H-France Review Vol. 1 (April 2001), No. 9
Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, Eds., The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Cambridge,
New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press and The German Historical
Institute, 1998. ix + 674 pp. Bibliography and index. ISBN 0-521-62132-1
Review by Joel Blatt, University of Connecticut, Stamford Campus.
Years ago in a Holocaust course I co-taught, I had portrayed the Versailles
Treaty as neither harsh nor conciliatory. Lucjan Dobroszycski, a survivor
of Auschwitz, a great historian of Jewish history, thought the Treaty
dealt harshly with Germany. I indicated the conflict between our interpretations.
With a characteristic twinkle in his eyes he asked, "Might we agree that
Germans perceived the Versailles Treaty to be harsh, and perceptions play
crucial roles in history."
Realities, perceptions, and myths are all analyzed in The Treaty of
Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. These twenty-six stimulating,
often provocative, and always informative essays are essential reading
for anyone interested in history of the twentieth century. There is surprising
agreement, but disagreements endure over reparations, the severity of
the treaty, and its impact.
I have been shaped by the same contemporary history and historiography
that have shaped the minds of the contributors. My students have also
influenced me as some of them, products of what I imagine are typical
American primary and high schools, bring a stark simplification of the
interwar years: The Versailles Treaty was unbearably harsh, particularly
reparations, destroyed the German economy causing inflation and depression,
brought Hitler to power, and caused World War II. They espouse monocausal
history and cast France as the major villain. These essays help explain
why more than eighty years after its creation the Versailles Treaty remains
one of the most misunderstood events of the twentieth century.
This book has already received a highly stimulating roundtable discussion
and commentary on H-Diplo (x-posted on H-France). The roundtable emphasized
that most of the contributors to this volume are senior scholars committed
to traditional scholarship rather than post-modernism. Ultimately, the
question that ought to be asked of any scholarship is what it contributes
to our understanding. In this regard, the essays in The Treaty of Versailles
expand our knowledge through "traditional" routes but also explore fruitfully
several dimensions that are distinctly contemporary either in methodology
or in being influenced by recent events. The main themes of the book as
well as individual essays will receive more detailed consideration in
this review, but I want to highlight some points at the start.
Two correctives in the area of fact alter widespread misconceptions and
will surprise many if not all readers. First, William Keylor asserts that
Article 231, the so-called "war guilt clause," was not authored by the
French but by two Americans, Norman Davis and John Foster Dulles, and
(in coordination with Article 232) was designed to foster a practical
reparations settlement (pp. 500, 504). Second, Sally Marks regards the
reparations controversy as a battle over the postwar balance of power
that Germany won. She declares the total figure of German reparations
over many years as approximately 21.5 milliard gold marks (p.367--a milliard
is the American billion; with approximately four gold marks to the dollar,
her figure is somewhat more than $5 billion). As a reparations non-specialist,
it appears to me that Sally Marks has largely won her thirty year war
over reparations (She was not alone as scholars such as Marc Trachtenberg,
Stephen Schuker, and others joined her on the same historiographical playing
field). A significant caveat though: Marks and Gerald Feldman, who do
not agree on much concerning reparations, are in accord that the reparations
conundrum was a huge, costly mess that might have been avoided. More on
reparations later.
Regarding ways in which this book reflects the modern, first, a number
of contributors analyze how unrealistic German, American, and British
expectations before the Paris Peace Conference were transformed into bitter
condemnations of the Versailles Treaty. A major thread of this publication
concerns perceptions and even national identity, which carries it close
to what is loosely called "cultural history." Second, this book bears
the contemporary imprint of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of
the Cold War and collapse of Soviet and European Communism diminish sensitivity
to the significance of the Communist Revolution in post-World War I international
relations. At the same time they sensitize a number of authors to the
linkages of 1919 and 1989 and later.
What picture of the Versailles Treaty emerges from this book? The war
ended abruptly in November 1918 leaving everyone unprepared for peacemaking
as they had been unprepared for a long war. Then the major victors, the
United States, Great Britain, and France, scuffled with each other to
shape the peacemaking agenda while German leaders labored under the illusion
that they would be treated as equals.
German perceptions and mis-perceptions help explain the extreme German
hatred of the Treaty. The war ended with Germany's retreating armies still
fighting on enemy territory, not in Germany. The German victors of 1871
paraded on the Champs Elysées while the defeated Germans after World War
I paraded through Berlin, presented as "undefeated" (Marks, pp. 348-349).
