, 2015, accessed October 17, 2015, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/06/28/le-jour-ou-manuel-valls-parla-de-guerre-de-civilisation_1338778.

[19] Hartog, *Croire en Histoire*, 294.

Jonathan Dewald
University at Buffalo, State University of New York
jdewald@buffalo.edu

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