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The last volume in Jonathan Israel’s trilogy on the Radical Enlightenment, Democratic Enlightenment is a truly monumental work that draws on a wealth of sources in eight European languages to recount the development of radical moral, social, political, and theological thought not only in the areas of Western and Northern Europe where these ideas were born, but also in the world regions where the European powers extended their empires, notably the Americas, China, and India. Nor is the book’s breadth limited to linguistics and geography: it covers also intellectual debates, revolts, revolutions, philosophic quarrels, social and economic policies, and the persecution of scholars and intellectual minorities. The diverse mix of topics derives from Israel’s conviction that intellectual, social, political and cultural histories must necessarily meld to narrate the Enlightenment, which he envisions as a unitary movement concerned principally with “human amelioration” and as a phenomenon both permeating and conditioned by most aspects of the human experience between 1680 and 1800 (p. 7). It is a holistic idea of Enlightenment solidary with John Robertson’s model and antithetical to postmodern Enlightenments rendered plural by national variation.

Simultaneously, though, Israel seeks to avoid the “excessively unitary character” of the Enlightenment as Peter Gay defined it (p. 6). Reusing a theoretical framework rendered famous by previous volumes, he posits that insofar as the Enlightenment was divided, it was so by inner fault lines that yielded only three streams—moderate Enlightenment, Counter-Enlightenment, and Radical Enlightenment—each of which was defined by the role it ascribed to reason as a democratizing tool. Thus moderate enlighteners—by whom Israel means Lockian-Newtonians, Leibnizian-Wolffians, the Scottish thinkers, Mendelssohn, Turgot, and Voltaire among others—agreed that there should be progress, but of a gradual rather than convulsive kind that for the moment at least should preserve social distinctions. Their views were more rationalist and progressivist than those of the counter-enlighteners, supporters of the status quo who went so far in their opposition to progress as to put sentiment above reason in their quest for the source of philosophy. Lastly, the radicals—Israel’s heroes—were revolution’s great heralds, men and women who sought to reorganize society according to the precepts of liberty and equality and to lose no time in eradicating privilege and oppression.

Democratic Enlightenment makes no explicit claims about the metaphysical underpinnings of the Counter- and moderate Enlightenments, although the narrative associates the former with orthodox Christian dogma and the latter with deistic notions of a world moved by the laws of a departed divinity. But the book does strongly associate the Radical Enlightenment with materialism and one-substance metaphysics, especially as expressed in the philosophy of Spinoza. Denying that the world is divinely governed and holding that reason alone produces morality as well as social and political legitimacy—the argument goes—substantialist monism put humanity in charge of its own destiny. Materialist metaphysics was thus linked to democratic politics, endowing the radicals with an unmatched capacity for revolutionary work (p. 766) and propelling their movement from a largely marginal and underground phenomenon around mid-century to a briefly triumphant crusade in the 1770s and 1780s.

I.

The narrative develops over five parts and thirty-five chapters. Part I, “The Radical Challenge,” mostly details philosophical controversies in the French-speaking regions of Europe, although the
last and seventh chapter concentrates on Central European debates. From the blows received by providentialism at the time of the Lisbon earthquake (chapter two) to the erosion of Germany’s religious Enlightenment at the hands of Reimarus’ deism (chapter seven) to Voltaire’s inability to contain the “internecine differences” (p. 68) between the philosophes (chapter three), Part I seeks to demonstrate that moderate Enlightenment was logically inconsistent to the point of being unfit to survive. The pivotal moment of its unraveling came during the years 1752-1760 with the struggles for the suppression of the Encyclopédie, a work portrayed here as exceedingly radical, indeed as a “philosophical engine of war directed not only against Christianity but also against the providential deism and Creationism of Voltaire, Turgot, Réaumur, and the like, against Newtonian physico-theology and Locke’s version of empiricism” (p. 69)—a portrait that certainly contradicts, but without providing proof, conventional portrayals of the Encyclopédie as adhering to Lockian epistemology. The encyclopédistes, unlike Locke, may have been no pious Christians, but this circumstance did not hinder them from devouring his theory of knowledge.

The battle for the Encyclopédie was a central event in the wider intellectual and cultural war that raged around the censorship of subversive ideas and that, according to Israel, allied moderate deists and radical atheists against the advocates of religion. It was a fortunate war for the radicals, he maintains, since it raised their profile. And it was a bane for the moderates, since it exposed the logical inferiority of their system and initiated their decline. Unsurprisingly, the anti-philosophes are described in this account as incoherent and dishonest (chapter six), while the Enlightenment’s great authors appear in this account in a light less favorable than usual. Voltaire emerges as moderation’s faltering leader, a habitual pessimist who yet miscalculated the Genevan intellectual climate as all too friendly to his cause, and whose ambition to lead the philosophes did not enable him to prevent their onslaught on his own philosophy (chapter five). As for Rousseau, a “strange mixture of radical, moderate, and Counter-Enlightenment tendencies… on all sides continually accused of contradicting himself” (p. 21), he appears even more shadowy, with a whole chapter (number four) devoted to discrediting the man and the thinker. Marmontel is thus called upon to present Jean-Jacques as an adulation-hungry opportunist who defected from philosophie to attract applause (p. 99), the circumstances of his persecution are interpreted to argue that he was a self-destructing paranoid whose perversity led him to settle precisely in those places where he could cause the most trouble (p. 100), and his xenophobia is underlined to prove that he was a chauvinist “[strangely fixated] with ancient cults” (p. 105).

