This is a long book, long in the making, and long anticipated by
early modern historians as a magisterial capstone to the brilliant
career of the late Nancy Lyman Roelker. Roelker intended to base
this book on exhaustive archival research, but advancing years and
declining health curtailed those ambitions. As the reader moves
through the book, it becomes increasingly apparent that the author
has become reliant upon published, more readily accessible, and
more familiar sources like the Mémoires-Journaux of Pierre de
l'Estoile, the Histoire universelle of Jacques-Auguste de Thou,
the writings of Guillaume Du Vair, and the correspondence of
Etienne Pasquier. These men Roelker holds as the most
representative of the socio-juridical group--the judges of the
Parlement of Paris--whom she seeks to track across the tumultuous
terrain of the sixteenth century and whose mentalite she seeks to
understand and explain. L'Estoile, de Thou, Du Vair, Pasquier--
this is a familiar roll-call of the politiques about whom all
seiziémistes have long known seemingly all there is to know. But
if Roelker's treatment of these leading men (any many more) is more
extensive than novel, she nonetheless gives us a book that, as
Barbara Diefendorf stresses in her introduction, is a powerful work
of synthesis and one, I would add, of almost encyclopedic
dimensions.
Synthetic sweep, however, is not the book's only
virtue, for, as Diefendorf also rightly observes, this book is a
work of interpretation based on a lifetime of reflection about the
sixteenth century. The noisy voices of parlementary ultra
catholics and of Huguenot sympathizers have often crowded the pages
of books about the French Wars of Religion, but Roelker contends
that such attention has been disproportionate to their numbers and
even to their importance. She seeks to redress that distorting
imbalance by shifting the focus away from this vocal minority to
the silent majority of parlementaires who toed a consistently
"moderate" line. While one may counter that this majority was not
so silent, one must applaud Roelker's objective and her central
thesis. She seeks to determine the "elements of the mind-set of
the elite leadership of the gens de robe", and her central point
is that this mentalite was steeped in religion and legal
tradition, and thus, from the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438 well into
the seventeenth century, religious issues cannot be isolated from
the "constitutional complex".
The mainstream, steadfast loyalty of the
parlementaires to religious and legal tradition was wrapped up in
Gallicanism, but when such loyalty was mixed with the explosive
religious and constitutional issues of the sixteenth century, these
judges found themselves immersed in a confounding and troubling
paradox. Indeed, during the sixteenth century--especially its
second half--the Parlement saw two mounting threats to its
juridico-religious identity loom before it. One threat was the
reforming Roman church; the other, the French crown and royal
court. The Church of Rome challenged the autonomy of the French
church and, thus, the stance taken by the Parlement as the
Gallican church's leading champion. Indeed, Roelker emphasizes
that the Parlement's role as "standard-bearer of Gallicanism
dates from the Pragmatic Sanction... and it was never lowered" (p.
91). The "moderate-conservative mainstream" parlementaires were
in a bind because they felt compelled to denounce the Huguenot
heresy, and they stated publicly that the cause of heresy and its
consequence, the civil wars, was "the delinquency of the clergy".
With this position, however, they were confronted with defending an
institution that they came to believe was the root cause of the
fundamental disorder plaguing the century. Short of destroying the
very professional identity they had constructed for themselves for
over a century, how was the French church to be reformed but kept
out of the grasp of Rome, especially the post-tridentine version
which was especially intent upon bringing all catholics under the
tutelage of the Pope?
One alternative was to turn to the French crown.
Roelker recounts a "reprise of the song which parlementaires
never tired of singing"--the 10th clause of the court's
remonstrance against the royal orders issued in January and
February 1561 which modified the repressive Edict of Romorantin of
1560 and allowed a modest degree of religious toleration to the
huguenots: "...`to put an end to all seditions and troubles... may
it please the king to bring about a reformation of the ministers
[sic] of the church... because... the disorder and diminution of
the ecclesiastical estate has steadily increased'..." (p. 254). The
Parlement had supreme confidence in the "superiority and
uniqueness of French institutions for France" (p. 107), and so were
consistently opposed to ultramontanism, the threat and fear of
which runs like a red thread through this history of
parlementaire thought, and is capped by the triumphant definitive
rejection of the decrees of the Council of Trent in 1607, those
decrees which since the conclusion of that epochal council in 1563
demanded the supremacy of the Church of Rome over all catholics of
whatever kingdom (appropriately, the chronological end to Roelker's
book). However, inviting the crown to clean the Augean stable of
clerical corruption introduced a different threat to the
Parlement, for if the reforming Church of Rome posed a threat to
Parlement identity from one side, the crown and the royal court
did from the other.