The German government denied war guilt, fearing frankness might undermine
appeals to the 14 Points; thus, the new German Republic took on the baggage
of its predecessors (Klaus Schwabe and Alan Sharp). Germany anticipated
a negotiated "peace of justice" recognizing their country as a great power.
Ulrich Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Foreign Office head, sought at
Paris to maintain Germany's dignity and status, wanted immediate German
entry into the League of Nations, emphasized Germany's potential in combating
Bolshevism and restoring European and international economies, advocated
Anschluss of Germany and Austria based on self determination, and considered
widespread plebiscites in contested territories. Citing a phrase from
Ernst Troeltsch, a number of contributors characterize Germany from the
cessation of fighting until the Treaty signing on June 28, 1919 as "the
dreamland of the Armistice period" (Schwabe, p. 42).
When more severe terms than anticipated punctured their dreams, Germans
as diverse as Walter Rathenau, Thomas Mann, and Max Weber responded with
bitterness and apocalyptic warnings (Fritz Klein). The emotional German
outburst exceeded the bounds of reason (Wolfgang Mommsen). During the
"dreamland" hiatus, Germany may have experienced "post-traumatic stress-symptoms"
(Antony Lentin quoting Hans-Joachim Koch, p. 238).
Practical recognition of defeat eventually produced a German counteroffer
of a 100 billion mark (approximately $25 billion) long-term indemnity
in return for allied concessions. When the allies refused negotiation,
Brockdorff-Rantzau resigned and set about destroying the treaty's "legal"
and "moral" authority. After debate, the German government signed the
Treaty, heeding Matthias Erzberger's warning that rejection could endanger
national cohesion (Schwabe and Mommsen).
The chasm between German self-perceptions and expectations and a treaty
that although far from a "monstrosity" was not conciliatory either helped
lay the bases for malevolent politics on a scale rarely seen in history.
So, too, did long-sustained propaganda by the German government designed
to cover up German initiatives in 1914 and to combat the Versailles Treaty.[1]
The propaganda campaign reinforced flight from a realistic public assessment
of Germany's own responsibilities for its traumas. To resonate abroad,
such propaganda needed fertile ground already sowed. This book elaborates
a pattern in which disillusioned Wilsonians helped delegitimize the Versailles
Treaty. American (and British) experts journeyed to Paris with "millennial
hopes" and a sense of moral superiority (Charles Widenor, pp. 550, 561).
Young wartime officials may have brought guilty consciences to Paris and
left doubly disenchanted. Versailles Treaty revisionists should be placed
within a widespread postwar rebellion against traditional authorities
(Gordon Martel). In this instance, history was not "written by the winners"
(Martel, 616). Similar to the German story, the gap between pre-conference
anticipations and a compromise peace among the victors led American and
British revisionists to discredit the Treaty. Americans ultimately focused
their ire on the French.
The images of Woodrow Wilson as disinterested and of David Lloyd George
as moderate at Paris need modification. The United States and Great Britain
seized at once their primary security objective, which was control of
the seas. Wilson's "freedom of the seas" meant American naval security
and trade. The British delegation contributed some of the hardest demands
against Germany. Moreover, both countries followed powerful self interest
in restoring the German economy.
Perhaps the book's dominant theme is that the Versailles Treaty was produced
through difficult compromises among the victors. The primary reason why
the Allies chose not to negotiate directly with Germany was fear that
tenuous compromises would not withstand German pressure. The war was fought
by a coalition, and the peace was made by patching together compromises
(Stephen Schuker, p. 276). There is partial truth in Lloyd George's observation
that "the Treaty was the minimum France would accept" (Michael Fry, p.
593), but the Treaty also represented British and American minimums too.
Not only did the peace fall somewhere between Wilsonianism and realpolitik,
but idealism and practicality also coexisted within the American President.
Wilson's direction of the Armistice process, his strengthening of American
naval security, and his attention to economic interests and trade all
attest to an under-appreciated pragmatism (Lawrence Gelfand, p. 198).