Should this portrait not sufficiently suggest that Israel does not harbor much love for Rousseau, his feelings are confirmed in the opening of Part II, “Rationalizing the Ancien Régime,” which celebrates Hume without hesitation as the “most powerful philosophical genius of the mid-eighteenth century.” Like Rousseau, Hume, too, looks more conservative than usual in this book, emerging as an “inexhaustible fund of insights and ideas to those opposing radical notions” (p. 209). He plays the same narrative role in Part II that the Encyclopédie’s enemies do in Part I, since he acts as the obstacle that gives radicalism an impetus “through the very acuteness of his objections” (p. 210). Israel dedicates chapter eight to an overview of Hume’s philosophy, from his religious skepticism to his views on the nobility, equality, and commerce (an exercise that one wishes he would apply to “radicals” like Diderot, see below). Chapter nine in turn describes the Scottish Enlightenment context in which Hume worked. “It was impossible,” writes Israel regarding the latter, “to pitch tents any further from the world of the nouveaux Spinosistes [sic]” (p. 233). Exceptionally conservative in Israel’s view, the Scots did not fully embrace toleration (p. 262), championed existing social hierarchies (p. 237), failed to take equality seriously (p. 269), and accepted that civil government was for defending the rich against the poor (p. 244). Chapter ten then moves to Europe’s German-speaking lands to describe the “generalized radical critique of enlightened despotism” (p. 270). Depicting rulers like Frederick and Joseph as moderately enlightened, Israel argues—in a move paralleling his treatment of Hume and Rousseau—that these monarchs were ultimately much more conservative than has previously been discerned: in fact Joseph did not differ that much from his thoroughly unenlightened mother, Maria Theresa (pp. 283, 285). But if the German-speaking ruling classes were reactionary, intellectual circles in the same territories were not at all so in this story: Chapter eleven recounts the “fracturing” of German Protestantism through Bahrdt’s subversive activity and through the Fragmentenstreit that Lessing launched by publishing pieces of one of Reimarus’ secret and theologically subversive texts. Chapter twelve then...
casts Italian intellectual life as undergoing a “philosophical crisis” in the 1760s and 1770s as the Catholic Enlightenment that had flourished in the 1740s and 1750s proved too precarious to restrict the diffusion of other Enlightenment authors (pp. 330-331), causing the papacy to retreat from its liberal stance as Beccaria and Verri’s radical coterie rose up in Milan. They were accompanied by other radicals throughout the country, discussed in chapter thirteen, some of whom became revolutionaries by the 1780s. The last chapter of Part II moves to Spain, where, probably too predictably, Carlos III emerges as less of an enlightened monarch than was thought until the work of Francisco Sánchez-Blanco (p. 374); and where we encounter the moderate Enlightenment defeated once more at the Spanish Inquisition’s trial of Olavide.

Part III, “Europe and the Remaking of the World,” argues that the injustices of European colonialism provided ideal ground for the flowering of radical egalitarian visions. The Histoire philosophique des deux Indes (1780) published by Raynal and co-written covertly by Diderot emerges as the intellectual fountainhead of political radicalism across the world in the late eighteenth century and functions as the centerpiece of this section. “Raynal,” Israel reminds us, not only exposed European tyranny in its multifaceted and multilayered forms, but also inspired revolutionary ideologies from the Americas to Russia, where he played the notable role of influencing the country’s first radical, Radishe. The Histoire was the “ultimate climax” of “publishing events in all history” (p. 420, chapter fifteen), a “project for world revolution” whose extraordinary fortune was to win the “general approval… of the entire literary world” (p. 413) (presumably in the West). Its radical ideas even made it to the American Revolution (chapter sixteen), which Israel presents as “a reflection of the ideological split between the moderate and ‘radical’ Whig legacies in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England” (p. 445), while the revolts that the Histoire had predicted and encouraged found expression in the Tupac Amaru rebellion (chapter seventeen) and the Spanish American revolt (chapter eighteen).

A despotic regime destined for decline, the Dutch Asian empire likewise fulfilled the Histoire’s predictions (chapter nineteen), and Raynal and Diderot’s publishing “climax” resurfaces in chapter twenty, where it serves to survey once more shifting radical views of China in Europe and the installation of the Enlightenment in Japan. Chapter twenty-one then recounts Britain’s conflicts with Indian princes, British administrative policies in India, and the Radical Enlightenment’s critique of the British empire; while Chapter 22 narrates the Enlightenment debates surrounding the Greek and Polish struggles for independence and the philosophes relationship with Catherine the Great, emphasizing Diderot’s criticism of the empress’ policies but without offering a general account of his political thought—an ill-known subject, centrally significant to Israel’s story and still quite available to original research.

