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Having one’s first book chosen for review in the same forum as works by distinguished scholars like Jan Goldstein, Jean-Clément Martin and David Bell was an unexpected, but very gratifying, honour. So I would like to begin by thanking H-France’s editors for selecting my book for consideration here and for overseeing the review process with such good grace, efficiency and patience. I am also pleased to see that the Forum chose its reviewers in the same interdisciplinary spirit as the book was written in. Of necessity, any history of commemorative culture should engage with a variety of methodologies and disciplines, and for this reason, I am particularly glad that the editors have assembled a diverse range of scholars to comment on my book. In bringing together an art historian, a historian of ideas and a nineteenth-century historian this forum presents three distinct perspectives on my work, and I welcome the chance to engage with these different points of view. I wrote this book to raise questions about how we write about memory and, more generally, about French Revolutionary culture, so the different views expressed in this forum will hopefully contribute to prompting a renewed debate about how historians confront these issues.

That said, reading these reviews has also been a frustrating experience in several ways. Seeing one’s arguments critically engaged with is obviously stimulating but to see them misconstrued and even misrepresented has been exasperating as well. Such are the perils of authorship, but when the reviews here appear to be fundamentally at odds about even the most basic of issues, the breadth of my research for instance, then it is difficult to find an appropriate response. Caught between David O’Brien’s conclusion that “the range of sources incorporated into the book and Clarke’s ability to tease meaning out of such disparate materials are truly impressive” and Marisa Linton’s rather less favourable verdict on my research I can only stand above the fray and ask the book’s readers to reach their own conclusions. However, if detachment seems the only option in the face of such divided opinions, I would like to engage directly with the more substantial issues these reviews have raised. My approach to commemoration, my place in the historiography of memory and my relationship to recent scholarship on the Revolution are issues which have arisen to a greater or lesser extent in all of the reviews here, and I will try to address them together. However, one review stands out quite markedly, both in content and tone, from the others, and I hope that the other reviewers will not feel short-changed if I devote more specific attention to it further on.

It is a truism to suggest that book reviews frequently say as much about the book the reviewer would have liked to have seen written as they do about the book actually under review. When that book spans aspects of the political, social, intellectual, cultural, religious, artistic and even horticultural history of eighteenth-century France, then predictably enough, each reviewer will
privilege his or her own perspective to see how the book measures up to the standards of his or her specialism. In one way or another, each of the reviews here conforms to this rule. Accordingly, Marisa Linton takes me to task for not going into more detail on the “origins” and “significance” of “concepts” such as virtue or antiquity in Revolutionary culture, both topics on which she has either published or recently presented research papers.[1] Alas, I must plead guilty as charged, although I am also tempted to ask how far one should go in tracing the ‘origins’ of the idea of virtue in Western culture in a book on Revolutionary memory? Would a few references to Montesquieu or Bossuet or Fénélon have sufficed or should I have traced this idea’s evolution back to antiquity itself in order to explain what it meant to attend a funeral in 1789 or raise a memorial in 1793? More importantly, why stop at virtue and antiquity? Perhaps I should have punctuated my analysis with excursions into the intellectual history of Republicanism or fraternity or Catholicism or grief as well, all “concepts” that feature prominently in this study. The resulting book would certainly have been much longer, and probably a good deal less coherent, but I am not convinced that this type of approach would have added much to our understanding of commemoration as a cultural practice as opposed to a “concept”.