As one example, the United States discontinued wartime interallied economic
cooperation and controls in favor of the "Open Door" and liberal economy
(Elisabeth Glaser). Moreover, after Germany's imposition on Bolshevik
Russia of the draconian Brest-Litovsk Treaty (March 1918), Wilson linked
the German people to their government and sought a peace of victory and
punishment (Manfred Boemeke).
Nonetheless, as is well known, at times Wilson was insufficiently pragmatic.
He made the League of Nations his highest priority, compromising on other
issues. Yet Wilson did not guide the Versailles Treaty successfully through
the Senate because he failed to cultivate his political supporters and
opponents. He also clashed dramatically with Republicans over collective
security and the "universalism" of the League of Nations (Gelfand). His
advice to Democrats to vote against the proposed compromise of appending
"reservations" to the League Covenant doomed American ratification of
the Versailles Treaty as a whole. A momentous corollary: the President
did not press the Senate to approve the Treaty of Guarantee with France
that had Republican support (Gelfand, Lentin).
On the other hand, the consummate politician among the Big Three, David
Lloyd George, achieved naval security, expanded the British Empire, cut
a large slice of the reparations pie, and then became a "fixer" at the
conference. Erik Goldstein correlates the Prime Minister's policies at
Paris with his strength at home. According to Goldstein, at Paris "the
Welsh wizard" blocked French "hegemonic aspirations" and softened reparations.
Other authors demur. German sabotage in France as the war was ending justified
reparations. Moreover, Lloyd George inserted pensions and allowances into
reparations in order to benefit British taxpayers (Lentin). The British,
not the French, proffered the high reparations sums bandied about at Paris
(Marks). The British leader returned to his country's traditional policy
of balancing France and Germany (Keylor). Lloyd George and Wilson hoped
to reintegrate a more reasonable Germany reconciled to its reduced status
(Fry citing Sharp, p. 597). It was the British Prime Minister who resolved
the Rhineland conundrum by offering the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee
to France, but Lloyd George subsequently abandoned his commitment after
the United States rejected the Versailles Treaty.
The Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee, I would argue, was the central
compromise of the Versailles Treaty. The failures of Wilson and Lloyd
George and their countries to honor their promises to France created one
of the largest vulnerabilities of the Versailles system. That Wilson and
Lloyd George walked away from such an essential component of the Versailles
Treaty structure was as remarkable as it was shameful. It also reflected
the decline in French power. Frequently from 1918-1940, the Americans
and British wanted European stability but were unwilling to pay the price
for it.
Georges Clemenceau fares relatively well in this volume. Straightforward,
his priority was French security, and he distrusted Germany. He recognized
the terrible human losses and material destruction that his country had
suffered, all magnified by German superiority in population, economy,
and power (Schuker). French Rhineland policies in 1919 contained an element
of expansionism (David Stevenson and Georges-Henri Soutou), but when faced
with vetoes by his foremost allies, Clemenceau settled for the security
guarantee as a compromise. Ultimately, the Premier trusted France's allies
too much (Soutou) and failed, after making the "disagreeable trade-offs,"
"to educate" his people (Schuker, p. 306). Clemenceau obtained the best
deal possible under the circumstances ( Soutou and Schuker).
The more positive interpretation of France's role carries over into more
favorable assessments of the Versailles Treaty itself, what I call post-revisionism.
The Editors of this volume write, "Whatever its shortcomings, the treaty
led to an era of temporary stability between 1924 and 1931(p. 3). In contrast,
some contributors cite Jacques Bainville's reading of the Treaty as "trop
douce pour ce qu' il y a de dur" ("too gentle for what is in it that is
harsh") (Stevenson, p. 108). Still, might the Versailles system have provided
sufficient strength and flexibility if the Great Depression had not carried
away its vulnerable foundations?