Part IV, “Spinoza Controversies in the Later Enlightenment,” contains the core of the book’s argument. Returning to Western Europe, it maintains that Spinoza’s materialism animated some of the most crucial philosophical quarrels of the late eighteenth century—notably those concerning modern democratic sovereignty, which reveal Rousseau as a nationalist and Diderot as a universalist (p. 637, chapter twenty-three). The year 1770 emerges as the great watershed in the narrative, as the landmark in the history of radicalism that witnessed the publication of two materialist “bombs”—the Histoire philosophique and d’Holbach’s Système de la nature. Israel argues that the intellectual power of the latter text was decisive in raising the fortunes of materialism during the 1770s and 1780s. Following, however, a pattern common in his narrative, radicalism emerges as triumphing both because of its inherent intellectual and moral superiority and thanks to circumstance, which as usual aids its fortunes in rather paradoxical ways, on this occasion through the authorities’ frequently sensational persecutions of d’Holbach, Helvétius, and their once-obscure fellow materialist Delisle de Sales. Israel tells the story of their trials in chapter twenty-four and then moves his stage to Germany, where a dying Lessing confesses his final Spinozism to Jacobi, much to Mendelssohn’s consternation (chapter twenty-five), where Goethe becomes a Spinozist but not an anti-monarchist (chapter twenty-seven), and where the Pantheismusstreit furthers, this time, the fortunes of moderation, forcing Kant to take a stand against materialist philosophy, notably by defending morality and traditional religion as fundamental to the quest for happiness (chapter twenty-six).
Historians of the French Revolution are divided on the role that Enlightenment ideas played in producing it, and Part V of Democratic Enlightenment, simply entitled “Revolution,” takes sides unambiguously. Observing that “the decades-old war of ideas in progress seemed inherently bound to produce an eventual political and ideological eruption” (p. 761), it contends that the production actually began not in 1789 as is usually supposed, but during the philosophically charged agitations of 1788 (chapter twenty-eight). Insisting, also, that radical philosophy was the major intellectual force behind eighteenth-century revolutions, Israel objects that social historians have placed too much emphasis on salons and freemasonry as media for the circulation of progressive ideas (pp. 779-780) and proposes publishers, booksellers, colporteurs, and the anti-philosophes themselves as all-too-little studied instruments of propagation (chapter twenty-nine). As might be expected, he believes the radicals to have provided the Revolution’s major intellectual inspiration, which he presents as a set of subversive attitudes and anti-Rousseauian principles (chapter thirty). But he deems that this contribution has been traditionally underestimated because it was kept concealed, since secretive institutions—like the hounded Illuminati of Weishaupt’s creation—were its most peaceful and effective instruments of diffusion (chapter thirty-one). This last argument, which recalls the abbé Barruel’s thesis of the 1790s, acts to compensate for the difficulties involved in tracing the revolutionary filiation and influence of radical and especially Spinozian ideas. In fact, it allows Israel to maintain that as the eighteenth century drew to a close, radicalism broke out into the open, sparking off revolutions throughout Europe, not only in France but also in Switzerland, Aachen, Liège, the Netherlands and the Austrian Netherlands (chapters thirty-two and thirty-three). In the case of the French Revolution, he suggests, the Radical Enlightenment dominated during the years 1789-1792, but Robespierre betrayed it during the Terror, restoring religion as a political force (chapter thirty-four). Israel views these developments as the result of a “tussle,” within the Revolution, between the “Revolution of Reason” and the “Revolution of the Will,” with the former representing radical ideals and the pre-Terror stages of the movement and the latter being associated with Jacobinism and the philosophy of Rousseau (pp. 932-933). Israel closes the book by reflecting that the late eighteenth century witnessed a “revolution of the mind” characterized by “a dramatic shift in the balance between radical and moderate enlightened thought” (p. 937, chapter thirty-five) during which the former emerged victorious, but only to be “arrested by kings, aristocracy, and Robespierre’s Counter-Enlightenment” and go back underground for a century and a half, “[resuming] after a fashion in the post-Second World War era” (p. 951). One wonders only why so much secrecy was required for so long, especially given the relaxation of censorship laws throughout Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

II.

Democratic Enlightenment perpetuates the strengths of Israel’s previous work. In breadth, it is difficult to surpass: it covers an impressive number and range of thinkers and events, and navigates easily between social, political, and intellectual history. It is thus valuable as a reference and survey. Its main premise is also suggestive: for if there was one polarizing idea at the heart of the Enlightenment, and one capable of driving its course, it was the relative roles that human reason and divine Providence played in the government of human affairs. Concretely, believing that human reason engendered morals and political legitimacy encouraged the refashioning and recreation of institutions. Or, in Israel’s negative rendition, a philosophy exclusive of the preordained was “inherently better suited to buttress claims that our world has been captured by self-seeking, oppressive elites” (p. 22). In addition, and although Israel does not make this point precisely, the monistic materialism associated with Spinozism could also have democratic consequences if it was used to support the conviction that every object and being is the manifestation of a single universal substance, so that all are essentially equal.

Conversely, providentialism, or the belief that human destiny is directed by spiritual forces which humanity can propitiate but not control, could logically breed greater conformity with an order where power over the destiny of the many was socially devolved to the few. This was especially the case given that the providentialist idea of an afterlife could discourage investment in human affairs. It was for this discouragement that Machiavelli had blamed Christianity, and it was its effects that Rousseau had tried to mitigate by devising the civil religion of the Social Contract (1762).
Building on the logical relations between ideas just described, Israel assumes that metaphysics and politics were related across the centuries in an immutable manner that obeyed a single and certain logic. His model, however, pertains to the way in which many conceive of these relations now, which is itself one possible and general way of relating them rather than the necessary, actual, and specific ways in which they were related in the past. As Israel himself allows (p. 21), materialism did not automatically entail egalitarianism or sympathy for revolt: Goethe was both a Spinozist and a monarchist, and Raynal deplored the French Revolution. Nor do the facts seem to support his contention that materialism was alone willing and able to impel resistance to oppression, and that radicalism’s powers of liberation were thoroughly unmatched. The first people who wrote to defend Indian liberties and denounce Spanish exploitation of native populations in the Americas, for instance, were not radical philosophers but Dominican friars (Luis Beltrán, Pedro de Córdoba, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Antón de Montesinos, Sebastián Valverde). Their efforts were also effective, since they culminated in the royal promulgation of the Leyes de Indias, a document almost unknown in the English-speaking world thanks to the success of the leyenda negra, but the one containing the sole prohibition ever issued by a European power prohibiting the practice of slavery in its empire. That the friars’ efforts should have had such consequences is hardly surprising when considering that orthodox forms of Christianity could draw subversive—and more importantly, humanizing—potential from the Christian belief that all human beings are equal in God’s eyes. But Israel insists that the mainstream Christianity he associates with the Counter-Enlightenment was the agent of abusive elites, while the “reform-minded” Unitarians and Socinians, in rejecting dogma and placing human reason at the center of religious experience (pp. 12-13), were the sole Christian givers of emancipation.

Consistently with these views, he tends to represent counter-enlighteners as either impotent or oppressive and to put enlighteners and radicals in the role of victims. Thus he recounts at length Olavide’s trial and re-conversion as well as the persecution that Helvétius endured when De l’esprit appeared—but he dismisses Rousseau’s similar experience after the publication of Du contrat social as “tepid” and ascribes its reputed magnitude to Jean-Jacques’ paranoia and perverse choices as a refugee in Switzerland. Another disparity is that if we see the radical philosophes as targets of persecution, we never see them as persecutors themselves. Democratic Enlightenment contains no mention of how, for instance, the philosophes—who included both moderate and radical enlighteners in Israel’s definition—proceeded to “stifle [the] reputation” of Madame de Genlis, as she affirms that they usually did with all those who were not “of their party.” Not only excluding her from intellectual circles but going so far as to make sure that she was booed when she went to the theater. Their motivation in applying these measures seems to have been her refusal to accept D’Alembert’s offer to make her the first woman member of the Académie française if she stopped writing about religion and refuting the philosophes on the same subject—an offer hardly consistent with the “tolerance” that Israel assures us radicalism everywhere upheld.