Nevertheless, the fact is that contemporary discussions about virtue and the rôle of antiquity in Revolutionary culture do arise in this book, as do many other “concepts”. However, to paraphrase Mendès-France, “écrire c’est choisir”, and I chose not to stop off to conduct a detailed exegesis of each individual “concept” I encountered in my research. There is a particular type of intellectual history that specialises in tracking the trajectory of specific themes or “concepts” within elite political discourse. Marisa Linton’s The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France is a good example of this kind of history, and obviously, I can see the merits of this approach when it is done well. However, this type of study has clear limitations as well. It generally concerns itself with the production of discourse but seldom addresses its reception, and as a rule, it rarely looks beyond the world of print culture and the well-to-do. Put simply, this is not the type of history that I want to write. Its preoccupation with the chattering classes of eighteenth-century urban society seems so very restrictive in an age of still limited literacy, and its stress on canonical texts and critical concepts would leave so many aspects of commemorative culture, the ceremonial, the sensory, the spatial even, unexplored. So, as I should have thought my decision to begin my book with a Parisian apprentice’s funeral and conclude it with a lament sung by an illiterate Norman widow made quite clear, I am not a historian of ideas in the mould of Marisa Linton. Rather, my aim in writing this book was to look beyond the world of the social and cultural elites to understand what the death of a tradesman before the Bastille or a soldier on the Spanish front meant to the communities who came together to honour, and mourn, them and to integrate their stories into the wider history of Revolutionary remembrance.

To do the scope of its subject justice, the cultural history of commemoration must try to transcend the confines of the printed page and investigate the realms of the ritual and the visual (and the emotions they evoke as well as the ideas they express), and it must be willing to learn from related disciplines such as anthropology and art history. And yet, with a few notable exceptions, too many cultural historians’ interest in images stops once their book cover has been chosen for them. This is bad enough at the best of times, but this neglect would be especially indefensible when so many critical aspects of commemorative culture, the placing of a crucifix or memorial, the sound or indeed the silence of a church-bell, or the composition of a painting or print, remain so resolutely non-verbal. For this reason, I welcome David O’Brien’s considered comments on my work and appreciate that his review raises important issues about the relationship between our respective disciplines. As a historian aiming to integrate a range of visual sources into a wider political and cultural history, I hope I have benefited from the fine
scholarship of art historians like Thomas Crow, T. J. Clark and Philippe Bordes, but I must agree with Professor O’Brien that our emphases do diverge in significant ways.\[2\]

In the context of a study that incorporated everything from garden designs and architectural projects to paintings, prints and commemorative plates, there will inevitably be absences like Lebarbier’s *The Heroic Courage of Young Désille* and images that would, in an art historical study, have warranted a quite different type of discussion. Professor O’Brien is quite right in this respect. However, my principal concern in discussing little-known works like Brenet’s plodding *Louis XVI jure fidélité à la constitution* or Vaudoyer’s almost equally pedestrian plans for a memorial *Voie de l’honneur* or even the commemorative slipware that appeared after Mirabeau’s death was not to assess them in aesthetic terms. Rather, my aim was to explore the values and memories such works expressed or, in many cases, suppressed and to explain their relationship to the context within which they were produced and received. This is obviously a context in which political priorities, personal ambitions and artistic agendas intertwine, but for much of the 1790s, I would suggest, politics probably outweighed aesthetics in many artists’ minds. This was certainly the main thrust of publications such as the *Journal de la Société républicaine des arts* and of projects such as the Republic’s *concours*, not to mention the iconoclasm of *an II*, but this prioritisation operated on a more personal level too. While I quite agree with O’Brien that Jacques-Louis David wrestled with many conflicting impulses throughout his Revolutionary career, I also suspect that the politician in him won most of these contests, and for this reason, I have tended to emphasise the ideological rather than the aesthetic imperative in assessing his work. Art historians may hang their heads in despair at such philistinism, and O’Brien seems slightly shocked that I should find the artist’s intentions “surprisingly important” in this context. However, I very much doubt whether we can appreciate how Quatremère planned the Panthéon or David painted his *Marat* without first understanding why they chose to do so in the first place. This is probably where my priorities diverge most dramatically from the art historian’s agenda. For all that we can learn from one another, both our ends and our methods do differ. So while I fully accept the encouragingly inter-disciplinary thrust of David O’Brien’s comments, I must admit that I remain a historian after all.

