Samuel Goodfellow:
The story of the Green Shirts is nothing if not the story of a
failure, and Dorgeres' failure is an instructive one. It offers
insights into the general weaknesses of French fascism, despite the
number of movements and adherents. Dorgeres' failure to come to
power hardly distinguishes it from most fascist groups, especially in
France, which did not cut the mustard; the miracle seems to be that
Mussolini and Hitler succeeded. Here, Paxton's call for
greater contextualization is a good one, although I would have
liked to see a bit more of an examination of the Green Shirts set in
the context of the overall national failure of French fascism.
The failure of rural fascism, specifically of
Dorgeres, is not simply a consequence of the robustness of rural
institutions or even the fact that the government and the political
parties tried to do what they could for the small farmer (although
these factors are important). The failure here is the lack of a
credible link, such as occurred in Germany and Italy, between rural
and urban discontent. The early success of Nazism in rural areas,
for example, stemmed from the ability of the Nazis to present
themselves credibly as a mass party in the towns and regions
around issues which bridged social differences such as the universal
hatred of the Treaty of Versailles and economic conditions during
the depression, and not solely from the Nazi's appeal to separate
interest groups. In response to Paxton's comments about specific
comparisons with Germany, generalizations are difficult because of
the tremendous regional variation, which reflect cultural,
religious, economic, and political differences. The role of
agricultural elites in Schleswig-Holstein, for example, bore little
resemblance to their role in Prussia. What Nazism did was build on
the regional sensibilities through grass-roots activity to fill a need
for a mass party which connected Germans to the nation.
Such glue was lacking in Dorgeres' case, as it was
for the entire French fascist movement. Not for lack of trying--
the Faisceau, the Jeunesses patriotes, the Solidarite
francaise, the Francistes, the Parti populaire francais, and the
Parti social francais (PSF) were among the most notable of
the fascist groups which sought to redraw politics through the
creation of a mass, nationally based fascist party. Only the PSF
succeeded, and its success was obscured by the creation of the
Vichy government. All of the groups were too beholden to their
core social constituencies and, for lack of a compellingly unifying
theme, were unable to rise above their petty differences. They
could not even agree who had the rights to the fascist salute. The
inability to find common cause in turn enabled the persistence of the
existing institutions--the departmental chambres d'agriculture, the
rural notables, and even the Church--to remain authorities, despite
the putative decadence that all institutions seemed to exhibit in the
interwar period.
The fascist movements do not conform to a single
template. There is no holy grail out there which will define
fascism, largely because the movement itself does not have a root
text, draws from too many sources, and has difficulty transcending
the local and national for the universal. At best we can use
fascism as a flexible heuristic rapier, rather than a dogmatic
bludgeon, with which to attack aspects of the past. The idea of a
continuum, or as Paxton calls it, a set of stages, addresses both the
issue of diversity and commonality. In any event, it is an
advance over the idea of a generic fascism, a fascist minimum, or a
universal fascism.
Steven Zdatny :
Professor Paxton wishes that this forum had included an Italian and
German historian, to give it a variety of perspectives. He is
correct, of course, that the four of us work in closely related
fields and that his book and our comments take up only a few of the
questions raised by the Dorgeres movement.
Let me therefore suggest another perspective which
would place Dorgeres in the historiography, not of fascism, but of
rural protest. It is hard, in the marketplace harangues of the
Green shirts, not to hear the echoes of jacqueries, ancient and
modern. Paxton tells us, after all, that Dorgeres found his
entree into peasant politics in the issues of taxes and social
payments--just like Pierre Poujade, who burst onto the French
political scene in 1953, leading a violent anti-tax action in his
hometown of Saint-Cere. "Vive le roi sans taille" had been the
slogan which captured the naive program of seventeenth-century
peasant rebellions, all directed, as Robin Briggs notes, "against the
rising burden of royal taxation"(Briggs, Early Modern France,
1560-1715 [Oxford, 1977], p. 117). It would have been
interesting to have the comments of Briggs, or P. M. Jones or Yves-
Marie Berce on the Dorgerists.
The seemingly timeless struggle of peasants against
more powerful interests also poses a general question: what sorts of
politics are available to those who find themselves on the wrong side
of dominant historical forces? This was an especially sharp problem
for small producers in the twentieth century--artisans and
boutiquiers, alongside peasants--whose interests often ran
directly opposed to those, not only of les gros, but also of
workers, consumers, urbanites. Paxton notes, for example, that
Dorgeres was a "fervent corporatist" (p. 127). Corporatism, simply
put, was an attempt to find some way around the Darwinian logic of
market capitalism without surrendering to the logic of socialism. It
became, in one form or another, one of the most popular economic
nostrums of the first half of this century and a basic economic
principle of most fascisms. Indeed, for many of those who were
neither thugs nor anti-communist fanatics, corporatist ideas paved
the road to fascism. Corporatist intellectuals could come by way of
grand theory; petits proprietaires by way of "economic
despair".(I borrow the phrase from Robert Gellately, The Politics of
Economic Despair: Shopkeepers and German Politics, 1890-1914
[London, 1974]).
As liberal, democratic, capitalist societies seized up
in the 1930s, corporatist programs multiplied and became more
popular than ever. Invariably they proclaimed their political
neutrality and held out the promise of an economic system without
class struggle. Not all Corporatisms, it must be said, were
conservative in inspiration. The Belgian socialist Henri de Man
sought to make corporatism the basis of a more equitable society.
In France, the National Economic Council, a broadly corporatist
institution, was largely the work of the French left.
In general, however, and Dorgerisme is a good
example of this, corporatism's conceptual flaws usually pulled it
towards authoritarianism in practice. Politics without class
struggle in a society with classes? A relatively free economic
system where weaker interests prevail? Rubbish! Neither of these
promises, which were the essence of corporatism's appeal, were
compatible with the maintenance of open, democratic politics. Thus
any attempt to build corporatism inevitably involved lies and
repression, as Vichy's National Revolution proved. In the Dorgeres
movement, the history of jacqueries joined the history of fascism
in the defense of a lost cause.
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