Such lacunae are related to one pattern that emerges more clearly in Democratic Enlightenment vis-à-vis the previous volumes in the series: the tendency to push the majority of Enlightenment thinkers rightwards and in the direction of Counter-Enlightenment. As remarked above, Israel portrays Rousseau, Hume, the Scottish writers, Voltaire, and “enlightened despots” such as Frederick, Catherine, and Joseph in a light more conservative than is usually the case. As one reads along and encounters increasing numbers of historical figures departing in a counter-enlightened direction, an uncomfortably predictable pattern begins to arise whose nearly unfailing pervasiveness suggests that it is rooted less in historical fact than in the historian’s perspective. The perspective, moreover, nowhere suggests how things in particular cases might have been otherwise—a crucial aspect of the historian’s task—or how events often combine to yield consequences quite unexpected for the actors, as well as incompatible with, and unpredictable through, the logic of intellectual categories. I will say more on this below, but for now I wish simply to point out that in shifting most thinkers and rulers rightward, Israel is pushing them into what he conceives of as a realm of invariable moral, political, and intellectual impotence and inferiority that leaves the far smaller fringe of radicals precariously inhabiting a space characterized by precisely contrary qualities.
These patterns indicate that Israel is elaborating, so as to continue, the intellectual legacy of Isaiah Berlin, whose concept of Counter-Enlightenment helped to appropriate the Enlightenment for the political left, all the while cutting the political right’s precursors off from any modern intellectual lineage. Specifically, Berlin lodged the left’s intellectual ancestors within the Enlightenment and left the proto-conservatives outside of it as thinkers whose intellectual identity was strictly reactive, in the sense of derived solely from their opposition to the representatives of the Enlightenment proper. Adopting this approach has methodological implications. It suggests that intellectual innovation happened only within the Enlightenment camp and that the intellectual task of counter-enlighteners consisted simply in picking up their enemies’ weapons and using them against them. It also sidelines the issue of intellectual filiation and obscures the fact that both sides not only contributed to, but also drew from, a common intellectual fund. In Democratic Enlightenment, this last effect exacerbates the major weakness that the book derives from its breadth—it’s insufficient interest in tracking the origins, transformation, and destiny of ideas among intellectual traditions and between individual thinkers. The result is that the reader is left with the impression that evidence is lacking that Spinoza’s ideas were as pervasive and influential as is claimed.

Yet Israel takes Berlin’s theoretical model even further by suggesting that democracy’s real precursors—the only ones who were enlightened in a dually moral and intellectual sense—were the radicals. Thus in a book memorable for the quantity and breadth of the empirical evidence it provides, the duality between materialist egalitarianism on the one hand, and the various defenses or attempts to improve the status quo on the other, stands throughout as a perfect antithesis, absolute, unchallenged, and unmalleable. The reader expects the model to exhibit at least some protean qualities as the narrative moves across languages, among continents, and between intellectual debates. Yet the narrative maintains unabatedly that throughout the globe and regardless of circumstance radical thought was the sole effective instrument of true reform; and that its often morally dubious and intellectually inferior enemies failed to impel any meaningful and lasting changes.

In addition to purist overtones, categorizing thinkers in this way has narrative consequences detrimental to persuasion. Ironically for a book so centered on the history of freedom, Democratic Enlightenment provides exceptionally little room for human agency in the formation and transmission of intellectual systems. The radical “package” remains unchanged throughout the centuries: no one seems to alter Spinoza’s materialist, monist, and republican scheme, or to mix it with other intellectual traditions in different contexts and for different purposes to yield what distinguishes intellectual history from logic and pure philosophy—the unforeseeable. Concomitantly, Spinoza emerges as the radical tradition’s sole creator and his descendants as the replicators and perpetuators of the broadest tendencies in his thought. This fact illustrates a larger pattern of Democratic Enlightenment, which—in a second ironic twist, given the book’s preoccupation with equality—ascribes the capacity for intellectual innovation, historical determination and the creation of meaning to only a few, privileged geniuses, with Spinoza always constituting the towering example but with Helvétius and Hume providing notable—if still inferior—instances in the late eighteenth century. The decisive few having spoken, this story suggests, the best that the rest of humanity—including the intellectual elites—can do is to repeat and popularize the ideas of the “radicals” among them and the worst is to engage in the futile and benighted exercise of trying to combat or refute them.

The third and related consequence of categorizing thinkers within a pre-set model of Enlightenment is to associate them with broader streams of thought in ways that oversimplify and potentially cloak the real nature of their reflections. In what follows, I try to illustrate this last point in the particularly complex case, discussed by Israel, of William Jones.

III.

Israel identifies Jones as “by far the greatest as well as intellectually most impressive of the Enlightenment minds in British India” (p. 599), a representative of the moderate Enlightenment that in India as elsewhere, Israel believes, failed to effect significant reforms (p. 602). Jones is thus
presented as a reformer who was well-meaning but ultimately disempowered due to his status as an imperial civil servant. Yet one might argue that this very status placed him in a particularly privileged position to effect lasting change, and that his administrative carrier might have borne more abundant and liberating fruits had he not died at the age of forty-eight, weakened by overwork and a liver infection, in the midst of translating Hindu and Muslim laws with the intent that Indian people should govern themselves. Indeed to label Jones a “moderate” simply by virtue of his status as an imperial civil servant is to oversimplify his case exceedingly. It is specifically to ignore how his contributions in political and scholarly fields dovetailed with his administrative position to make his case complex and difficult to categorize—and to render the Indian Enlightenment in which he participated so majorly perhaps not so straightforwardly “moderate” in Israel’s sense. To begin with, Jones was considered a political radical by the standards of his time: he published a pamphlet, The Principles of Government; in a Dialogue between a Scholar and a Peasant (1782), banned for seditious libel, where he not only defended the principles of self-government but even suggested that it might be lawful to commit violence for their sake; he earned, as Israel tells us, the praise of Richard Price (p. 601); and his wife, Anna Maria, was the daughter of Jonathan Shipley, the “radical bishop of St Asaph.”[9] In fact Jones’ radical reputation was such that he withdrew his application for an academic post at Oxford, realizing that it would never be awarded to him due to his revolutionary sympathies and opposition to slavery.