The most contested subject in this volume remains reparations. In an
essay encapsulating post-revisionism, her third on the subject over thirty
years and her most comprehensive, Sally Marks characterizes reparations
as the "primary battlefield" of the postwar "continuation of war by other
means" (pp. 338, 370; her first two forays into reparations are in Central
European History, 1969 and 1978). Northeastern France had been destroyed,
Germany had taken French factories and cattle into Germany, and retreating
German Armies had flooded French coal mines. If France confronted domestic
war debts, interallied debts, and reconstruction while Germany only faced
the former, Germany would "reverse" its defeat. Reparations was a tug-of-war
over the postwar balance of power. "For political reasons," the London
Schedule of Payments of 1921 established an ostensible 132 billion gold
marks figure for reparations but then deposited all but 50 billion gold
marks in "never-never land" (p. 346). "Comparative moderation" was hidden
"in apparent rigor" (p. 367). From 1919 until 1932, Germany only paid
approximately 21.5 milliard marks (somewhat more than 5 billion dollars)
(p. 367). Marks states, "A substantial degree of scholarly consensus now
suggests that paying what was actually asked of it was within Germany's
financial capacity" (p. 357). What would have happened if Germany had
raised taxes to allied levels and launched a "liberation loan" similar
to France from 1871-1873 (pp. 347, 357)? Marks criticizes the Allies,
too. They should have opened negotiations in 1919 in response to the German
counteroffer of 100 billion gold marks. The Allies suffered from "psychological
blindness" towards German feelings of "humiliation" (p. 358). Marks concludes,
"It is always unwise to impose heavy burdens on a major power unless it
has been brought to acceptance by full awareness of military defeat and
unless the instruments to compel obedience are at hand" (p. 369).
Niall Ferguson and Gerald Feldman disagree with Marks but agree that
German leaders played domestic politics with reparations. Ferguson concludes
that in 1921 reparations placed an "intolerable strain on the state's
finances." Therefore, reparations were "'ultimately responsible for the
inflation' (Barry Eichengreen's phrase), meaning that no Weimar government
could have raised taxes or cut spending sufficiently to pay reparations
and balance the budget" ( Ferguson, p.425). Ferguson, though, only estimates
a "total value of unrequited transfers from Germany to the Allies" of
approximately 19 billion gold marks from 1919-1932 (p. 424). And Ferguson
shows German governments utilizing budget deficits and currency depreciation
to avoid paying reparations and, a decade later during the Great Depression,
turning to deflation in order to end reparations, achieving "diplomatic
success" at the price of domestic political catastrophe (pp. 438-439).
Gerald Feldman castigates the Versailles Treaty as a "horrendous failure."
He appears to agree with what he regards as the prevailing view that the
Treaty was too hard given the means of enforcement and too soft to block
"a second German grasp for world power" (p. 441). Feldman disputes Marks'
linkage of reparations to the balance of power and denies any "scholarly
consensus" that Germany could have paid the reparations. Feldman believes
that the appropriate time for German stabilization would have been November
1922 while Ferguson cites 1920. Feldman concludes that reparations "undermined
German democracy and were instrumentalized to romote inflation in the
beginning of the Republic and deflation at its end" (p. 447).
Reassertions by Ferguson and Feldman of the decisive role of reparations
in disrupting the German economy, focusing on a specific moment in 1921,
appear to be a rear-guard historiographical action. Marks' and Ferguson's
figures are strikingly modest. They are comparable to those regarded in
1919-1920 as feasible by one of the Treaty's harshest critics, John Maynard
Keynes. To assert that German attempts to avoid reparations contributed
to inflation and depression is very different than to claim that reparations
themselves caused these economic catastrophes. To be sure, reparations
did not help the German economy, but they did not destroy it either. The
figures, a far cry from 132 billion gold marks or 100 billion or 50 billion,
do not bear the weight placed on them.
Several authors reinforce Marks' critique. Diane Kunz observes, "The
German government's decision not only to sabotage the Versailles Treaty
but to manipulate its economy for short-term political gain triggered
the financial chaos of this period" (p. 528).
Provoked by the tenacity of myth, William Keylor presents a full-fledged
post-revisionist interpretation. New scholarship offers "a much more nuanced
portrait" of peacemakers at Paris acting "with a remarkable degree of
flexibility, pragmatism, and moderation...." (p. 471). "There was no war
guilt clause" and "the most egregious popular misconceptions" surround
Article 231 (pp. 500, 504). Two Americans on the Reparations Commission,
Norman Davis and John Foster Dulles, were responsible for the clause,
not the French. They anticipated Article 231 would assert German "moral
responsibility" and "legal liability" while Article 232 would imply German
"financial incapacity." By providing psychological balm for British and
French reparations hard-liners, the two Americans thought they were establishing
the bases for a pragmatic solution (pp. 500-501). Furthermore, Keylor
cites Stephen Schuker's book showing that Germany suffered "no net reparations,"
paying with money borrowed from the United States during the l920s and
defaulting on the loans during the early 1930s (p. 502).[2]
The historical trends of the last decade resonate in essays considering
national self determination and minority rights. Carole Fink studies the
Polish Minority Treaty, which Wilson favored following pogroms in Poland.