As such, and as a historian of that infuriatingly elusive term “collective memory” in particular, I must take my place in an extensive historiography. For that reason, I am pleased to see that Professor O’Brien thinks that my book has opened up welcome new perspectives on the study of commemoration in France. Marisa Linton, however, seems less convinced. Indeed, she appears almost indignant that the editors and external readers at Cambridge University Press considered my book fit for publication (to raise that particular point once in a review might be legitimate criticism but to raise it twice looks rather like pique), and her review is a litany of historians whose work I apparently did not address in enough detail. I have to confess to some surprise at this, not least because she then concedes that my work “engage[s] strongly with the history of emotions”, but also because I made my views concerning many of the historians she mentions abundantly clear in the introduction and elsewhere throughout the book. Jacques Guilhaumou’s *La Mort de Marat*, for example, is referenced appreciatively in the relevant chapter, as are Annie Jourdan’s studies, while Jean-Claude Bonnet’s work is addressed, rather less favourably it might be added, in three chapters out of six. So too, I engage with Lüsebrink and Reichardt (whom she claims I ignored entirely) quite unambiguously on p. 75 in the midst of a lengthy discussion about the political problems the bloodshed at the Bastille posed for those commemorating its fall.

The list of explicit references overlooked and historiographical arguments ignored by Linton’s review could go on but that would be pointless. More generally, as regards the American and French scholarship that she thinks I so badly need to brush up on, I can only conclude that she also ignored the historiographical agenda I outlined in my introduction as well. So, given her
rather caustic closing remarks concerning “the confines of English historiography”, it is only right to note that my introduction singles out works by Michel Lagrée and Jean-Clément Martin, alongside Jay Winter and Annette Becker, as models of how memory may be studied with real sensitivity and acknowledges Gabriel Le Bras’ seminal studies of French religious sociology as the “starting point” for my own investigations in that sphere (pp. 5-7). I may be mistaken but none of these authors are conspicuously English in either their origins or their approach to cultural history. It is a small point perhaps, but the implication that I have adopted a blinkered, “little Englander” approach to the writing of French history is too egregiously unjustified to ignore. However, rather than turn this response into the extended historiographical review that Linton appears to think I should have written in place of a piece of original research, it might be more constructive to reiterate exactly how my approach to commemoration differs from most historians of collective memory in France.

I should begin by stating that whereas most of the studies of collective memory Linton mentions explore how the commemoration of the past has been used to construct an ideological consensus or cement a sense of political identity, I encountered a quite different set of concerns in the Revolutionary archives. Unsurprisingly, given the turbulent decade under investigation, division and discord loomed far larger in the sources I consulted than consensus ever did, and so my analysis has been as much about the disputes commemoration engendered as the unity it failed to inspire. So too, the archives furnished much more evidence of ordinary men and women seizing the commemorative initiative as opposed to obeying the instructions of the authorities than many studies of memory, with their endless parade of politicians, artists and intellectuals, allow. The deputies of successive legislatures may have kept the keys of the Panthéon to themselves, but when it came to commemorating lesser-known local heroes like the vainqueurs de la Bastille, the dead of 10 August 1792 or the war-dead of an II, the impetus for, and much of the ethos inspiring, commemoration came from the closely knit world of the neighbourhood, village or even family connection. Seen from this perspective, the paradox of Revolutionary remembrance is that the 1790s most explicitly democratic rites of memory were as much, if not more, an expression of the customary moral and social values of the corporate order than they were an expression of the epic individualism or embryonic nationalism that Bonnet and Bell, for instance, have identified as the hallmarks of the Enlightened cult of the Grand Homme.