The difficulties inherent in categorizing Jones become even greater when examining the sources of his thought. Although no evidence seems to survive of his having read Enlightenment philosophy, his close friends and acquaintances were prominent representatives of various Enlightenment strands. Thus Benjamin Franklin, whom Israel identifies as a moderate enlightener for his association with Anglicanism (pp. 463-464), was a close friend of the Jones ménage, and his home in Passy was the place where the young linguist composed The Principles of Government.[4] Jones was likewise a friend of Samuel Johnson—a pious Anglican and prominent Tory—and a member of Johnson’s renowned dining club, being in extensive contact, both socially and over legal matters, with Edmund Burke, a thinker whose conservatism did not prevent him from supporting, like Jones, the American Revolution and the principle of self-government, so that Jones the radical did not just dine with those that Israel would label as “counter-enlighteners,” but also shared ideas with them. This fact is further suggested by Jones’ later search for India’s primitive, “pure,” and egalitarian laws ignorant of modern oppression and cleansed of corruption (p. 600), a quest that is closely related to the search for the pristine origins of national mores that Dale Van Kley has described as a major preoccupation of Augustinian patriots.[5] Unfortunately, though, the Augustinian strand of the Christian Enlightenment is completely absent from Democratic Enlightenment; Israel associates patriotism only with the Patriotenbeweging and appropriates the latter for the Radical Enlightenment by presenting it as a “democratic revolutionary movement” (p. 889).

If Jones’ writing of radical texts and close friendships with moderate and counter-enlighteners is not complex enough, things become even more convoluted when considering that his search for India’s “pure” laws may not even be an enlightened one, at least in the European sense. “Oriental Jones” and “Orientalist Jones” provide the titles of his biographies for a reason, and as co-founder of the Asiatick Society of Calcutta he seems to have been both personally and philosophically very influenced by the Hindu culture and religion in which he became a world expert. Pace Edward Said, whose work perpetuates the very imperialism it denounces by portraying Oriental thought as a passive and disempowered European construct with no impact on European intellectual development, Jones spent the time others used reading Enlightenment texts mastering Sanskrit and other Indian languages (to add to the several dozen he already knew), collaborating with pandits and Brahmins, translating major texts of the Vedas and Puranas, and imbibing Hinduism to the extent of himself composing devotional hymns and poems to Hindu gods and goddesses like the Ganges, Surya, Lakshmi and Sarasvati. If the language of deep reverence conveyed by these texts is any indication, Jones seems to have sympathized with, and possibly even practiced, bhakti yoga, or the yoga of devotion expounded by Krishna in the Bhagava Gita. Jones’ reputation as an aesthetic precursor of English Romanticism thus has probable roots in a non-European spirituality very coherent with the belief in a personal divinity involved in human affairs that his friends Burke and Johnson professed and which he himself acknowledged in The Principles of Government, where the politically wise peasant remarks that God would pardon him if he defended his freedom by killing
those who sought to enslave him.\[6\] Contrary to Israel’s argument, therefore, a radical political thinker could be oblivious to monist materialism, have little or no interest in la philosophie, and hold quite mainstream religious opinions, as seems confirmed by the fact that Jones’ most radical comment on religious matters was apparently a congratulatory reference to Anglicanism as the “rational faith” that had preserved Britain from “Romish impositions” like the Lady of Loretto.\[7\]

Taking into account these religious and scholarly sensibilities, it becomes possible and even probable that Jones’ search for India’s primitive, egalitarian constitution might have been at least partly inspired by the Upanishads. Upholding the shramanic or yogic doctrine that every human being is holy for bearing the Creator, Brahm, within, and that the ultimate purpose of human life is uncovering and uniting with Brahm, the Upanishads were socially subversive texts that rejected social hierarchy and in particular the caste system as inconsistent with the indestructible holiness of every individual. The social and spiritual ethic they profess is thought to continue that of the Indus Valley Civilization, the only complex ancient civilization we know of where all the houses were of equal size, and where no public buildings except baths existed. Jones, then, may simply have been looking, with that instinct for accuracy that never left him, for the mores of the Indus Valley Civilization—more than a century before archaeologists uncovered it. Having rediscovered proto-Indo-European,\[8\] a language whose “purity” he praised,\[9\] searching for the “pure” social order of its speakers would have been natural to him—especially if this order coincided with his own political ideas.

As I hope the above demonstrates, Jones resists fitting into any of Israel’s three categories of Enlightenment, since he was a radical thinker by his politics, a moderate enlightener by his administrative policies, a counter-enlightener by his friends and religious sympathies, and an Indian philosopher with devotional inclinations by his poetry and scholarship. His case, though complex, is by no means unique in its complexity and suggests that Israel’s tripartite division of the Enlightenment may not be the most accurate and useful way to assess the intellectual underpinnings of imperial regimes—or to approach the history of radical thought. In fact it might be more fruitful to think of radicalism, especially in its political manifestation, not so much as a “package” as Israel suggests, but rather as a set of dispersed notions often sustained by various people in fragmentary fashion in different contexts and for different purposes. Also, establishing some distinction between radicalism—which has debunking connotations—and democracy—which refers to an established political order—might be helpful in discerning the wide variety of sources from which proto-democratic sensibilities derived. After all, far from requiring monist and materialist metaphysics, the sympathy for liberty, equality, and justice that Israel associates with democracy is a moral sentiment widespread among people of all periods, backgrounds, ages, and convictions—including religious seekers of all kinds—so that the task of the historian of political thought might more accurately consist in identifying when these sympathies were oriented in a democratic direction.