According to Roelker, among the salient adjectives
describing mainstream parlementaire thought were, besides
"Gallican", "légiste", "royaliste", and "conservateur". All
of these adjectives, in one way or another, trumpeted the
importance of the law. Displaying a juridical mindset, these
"conservateur" judges were "oriented to past ideals", and the
constitutional tradition that they embraced linked the crown and
this royal court in a double relationship. Wedded to the notion
that "the joint product" of crown and Parlement is justice, the
judges viewed themselves simultaneously as partners to the king in
meting out justice, but also as his bridle restraining the
arbitrary exercise of authority. Forever committed to such a
balance of power, they were deeply troubled by the "new conditions"
of the sixteenth century which seemed to violate the "ancient
constitution"--the increasing power of the crown and the influence
of the court.
In Part I, "The Mainstream Parlementaire Mentalite",
Roelker notes two "revolutionary factors" which affected the
Parlement and its history in the sixteenth century--and her
history of it--: venality and the dramatic increase in the numbers
of judges (from 43 in the beginning of the century to over 200 at
its end). The court became unwieldy, and buffeted by the religious
and constitutional crises of the period, became increasingly
factionalized. She divides her analysis of these men
generationally. The "early generation" (in office from the
mid-1520s to the mid-1530s) faced the "initial challenge of the
reform movement". They were followed by what Roelker calls the
"transitional generation" which was in office from the early 1540s
to the mid-1550s. It was during this phase that venality
accelerated and the factional lines became increasingly drawn. Part
of the court shared the crown's drift toward repression, its more
vocal proponents staffing the Chambre ardente, that special court
for heresy cases created by Henri II in 1548. The other group, led
by Pierre I Seguier, was more "moderate" though increasingly open
in its opposition in the early 1550s to the advances of the
"ultras". This riven cohort was followed by the "crisis
generation" who staffed the court from the mid-1550s to the early
1580s. During this time divisions in the court crystallized into
open factions as judges sided with rival noble houses which squared
off in civil war. Finally, the "later generations" take center
stage during the period of the League and the decade of Henri IV's
consolidation of power, the mid-1580s to 1605. During this time we
see factionalism at its most extreme, and then the unifying of the
Parlement under the moderate, mainstream banner, personified by
Achille de Harlay. This first President of the Parlement from
1583-1611 stands like a colossus, silent but imposing, the
"climactic and most authentic spokesman of the parlementaire
mainstream in the entire period of this study" (pp. 39-40).
Given the drift toward faction and increasing
polarization around religious ideas, it is hardly surprising that
about half of the book deals with the Parlement and the Wars of
Religion. Though Roelker employs the terminology of "civil war"
(two chapters on "The Road to Civil War", followed by one entitled
"The Crisis Generation in Civil War"), her book is fully in step
with current historiography which has quite convincingly "Put
Religion Back into the Wars of Religion" (see Mack Holt's review
article of that title in French Historical Studies 18:2 [Fall,
1993], 524-51). Indeed, Roelker's key to unlocking access to the
mentalite of the parlementaires is understanding their
religious views, for these framed their constitutional identity.
Gallicanism, in a word, and Roelker never lets us forget that "the
Gallican issue was stronger than any other consideration in
Parlementaire thought" (p. 302). Thus, in Part II, "Religion in
the Parlementaire Mentalite", Roelker argues that the
parlementaires, always dedicated to constitutional equilibrium
between crown and Parlement, blamed the Queen Mother Catherine de
Medici for letting it swing out of balance in the early 1560s.
Dedicated to their credo "one king, one faith", they found
Catherine's policy of limited toleration as sanctioning two
religions, and so opposed it. Roelker calls these men "moderates",
and in the context of religious politics of the early years of the
Wars of Religion, they were, for they were flanked by the
increasingly ascendent ultra Catholics who were dominated by the
Guise clan (there were no parlementaire spokesmen corresponding
to the Huguenot nobles).