Finally, the archives also furnished much more evidence for the ongoing importance of customary religious beliefs and practices in making sense of death and mediating remembrance than they reflected what Michel Vovelle and many more scholars since have described as “the dechristianisation of death” or the “laicisation of memory”. While I do not see this in terms of the “lament” for the lost world of Catholic ritual that Marisa Linton ascribes to me, that sounds far too elegiac, this does point towards one very clear conclusion: that many of these long-standing (and still current) assumptions concerning the secularisation of eighteenth-century attitudes towards death need to be radically revised. So, in place of the normal preoccupation with “the politics of national identity” that has supplied the subtext for so many works on commemoration, and Bonnet’s rhapsodic account of the Grand Homme as the axis around which the French “imaginaire national” has evolved is a case in point, my research resulted in a new set of priorities alongside the conventional political narrative. Conflict and contestation, the central importance of social community as an actor in the politics of commemoration and the initially collaborative but later conflictual relationship between customary culture and Revolutionary politics: these are the issues I encountered most often in my research.

Now, whether one views the conclusions I reached following this research as a dispiriting reflection on the Revolution’s failure to realise its regenerative ambitions or a reassuring
affirmation of the cultural resilience of ordinary men and women is entirely a matter of choice. However, it is also a question of perspective. And on purely methodological grounds, the angle of vision I have adopted diverges markedly from the perspective that has generally characterised the study of collective memory in France. That perspective, and while I generalise I do not believe that this is too much of a caricature, has been overwhelmingly statist in its stress on the ideological ends that successive French régimes have made memory serve and socially exclusive in its emphasis on those régimes’ political and intellectual elites. This predominantly political focus, with its rather teleological emphasis on the invention of national traditions and the promotion of modern, and in most cases this means Republican, values, has been illuminating. However, as “collective memory” has become a commonplace in historical discourse, so many of these assumptions about how societies remember have come to look increasingly stale. The state-centred bias that characterises Nora’s influential *Lieux de Mémoire*, for example, now appears rather one-dimensional in comparison to the scope of sophisticated recent studies by scholars like Valérie Sottocasa, Anne Dolan and Catherine Merridale.[8] Indeed, in many ways, the very term “collective memory” has itself become something of a straitjacket, one that I prefer to avoid precisely because its use tends to privilege the political sphere over the private and overlook the specificity of context that makes each act of commemoration unique. Above all, this preoccupation with the political has essentially ignored the other ends, social, cultural, emotional, even economic, that the remembrance of the dead entails for those who remember.

On that basis, if a book like Ben-Amos’ *Funerals, Politics and Memory in Modern France 1789-1996* does not figure as prominently in my work as Marisa Linton would like, it is for two reasons, and both are implicit in the book’s title. Ben-Amos’ work is a fine study, but it does view the funerals it examines in exclusively political terms, and, as I argued throughout my book, this can only ever be one element of what remembering the dead means and often a far from fundamental one at that. Ben-Amos’ book is also, one introductory chapter on the Revolution notwithstanding, essentially about the politics of memory in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries, not the eighteenth. Rather than view the 1790s as merely an overture to commemorative conflicts to come or an anticipation of a later laïcité, I chose to prioritise what death and remembrance meant to the men and women of the Revolutionary generation instead. I could, and did, cite Richard Cobb to justify my emphasis on exploring the lived experience of the Revolution rather than revisiting, as Linton advises but so many other scholars have already done, the Revolution’s “legacy into the nineteenth century”, and I might also recommend Peter McPhee’s superb recent *Living the French Revolution 1789-1799* for the same reason.[9] Alternatively, I could mention Stephen Lukes, Roger Chartier and Michel de Certeau to endorse my interest in exploring the multiple meanings that texts, symbols and ceremonies may contain.[10] I could even echo Edward Thompson’s classic *crie de cœur* concerning “the enormous condescension of posterity” to justify the importance I attached to understanding the meaning of memory “from below”, from the perspective of the men and women who made their own choices about whom and how to remember independently of the authorities throughout the Revolution.[11]