If radical ideas could have diverse origins, their posterity could also disband, and not always—as in Israel’s discussion of Rousseau’s borrowings from Spinoza (see below)—for democratizing purposes. Jones’ case is again illustrative. Although his idea of Indic primitiveness was consistent with left-leaning patriotic traditions, it inspired a quest that was anything but radical, impelling the Catholic convert and father of Romanticism Friedrich Schlegel to elaborate his theory of the “primitive revelation.” According to it, in prediluvian times God imparted to humanity a complete spiritual knowledge that preceded and complemented the Bible, but this knowledge had been lost and now survived only in fragments in the planet’s traditional cultures and especially in India’s most ancient wisdom. The most urgent task of present scholarship was therefore its reconstruction.\[10\] Schlegel’s theory later became a mystical favorite among such “counter-enlighteners” and avid readers of Jones as Herder, Uvarov, and Maistre.\[11\]

If ideas could travel between opposite poles of the enlightened political spectrum, these opposite poles (which from the point of view of intellectual genealogy are more accurately referred to as different streams), could also produce similar ideas and attitudes. Augustinianism, for instance, could converge with Spinozism on the subjects of self-government, egalitarianism, and anti-slavery. Curiously, however, and as remarked above, the Augustinian liberal tradition is missing from Democratic Enlightenment, which presumably explains why the abbé Grégoire, as prominent a
member of the National Assembly and Convention as he was—and as ardent a defender of the emancipation of blacks and Jews[12]—shines by his absence from Israel's story. Indeed it would have been useful to know how the Augustinian civic humanism that Grégoire's political thought represented[13]—and which drew on the socially insurrectionary aspects of the message of Jesus Christ—related to the Radical Enlightenment that supposedly governed the Revolution's early phase. The exercise might have suggested that democratic ideals could derive from sources other than the Spinozist tradition that in Israel's narrative becomes—conveniently but unpersuasively—progressive democracy's sole true precursor.

IV.

Israel's division of the Enlightenment into right-wing and radical varieties acquires a temporal dimension in his account of the French Revolution. Just as proto-democratic sensibilities were sustainable only within and through the Radical Enlightenment, the narrative maintains, so it was solely this strand that was politically operative within the National Assembly, and it was the National Assembly alone, in turn, that produced the principles of modern democracy. The moral and political purism noted above returns here, but this time to claim, in a manner that may be surprising for historians of revolutionary France, that insofar as Rousseau influenced the political thought of the French Revolution, it was not as the "Rousseau of reality," but as a "repackaged and remodeled 'Rousseau'" whose anti-radical thoughts were "screened out from the beginning." This "repackaged" Rousseau, for his part, adopted two personas, one the "radical" who influenced the early phase of the Revolution, and the other the patriot, the disparager of philosophy, the man who bowed down to the feelings of the common man—a figure probably closer to the "Rousseau of reality" in Israel's estimation, and one who was discussed in "specific, and especially Jacobin, contexts," presumably in preparation for the Terror (p. 642).

Thus, Israel contends originally, insofar as Rousseau, the "strange mixture of radical, moderate, and Counter-Enlightenment tendencies..." (p. 21), played a role in the early Revolution, it was only because he was passed off as a radical (and perhaps, insofar as the "real Rousseau" had influence, it was as the patriarch of the Terror; but we have to wait for the sequel to Democratic Enlightenment to find out Israel's precise thoughts on this subject). The problem with this model is that Israel sustains it without a detailed examination of the texts, an examination that seems especially crucial considering not only the unprecedented nature of his thesis, but also that Michael Sonenscher's major book[14] traces the origins of revolutionary political thought to the eighteenth-century debates that Rousseau's philosophy stirred and to which it responded without having to separate the Rousseau of "reality" from the Rousseau of radical fiction—a separation suggesting that, when they drew upon Rousseau and repackaged him as a "radical," the revolutionaries were intellectually unconscious of their actions to a degree improbably convenient to Israel's overall argument. The unconsciousness thesis, however, might draw support, if carefully recast, from the work of Joan McDonald, which provides evidence that most revolutionaries who invoked Rousseau had little familiarity with his philosophy and that those who truly knew and preserved him were the Revolution's aristocratic critics. Yet this hope must come with the caveat that McDonald's conclusions have been challenged both by R.A. Leigh's bibliographical researches and by Norman Hampson's Will and Circumstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Revolution (1983).[15]

One reason that Israel separates the "real" Rousseau from his "radical" fictional variety during the Revolution is that the "real" Rousseau was an absolutist, and Israel deems that ancien regime notions of sovereignty, which he equates with absolutism, had no influence on the Assembly (p. 913). Asserting this requires him to ignore, however, that by the late eighteenth century absolutism was a contested concept within the regime itself, having undergone important transformations in practice and in theory that are relevant to the history of the Assembly. Louis XVI was not his great-great-great-grandfather; he reigned after the publication of De l'esprit des lois (1748); and his reversal of the Maupeou coup—which had provided an enormous boon to absolute royal power—as well as his summoning of the Estates were less the acts of an absolutist than those of a ruler with a genuine, if weak, will to inclusion and reform. Royalist thought of the 1780s also demonstrates that well before the Revolution, the views of the monarchy's supporters were moving in an anti-absolutist direction.
Thus the young royalist scholar and Montesquieu enthusiast Marie-Charlotte-Pauline Robert de Lézardière labored away in her father’s château compiling several treatises on the laws of the French monarchy which summoned erudition to defend a cause dear to the noblesse de robe—and to Diderot—in the wake of the Maupeou coup: the parlements[16] The king not only approved of Lézardière’s writing, but also published her masterwork, Théorie des lois politiques de la monarchie française, in 1791 in a last-ditch attempt to provide the monarchy with an ideology that would allow it to combat with equal footing on revolutionary ground (an attempt that the Convention thwarted by preventing the distribution of the work) [17].