Of course, centering parlementaire thought
squarely upon Gallicanism is not new, but what Roelker does better
than anyone is show in extensive detail how the tumultuous
conditions of this century challenged the judges' commitment to
Gallicanism and forced them to confront seeming paradoxes in their
most cherished assumptions and constitutional beliefs. Guided by
the slogan "one king, one faith", the Parlement nonetheless
tacked this way and that as the stormy historical winds of heresy,
civil war, and counter-reformation blew the court in directions
which exposed the paradox of its fundamental constitutional
foundations. At issue was the relationship between civil peace
(traditionally guaranteed by the joint administration of justice by
crown and court) and religion. Clearly the parlementaires were
committed to an indissoluble bond here, and one, if anything, that
was becoming even tighter during this century as judges everywhere
increasingly sacralized justice (a reflection of what John Bossy so
felicitously called the "migration of the holy" (John Bossy,
Christianity in the West, 1400-1700 [Oxford, 1985]). But what if
this dedication to "one king, one faith", instead of securing civil
peace and order, in fact fanned the flames of its opposite? What
then? Could civil peace and religion be separated, as the Queen
Mother seemed to think? But how could the Parlement embrace such
a solution when it meant abandoning half of its credo, "one faith",
and cut the heart out of Gallicanism and the very historical
identity of the court and its members?
After the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572,
the storm of heresy subsided, but the rise of the League in the
1580s posed the continuing problem for royalist, moderate catholic
parlementaires: how to "separate the one true church from the
grasp of the League and heal the breach between it and the crown"
(p. 352)? As the royalist cause hit bottom in the summer of 1588
when Henri III did the bidding of the League by signing the Edict
of Union which barred Henri of Navarre from the succession, the
grasp of the League was indeed a tight one. The League loudly
proclaimed that religion was "the only cement of the state and that
the defense of religious uniformity must have top priority". The
problem with the League for the Parlement was not so much an open
challenge to "one king, one faith", but rather, first, to the
cherished independence of the French church from Rome (the League's
ultramontanism was intolerable), and second, to the Parlement's
constitutional vision of equilibrium between crown and Parlement.
The seizure and execution of first President Barnabe Brisson in
1591 demonstrated to all that the court's independence--and its
members--were dangerously in jeopardy.
So long as Henri of Navarre still laid claim to the
throne by rightful succession but remained a Huguenot, a wedge
continued to be driven between the two elements of the mainstream
parlementaire's credo of "one king, one faith". So, it would
seem that once Henri abjured and rejoined the Catholic faith, the
wedge would be removed and the dilemma facing the parlementaires
would dissolve. But in fact, with the controversy over papal
absolution of Henri's former apostasy, "papal encroachment" on the
autonomy of the Gallican church again was perceived and resisted.
The battle lines between ultramontanism and Gallicanism were drawn
over the reception of the Tridentine decrees for France, for one of
the pope's stipulations for absolution of the king was the
acceptance of the decrees into France (owing largely to
Parlementaire resistance, they never were). And lines hardened
with the assassination of Henri IV in 1610. Thereafter "everything
with a Roman stamp became anathema to the French" (p. 456).
Roelker may exaggerate when she asserts that this
final ultramontane assault prompted the leading "spokesmen of our
last generation virtually [to] reinvent both gallicanism and
traditional constitutionalism in their concern to defend and
preserve them" (p. 415). But she is directly on the mark when she
notes that the 17th-century parlementaire embraced and refined
the model of the "perfect magistrate" who obeyed a "codified ideal
produced by legists concerned... to place it on a pedestal as the
model for a reformed society" (p. 464). She looks to "the threat
of national annihilation in the 1590s [as] the fire that fused" (p.
482) this vision, but whatever brought them together, make no
mistake, law and religion undergirded the vision of these neo-stoic
magistrates of the Grand Siècle, perhaps even more clearly than
they had their forebears. Only in the union of law and religion
could civil peace be secured. Roelker thus shares the view held by
several contemporary historians (Bossy, Denis Richet, William
Bouwsma, Ralph Giesey, and this reviewer) that it was the nobility
of the robe and not the sword which framed the most important
issues of state-building of the next century and a half, and that
the basic constitutional trajectories were those hammered out in
the crucible of disorder and paradox which religious difference
injected into the lives of 16th century people.
James R. Farr
Purdue University
jrfarr@purdue.edu
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