Ultimately, however, I prefer to think that my reluctance to make the commemorations of the 1790s conform to historiographical type is a reflection of the variety of voices I encountered in my research and a recognition that no historian can disregard the grief, sympathy, anxiety and often anger that so many communities expressed when they assembled to honour their dead without doing this subject an immense disservice. Lest that seem too idealised a vision of what remembrance meant in the 1790s, it would be just as unwise to ignore the ulterior motives and political machinations that marked so many of the Revolution’s rites of memory, but I think it will have become clear from the preceding essay that I have given this aspect of the question its due. Commemorating the dead is a complex business, more complex than most historians of
Revolutionary France have allowed. It certainly served any number of political purposes during that tumultuous decade, and these varied enormously according to circumstance, but remembering the dead in a time of Revolution also entailed social and spiritual responsibilities and fulfilled private, personal needs that went well beyond mere politics.

With these points in mind, I am very gratified to read that Professor O’Brien concludes that my work “reveals that our understanding of collective memory in this period is ripe for revision.” Convincing one’s readers to rethink what once seemed familiar is as much as any author can aspire to and it is encouraging to see that David O’Brien thinks I have accomplished that. Marisa Linton seems much more troubled by my work, but while we clearly disagree on many issues, we can probably concur on others. Thomas Kselman’s review of my book is different. It is shorter than the other essays here so I think I can summarise its conclusions quickly enough. Kselman does concede that I have “several interesting things to say”, and at one point my analysis even appears “plausible”, but in the main his review is overwhelmingly negative. At best, he suggests that my work merely confirms the conclusions of others, but more generally, my argument is dismissed as “overly tendentious”, my writing as “harshly moralistic”; my structure appears erratic to him and my analysis either “struggles to make sense” of its subject matter or else simply “caricatures” it. To make matters worse, Professor Kselman’s final barb implies that I have also failed to take account of the most relevant recent scholarship when he claims that I did not cite Suzanne Desan’s *Reclaiming the Sacred: Lay Religion and Popular Politics in Revolutionary France.*

To take the last point first: I agree. Any work that aspires to say anything meaningful about Revolutionary religious history would need to be familiar with Desan’s work. However, if Professor Kselman turns to the conclusion’s discussion of the relationship between remembrance and religious revival after *an II,* (p. 282 to be precise) he will find the reader duly referred to Desan’s book, along with Olwen Hufton’s pioneering essay on the reconstruction of the Church, for more general discussions of the religious revival that swept France after Thermidor. Now, I would be loath to suggest that Kselman made this mistaken claim in order to deliberately misrepresent my work. It might be more charitable to suggest that he simply missed this point, but he seems to have missed quite a few points in his review. The discussion of the Catholic cult of the dead and the historiography of secularisation in eighteenth-century France that concludes chapter one appears to have passed him by completely because he criticises me for not discussing this “where one might have expected” it to be, i.e. in chapter one. In similar vein, he refers to my failure to make “some reference to the world of occult belief and practice that was emerging in the eighteenth century”. Again, this might be valid comment if it was true, but it does overlook the references to popular practices concerning the afterlife, millenarian prophecies and belief in ghosts that punctuate chapters one, two, three and five. Certainly, any reviewer would be entitled to suggest that these issues might have been discussed in more detail; that is a matter of opinion, but to pretend that I ignored them entirely is simply disingenuous. To put it bluntly, if Professor Kselman wants to criticise my work for its sins of omission then he should at least get his facts right.