There are signs, too, that Lézardière was not an isolated example among contemporary monarchists. The fact, for instance, that the monarchois and the monarchy’s aristocratic supporters who were members of the National Assembly were all anti-absolutist adepts of Montesquieu[18] suggests not that the Assembly broke with ancien regime notions of sovereignty, but rather that the transformations that monarchy underwent at the end of the ancien regime carried over into revolutionary thought. Not to mention, of course, that the actual debates of 1789—on the voting regime, on the privileges of the estates, on monocameralism versus bicameralism, on the role of the executive power and especially of the royal veto—were necessarily tied to ancien regime notions of sovereignty if only because rearranging the constitution necessarily implied pondering the nature and distribution of sovereignty.

Israel’s denial of any political theoretical continuity between the ancien regime and the National Assembly goes hand in hand with his lending to the Assembly a more radical character than is usually ascribed to it. Thus where Richard Whatmore has found a source for the Revolution’s republican visions in the Swiss Calvinist circle that developed around Étienne Clavière,[19] Israel views Clavière’s politics simply as an extension of those of Mirabeau, whom he portrays as a radical for insisting that government should be for the governed and not for the rulers (p. 907). This last idea, however, was anciently and famously formulated by Aristotle in Books III and IV of the Politics and, far from having anything new or radical about it, has been a founding principle of Western political philosophy since the inception of the discipline: even Thomas Aquinas propounds it, drawing on Aristotle to elaborate his legal and political doctrine of the common good. Nor can it be argued that late eighteenth-century radicals appropriated it for their exclusive use, since none other than Burke used it as a guiding principle in his work.[20] Thus, just as Israel shifts most of the Enlightenment’s thinkers to the right, he shifts the National Assembly—along with its intellectual inspiration, the Encyclopédie—to the left, thus offering an exceptionally polarized portrait of the late eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

V.

One problem with proving that eighteenth-century radical thought was the most important influence on early revolutionary thought is that the radical triumvir of Diderot, Helvétius, and d’Holbach was composed not only of thinkers who (unlike Rousseau) were not primarily political thinkers, but also of thinkers who were politically divided among themselves. Diderot wrote Réfutation d’Helvétius, a text reflecting on political matters, that goes curiously unmentioned in Democratic Enlightenment. Israel also offers no detailed and systematic analysis of the political thought of the triumvir beyond their common subversive attitudes and anti-Rousseauian precepts (chapter thirty) and makes little attempt to describe the political issues that might have united or divided its members—an approach that, if pursued systematically, would have enabled him both to identify those political theoretical positions that had a revolutionary posterity and to characterize that posterity with precision. Instead, he fastens upon two concepts—the general will and representation—that according to him opposed, on the revolutionary field, the Radical Enlightenment represented by Diderot and d’Holbach against the Counter-Enlightenment embodied by Rousseau.

The very choice of the subjects of the general will and representation privileges a narrative of political opposition over one of intellectual difference more attentive to ideational genealogies and historical political debates. Even though these two were not the subjects most discussed by the
Assembly, they are certainly two of the most written-about in Rousseau scholarship, as well as two of the most illustrative of his differences with Diderot. In this sense, they suit Israel's drive to have the radicals take Rousseau's place as the Revolution's tutelary divinities, but they do so at the price of proving radicalism's supposedly determining influence on the Assembly's political thought in a solid and systematic manner. Thus, for instance, rather than delve into the texts left behind by the National Assembly for evidence of "radical" versus Rousseauian influence, Israel simply asserts that the "tussle" between the "Revolution of Reason" and the "Revolution of the Will" governed the Assembly's reception of the concept of the general will, with Diderot, d'Holbach, and Naigeon representing the rationalist liberating side and Rousseau the oppressive voluntarist one (pp. 636-640). The opposition seems rather reductive, and reasons to argue its obverse readily suggest themselves. Considering, for instance, that the idea of the general will has both ancient and modern origins[21] in Augustine's idea of the law as a voluntarist phenomenon and of the will as incorporating the passions[22] it emerges that Diderot too wrote in this tradition, since he posited the general will as resident not in reason but in the "prescribed law of all civilized nations, in the social practices of savage and barbarous peoples; in the tacit agreements obtaining amongst the enemies of mankind; and even in those two emotions—indignation and resentment—which nature has extended as far as animals."[23] Conversely, Rousseau's idea of the general will has rational elements insofar as it is meant to reflect "principles [that] are clear and luminous."[24] This is so to the extent that Rousseau's general will has been used to argue for his adherence to the Platonic theory of the Forms.[25] In addition, too, the "moi commun" that generates the "common will" according to Rousseau—a "moi" that is absent from Diderot's concept—has an affinity with Spinoza's notion of mens una.[26] so that, ironically, Rousseau's general will may be said to be genealogically closer than Diderot's to Israel's Radical Enlightenment.

Israel is aware that Rousseau had a political debt to Spinoza and refers to María José Villaverde's observation that the Social Contract's famous passage where Rousseau declares that whoever refuses to submit to the general will must be "forced to be free" is actually of Spinozian derivation (p. 636). But Israel's response to this is to privilege, as usual, political opposition over intellectual convergence. Thus, rather than reflect on the implications that such ideational crossovers might have for the accuracy or permeability of his categories of Enlightenment, he simply avers, without providing textual proof, that whereas Spinoza and Diderot's general will is "strictly universalist, tolerant, and anchored in reason," Rousseau's is "particularist, intolerant, and amenable to far-reaching censorship" (p. 637). He thus allows Rousseau to join the nouveaux spinosistes only in moving away from Hobbesian sovereignty and in conceiving of the general will as an equalizing force; and he insists that on every other subject a "rift" divided the two camps (p. 638).

