In a recent on-line review of an economic history text edited by T.
G. Rawski, historian Michael Dintenfass of the University of
Wisconsin remarks that the book "invites historians to discuss
matters that no longer interest them deeply."(1) In his volume on
pre-Revolutionary French agriculture Philip Hoffman also seeks to
write an economic history which will make concepts and findings
influenced by the cliometric revolution accessible to
historians.(2) I fear that despite his meticulous and imaginative
research, Hoffman will meet the same fate as the authors of
Rawski's volume and find that he is talking past his audience. Yet
historians of early modern and revolutionary France, even those of
a post-modern bent, will have to take into consideration his
conclusions about the agricultural economy if they want to
understand the behavior of most French men and women of the pre-
industrial era.
Hoffman's goal is to teach historians of early
modern France that cliometrics has something to offer them and that
they can understand its lessons even if not conversant with
economic theory and econometric methods. Specifically he wants to
revise the "consensus" view that the French agricultural economy
was stagnant for more than 350 years before the Revolution because
small farms were inefficient and the village community was hostile
to innovation. After outlining this position in the first chapter,
the rest of the book argues that the consensus is wrong on all
particulars: early modern agriculture was not stagnant, at least
not in all times and places; small farms were no less efficient
than large ones; members of the village community were not bound by
unyielding tradition but sought their individual interests, which
sometimes might be served by traditional arrangements, sometimes by
innovation.
Chapter 2 ("Common Rights and the Village Community") begins
with a dispute, revealed in legal documents, from a village near
Nantes on the Loire in which the local farmers seem to be defending
their traditional rights to pasture on the common against a local
lord who wants to enclose it. But Hoffman springs a surprise on
us: the poor farmers insisting on their common rights were
pasturing, not their family cows, but sheep, which they leased from
merchants in return for a share of the profits. In this way the
poor used traditional rights to break into "nascent rural
capitalism" (p. 23). The story is complicated, but by no means is
it one in which the poor cooperated to uphold tradition in face of
a modernizing capitalist elite. Instead, strife was more common
among the villagers than cooperation, and they were equally likely
as the rich to be involved in the market.
In chapter 3 ("Labor Markets, Rental Markets, and
Credit in the Local Economy"), Hoffman disputes the claim that
markets were risky, maintaining that they reduced rather than
increased the variation of peasants' income. Most peasants were
involved in one market or another, whether labor, rental, or
credit. Here he finds another assumption to disprove: that higher
rent on smaller parcels of land resulted from either the power of
large tenants or the land hunger of the poor. Rather he finds that
the difference resulted from the landlords' collection of a risk
premium from the poorer tenants of smaller parcels because they
would be more likely to default on their payments.
With chapters 4 ("Agricultural Productivity in
France, 1450-1789") and 5 ("Explaining Productivity in a
Traditional Economy") Hoffman comes to the center of his concerns.
What was the output of farms and how did it change? What were the
reasons for the changes which occurred? At first glance, it would
seem that answering these questions would have to begin with
measurements of the total output of French agriculture at several
points in time. But that is probably impossible since no one was
collecting national data until the eighteenth century, and, even if
contemporaries had collected such data, the researcher would face
problems such as changes in national borders. So Hoffman adopts
another strategy: comparison of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) at
different times and places. TFP measures how efficiently producers
turn their inputs--in agriculture typically land, labor, and
capital--into output--wheat, wool, and so on. When TFP rises it
means that the same inputs yield a greater output. The advantage
of using this measure is that TFPs can be compared even if areas
are very different because what is being measured is the output per
unit of input. Nevertheless, direct measurement of the factors
runs into almost as many problems as does measurement of total
output, so Hoffman adopts a technique used by Robert Allen ("The
Efficiency and Distributional Consequences," Economic Journal,
vol. 92, 1982) to circumvent these problems. Instead of trying to
measure how much wheat was produced or how many hours of labor were
needed in its production, he measures prices, wages, and especially
rents. Given certain assumptions about the agricultural economy,
mostly that it participated in a competitive market, Hoffman can
derive its TFP. I would accept Hoffman's assumptions, which recent
studies of Italian, English, French and United States farming tend
to reinforce.
The conclusions are that despite considerable
regional and temporal variation, agricultural efficiency grew
considerably in the Parisian Basin from the sixteenth to the late
eighteenth centuries. There was also growth after 1750 in the
Albigeois and Beaujolais and in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries in Normandy. Elsewhere, at least in the twenty
communities which form Hoffman's sample, the consensus view of a
stagnant agriculture is borne out.
What caused stagnation in some times and places and
growth in others? "Peasant mentalities" and communities were not
responsible for stagnation. Nor were obstacles to combining small
farms into larger ones (e.g., by enclosure), since small size was
not in itself a cause of inefficiency and small plots could be
combined to produce larger ones if farmers wanted. Recurrent wars
and taxes, which caused uncertainty, were more to blame. So
conversely, peace encouraged growth, as did demand from large
cities and reduction of transport costs. Only Paris was really
large enough to have a stimulating effect, and productivity in the
Parisian Basin rose steadily at levels comparable with those of
England. If the rest of France remained behind, one might
conclude, as does Vernon Ruttan for a later period, that the fault
was not in the farm sector, but in the slow growth of the urban
economy ("Structural Retardation," Journal of Economic History,
vol. 38, 1978).
Hoffman is a member of an increasingly rare breed,
the historian doing economic history. As a historian, he has read
manuscript sources in archives scattered throughout France, with
special attention to leases for farms owned by the Cathedral of
Notre Dame in Paris. Account books and court cases provide not
just statistics, but enable the construction of narratives, which
can be equally valuable as sources of human behavior. Hoffman is
attentive to specific conditions and thus is careful to reveal the
different patterns of growth over time and place, even if it means
that at the end we receive a set of nuances, not a dramatic bang.
At the same time, Hoffman is also an economist. His
undergraduate degree in mathematics and advanced training in
economics allow him to manipulate econometrics and economic theory
with assurance. This is important because the computation of TFP
and determination of the causes of its rise or fall are not
straightforward. Hoffman can do the necessary calculations because
he knows that seemingly irrelevant information may be vital and is
able to turn that information into data for his analysis.
Growth in a Traditional Society is thus a truly
interdisciplinary book and should be read by economists who want to
understand how growth can occur in a pre-industrial economy and by
historians who wish to put behind them the stereotypes of pre-
Revolutionary French society.
(1) Michael Dintenfass on eh.teach@cs.muohio.edu, 30 September
1996, reviewing Thomas G. Rawski, ed., Economics and the
Historian. (1996).
(2) Other French and American historians working in the same vein
include Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jean-Marc Moriceau, Jean-Laurent
Rosenthal, and George Grantham.
Jonathan J. Liebowitz
University of Massachusetts Lowell
liebowitj@woods.uml.edu
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