She emphasizes that the Peace Conference and the League of Nations impeded
implementation of the minority treaties in order to strengthen the new
states of eastern Europe. Implications for the present leap from Fink's
assessments of attempts in 1919 to grapple with minority rights in volatile
settings. Piotr Wandycz explores the Polish Question and, similar to Fink,
provides excellent historical background and context. Wandycz doubts that
the creation of Poland sowed the seeds for World War II. Concerning the
Polish corridor dividing east Prussia from the rest of Germany, not only
had it existed "for several centuries" until the eighteenth-century Partitions
of Poland, but "there really was no viable alternative" in 1919 (Wandycz,
pp. 334-335). The Versailles Treaty did not endure because of post-Peace
Conference events "for which the peacemakers were not responsible," and
Poland has withstood the test of time (334-335). In contrast, Ronald Steel,
who compares and contrasts 1919, 1945, and 1989, doubts that national
self-determination in its 1990s guise is compatible with order, tolerance,
and freedom, and seems to cast a nostalgic eye on the pre-World War I
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 1990s, the fallout from the end of the Cold
War also cast a long shadow over assessments of the weight of Bolshevism
on the creation of the Versailles Treaty. A number of contributors downplay
Arno Mayer's thesis, which asserts the influence of the Russian Revolution
on the peacemaking of
1919. They emphasize that containment of Germany rather than containment
of Bolshevism was the peacemakers' main motivation (Lentin, p. 242). Nevertheless,
there are references in the volume to anti-Bolshevism, and an essay by
Jon Jacobson focuses on Soviet policy towards "the Versailles order" during
the 1920s. Still, Diane Kunz is on the mark when she emphasizes "the empty-chair
attitude" of the British and Americans towards the Soviet Union (p. 529).
It would be impossible to overestimate the importance for France of the
Soviet absence from the international order established in 1919. Geography
mandated the capital position of Russia to Germany's east. Without Russia
in 1870-1871, France foundered. With Russia and Great Britain in 1914,
France survived--barely. Without the Soviet Union at France's side in
1940, Germany again decisively defeated France. From 1918-1940, the absence
of the Soviet Union deprived France of a countervailing force and threw
France into onerous dependency on Great Britain and the United States.
Michael Fry regards Germany as better placed than France to woo Communist
Russia after the Peace Conference (p. 601). Did France have to follow
such a fatalistic policy towards Communist Russia? From 1891-1894, France
had escaped German imposed isolation by securing a military alliance with
a reactionary Russian regime but refused to pursue a similar alliance
during the 1930s with the Communist Soviet Union. Granted, Stalin was
one of history's worst psychopathic mass murderers, but France's survival
was at stake. After all, the greatest western hero of World War II (deservedly
so), Winston Churchill, among the interwar's most arch-anti-Communists,
said, "If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favorable reference
to the Devil in the House of Commons." And the victorious alliance that
necessity soldered between the summer 1940, 22 June 1941, and 7 December
1941 included prominently the Soviet Union. This volume might have added
more explicit consideration of the impact of the ideological dimension
posed by the Communist Revolution on the power equations at Paris. In
conclusion, this publication is particularly rich in exploring the consequences
of gaps that emerged between self-perception, sense of identity, and expectations
on the one hand and results on the other. We can now see more clearly
that Germany did not accept its defeat in World War I, neither before
nor after the Paris Peace Conference. The disillusioned in Germany, the
United States, and Great Britain contributed to the postwar revisionist
deluge. One can hope, though, that the simplifications of revisionist
historiography and of public perceptions will be superseded by denser
analysis of the Paris Peace Conference and its aftermath.
In assessing the Versailles Treaty, the question ought to be: Compared
to what? The Treaty should be compared and contrasted with the Treaties
of Vienna (1815), Frankfurt (1871), Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), the peacemaking
after World War II, post-1989, and other postwars. In comparison, the
Versailles Treaty was neither harsh nor conciliatory nor wise. It consisted
of tradeoffs among the victors, relatively lenient in German territorial
losses, leaving the German heartland intact.