More substantively, Kselman suggests that my analysis both “violates Clarke’s own methodological bias in favour of taking what people say and do at face value” while also apparently “seeing these men as caricatures”. While I certainly hold that the historian should take what his subjects say and do seriously, Kselman cannot seriously claim that my methodology consists of nothing more than to accept them uncritically and “at face value” especially as he repeatedly implies that I have let my supposed “distaste” for and “disapproval” of the Revolution determine my analysis. In point of fact, these two criticisms contradict one another. Indeed, I think it would probably be quite difficult to discuss one’s subject in such an unreflecting manner and caricature it so critically at the same time, but I will try to give an
example of how this might be done. In assessing my chapter on the Terror, Kselman claims that “Clarke insists the funeral of Marat was ‘religious’.” This supposed quotation is not accompanied by any page reference for the simple reason that I insist upon no such thing. I actually say very little about Marat’s funeral, except to refer readers to Guilhaumou’s definitive description of it (p. 180). Rather, my analysis of the cult of Marat revolves around the wealth of scriptural and sacred language that was used to commemorate “the apostle and martyr of liberty” (p. 171) from his murder in July 1793 to his depantheonisation in February 1795. It focuses on the images and associations this language evoked, the diverse political ends it served and the varied responses it provoked in both Paris and the provinces. My purpose in this was two-fold. First, by analysing how and why the language of martyrdom, prophecy, sanctity and immortality continued to dominate Revolutionary remembrance throughout the dechristianisation of the Terror, I sought to explore the ordinary révolutionnaire’s predicament as he, or she, struggled to erase the trappings of customary religious culture from public life while still retaining many of the beliefs and assumptions about death, morality and the afterlife that that same culture had imbued him, or her, with from birth. Second, I sought to delve beneath this explosion of commemorative activity and uncover the diverse political agendas at work as competing factions and interest groups in Paris and throughout provincial France seized upon Marat’s memory to serve their own particular ends. So much, I might add, for taking things at face value. This analysis drew on a wealth of manuscript, printed and visual sources from across France to produce the first substantial assessment of the cult of Marat that embraces the provinces as well as Paris.

My conclusions in this were perfectly clear, and both Marisa Linton and David O’Brien offer accurate and even complementary accounts of them; the latter even considers it “a fascinating discussion”. By contrast Kselman suggests that my interpretation is inconsistent with the “literalist position” he has arbitrarily ascribed to me and concludes acidly that my argument “struggles to make sense of its subject”. The rest of my book fares no better. A chapter-length analysis of the Panthéon, which O’Brien considers “impressive”, is dispatched with a curt “Clarke detests the work of Quatremère” while a multi-layered discussion of commemoration after the Terror, which Linton describes as “intriguing and original”, is dismissed on the strength of a few lines quoted out of context. I am more than willing to engage in honest argument with any reader, and I would gladly debate the contrast I drew between Jacobinism’s concern to honour every casualty of war, and to provide for their families, and the elitist overtones of state ceremony during the Directory with Professor Kselman if he did not insist on inferring that my arguments had been dictated by “distaste” for the Revolution as a whole. However, in the face of such misrepresentation, and the repeated insinuation that I have let political prejudice distort my analysis is quite simply unworthy, I will leave it up to the reader to decide who is caricaturing whom.

Commemorating the Dead in Revolutionary France is a challenging book. It raises new questions and asks the reader to rethink old assumptions. It was written to provoke debate. In as much as the reviews here offer radically different assessments of its achievements, then it has been at least partly successful in this. My attempts to re-consider how we write about memory, my conclusions concerning Revolutionary culture, even my writing style, have been variously commended as “important”, criticised as “frustrating” and condemned as politically inspired. As an object lesson in confronting one’s work through the eyes of one’s readers, this forum has been an interesting and invigorating experience. It has raised a number of important issues about the writing of cultural history, its relationship to other disciplines, and even about the etiquette of the reviewing process. If my response to these questions has occasionally struck the reader as rather robust, then I can only apologise, but I have little patience for the reviewer who complains of individual studies or scholars (of whatever nationality) not being cited without caring to check whether his or her claims are even factually correct. Book reviewing entails
responsibilities, to the potential reader certainly but to the author under review as well, and accuracy is surely one of them. And so, I would like to conclude by thanking H-France once more for the opportunity to engage in this debate and to make my arguments more explicit, even if this has meant, more often than I would have anticipated in a scholarly exchange, simply having to set the record straight.

NOTES


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