Nevertheless, the Treaty was hardest on German pride, and pride matters
a lot. Germany should have been included in the Paris negotiations. Finally,
when did the slide towards World War II begin? For the Editors, "Krieg
ist der Vater aller dinge" (p. 20). Some contributors blame the Versailles
Treaty, while others point to German propagandists and disenchanted Anglo-Saxon
idealists. According to Sally Marks, France lost the postwar following
the Occupation of the Ruhr, especially in the Dawes Plan of 1924. Fritz
Klein finds "a path" from the Versailles Treaty to Hitler but accentuates
"choice" by Germans; Hitler's rise to power was not "inevitable" (p. 220).
For David Stevenson, the crucial failure was the renunciation shortly
after Hitler reached power of the clauses limiting Germany's military.
In my opinion, the treaty was viable, especially if the Treaty of Guarantee
had been included, but required a mixture of firmness and flexibility
in its defense woefully absent during the interwar years.
LIST OF ESSAYS
Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, Introduction
Ronald Steel, Prologue: 1919-1945-1989
Part One: Peace Planning and the Actualities of the Armistice
1. Klaus Schwabe, Germany's Peace Aims and the Domestic and
International Constraints
2. David French, "Had We Known How Bad Things Were in Germany, We Might
Have Got Stiffer Terms": Great Britain and the German Armistice
3. David Stevenson, French War Aims and Peace Planning
4. Thomas J. Knock, Wilsonian Concepts and International Realities at
the End of the War
5. Alan Sharp, A Comment
Part Two: The Peacemakers and Their Home Fronts
6. Erik Goldstein, Great Britain: The Home Front
7. Georges-Henri Soutou, The French Peacemakers and Their Home Front
8. Lawrence E. Gelfand, The American Mission to Negotiate Peace: An Historian
Looks Back
9. Fritz Klein, Between Compiègne and Versailles: The Germans on the Way
from a Misunderstood Defeat to an Unwanted Peace
10. Antony Lentin, A Comment
Part Three: The Reconstruction of Europe and the Settlement of Accounts
11. Carole Fink, The Minorities Question at the Paris Peace
Conference: The Polish Minority Treaty, June 28, 1919
12. Stephen A. Schuker, The Rhineland Question: West European Security
at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919
13. Piotr S. Wandycz, The Polish Question
14. Sally Marks, Smoke and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Rooms and the Galerie
des Glaces
15. Elisabeth Glaser, The Making of the Economic Peace
16. Niall Ferguson, The Balance of Payments Question: Versailles and After
17. Gerald D. Feldman, A Comment
Part Four: The Legacy and Consequences of Versailles
18. Jon Jacobson, The Soviet Union and Versailles
19. William R. Keylor, Versailles and International Diplomacy
20. Antoine Fleury, The League of Nations: Toward a New Appreciation of
Its History
21. Diane B. Kunz, A Comment
Part V: Antecedents and Aftermaths: Reflections on the War-Guilt Question
and the Settlement
22. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber and the Peace Treaty of Versailles
23. William C. Widenor, The Construction of the American Interpretation:
The Pro-Treaty Version
24. Michael Graham Fry, British Revisionism
25. Manfred F. Boemeke, Woodrow Wilson's Image of Germany, the War-Guilt
Question, and the Treaty of Versailles
26. Gordon Martel, A Comment
NOTES
[1] Holger Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany
After the Great War," in Forging the Collective Memory: Government and
International Historians through Two World Wars, ed. Keith Wilson (Providence
and Oxford: Berghahn, 1996), 87-127.
[2] Stephen A. Schuker, "American ' Reparations' to Germany, 1919-33:
Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis." Princeton Studies in International
Finance, no. 61, July 1988. Princeton: International Finance Section,
Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1988.
Joel Blatt
University of Connecticut, Stamford Campus
JOEL.BLATT@UCONN.EDU
Copyright © 2001 by the Society for French Historical Studies, all rights reserved. The Society for French Historical Studies permits the electronic distribution for nonprofit educational purposes, provided that full and accurate credit is given to the author, the date of publication, and its location on the H-France website. No republication or distribution by print media will be permitted without permission. For any other proposed uses, contact the Editor-in-Chief of H-France.
H-France Review Vol. 1 (April 2001) No. 9
ISSN 1553-9172