One indication that things are more complex than suggested here is that Diderot does not seem to have had very radical thoughts on the subject that most occupied the Assembly—the form of the constitution. Israel devotes pp. 619-626 to "Diderot's Clash with Catherine" and draws attention to Diderot's Observations sur le Nakaz (1774), which were highly critical of Catherine's policies, but this should not preclude a discussion of the fact that the encyclopedist's sympathy for democracy, even in 1778, four years after his visit to Russia, left something to be desired. This is what is indicated, for instance, by his writing in the Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron that "the man-people is the stupidest and most evil of men [l'homme peuple est le plus sot et le plus méchant des hommes]."[27] The undemocratic impression is increased by the very text that Israel cites on p. 623 to prove Diderot's dislike of despots, and which is intended as the "first line of a well-made Code": "We the people and we the sovereign of this people swear conjointly...." The line suggests that for all of Diderot's demands for Catherine's abdication, and although he believed that the people should be involved in government through representative institutions,[28] he was not—unlike Rousseau—an advocate of popular sovereignty.

In fact Diderot may have approved of republics even less than "moderates" like Montesquieu: the Voyage en Hollande pointed to modern republics like Venice and the Netherlands as unviable alternatives to monarchies, both because they were corrupt and because the latter resembled a monarchy due to the Stadtholder's power.[29] Nor did the encyclopedist's idea of representation much resemble the downfall of privileges that happened during the summer of 1789—let alone the Revolution's most egalitarian moments—since he believed that the people's representatives should
be the big landowners, “les grands propriétaires.”[30] The idea had nothing radical about it—Edmund Burke shared it too—and drew on the then-common assumption that only those sufficiently wealthy can have a stake in the public good. [31]

Indeed Diderot’s ideal on the form of government looks very Montesquieuian. As Willem Verhoeven observes, the *Voyage en Hollande* maintains that the state form of a particular society should be determined by its dominant moral tendency; the *Réfutation d’Helvétius* assumes that small states could be republics or even direct democracies, while larger states like Russia and France should have monarchies[32]; and—contrary to Israel’s claim on p. 813—Diderot’s political writings more generally—including the *Histoire philosophique* itself—suggest that for him a limited monarchy roughly on the English model is the most practical form of government.[33] Political views like these, quite widespread in his time, explain why, despite his criticisms, Diderot’s main political activity was as the advisor of an “enlightened despot.” And they certify that in politics, in fact, he would be less justly labeled a “radical” for his avowed political writings than if he turned out to be, after all, the man behind the pseudonym of the proto-communist and Rousseau affine, Morelly.[34]

The problem of Diderot’s political legacy would also be more easily resolved if light were shed on what, precisely, Israel means by the *telos* of his narrative: “democracy.” Although it is part of the radical “package” (p. 12), “democracy” remains undefined except by Israel’s general usage of the word—a leveled society whose members can participate in government—a usage too general to acquire historical specificity among late eighteenth-century political concepts.

VI.

There is one subject, though, on which Israel’s radicals do seem to have been consistently united across the centuries: religion. For they all appear to have agreed not only that divine providence does not exist, but also that religion is useless and detrimental to politics and society. As explained above, Israel underlines this anti-theological perspective as a defining feature of his radicals (p. 22), and intellectually at least, if there was one attitude among them that never altered, and that proved to be integrative of the group, it was this one.

Given, then, that *Democratic Enlightenment* may be read at least partly as a history of anti-teleology, it is ironic that its narrative contains elements of a philosophy of history, positing that history is guided by the opposing principles of liberation and oppression, power and impotence, logic and unreason, good and bad. The application of these principles to historical characters is perhaps most clear in the case of Diderot and Rousseau. The encyclopedist is acclaimed as “one of the most enlightened, humanity-loving and creative geniuses of his age” (p. 108), while Rousseau is reviled as the willful, irrational, and reactionary upholder of a decaying order whose “hypocrisy, contrariness, paradoxes, and bad nature” “honourable men [mostly elite radicals]… denounced” (pp. 108-109). As with their characters, so too with their thoughts: Diderot becomes the long-lost intellectual father of a radicalized Revolution, while Rousseau begets the Terror. Indeed the latter and retains his title as a major theoretical precursor of modern democracy only because, fortuitously and improbably, the revolutionaries wrapped up his philosophy in his “radical” rivals’ ideals. But what is perhaps most surprising is the fact that enlightened thinkers are not the only ones susceptible to permeation by the “good” and “bad” principles: historical periods are so too, with the 1770s and the early French Revolution harboring the “good” principle, and others—notably the Terror—becoming infected by the “bad.”

Nor is the struggle between “good” and “bad” principles the only element of Israel’s narrative that is reminiscent of speculative historical philosophy. Even more suggestive is the unstoppable flow of the pure stream of ideas represented by Radical Enlightenment toward its end in itself—our present social and political order. The progress of the stream may be slowed by intellectual and political enemies or by adverse circumstances of various kinds, but its sheer force eventually overcomes all obstacles to let it flow even more strongly than before, while its pure quality is never altered by the composition of the terrains it traverses. In a double paradox, then, the history of a fundamentally
anti-teleological philosophy is teleologically determined by the superior power of its own, anti-teleological ideas.

In the end, Israel perhaps best formulates his project when, responding to his critics, he writes that “monist systems were in fact indispensable to the rise of a generalized radical outlook which was, in turn, the principal cause of the French Revolution and the other revolutionary movements of the late eighteenth century” (p. 22). This statement of the necessity of monist systems to the rise of modern democratic consciousness is less strong and therefore more persuasive than the argument actually executed in the book—that monist systems were both necessary and sufficient, in fact necessarily sufficient given the utter inferiority of the alternatives they faced. Yet if the argument is flawed, Democratic Enlightenment is a well-informed, extremely wide-ranging, and passionately argued book whose importance should be suggested if nothing else by the unprecedented length of the reviews in this forum, and above all by the fact that it accomplishes beautifully what is perhaps a book’s highest purpose—stimulating the reader to think about truth. The pity is that I have found my thoughts dwelling excessively on the difficulties involved in supporting the book’s thesis empirically, especially in light of the current literature available on its subject. And I have been struck as well by the surprising similarities between its narrative and other metanarratives that should if anything be anathema to its vision. One hopes that the sequels to Democratic Enlightenment might pay closer attention to the nuances that differentiate thinkers from each other, and streams of thought in different times and contexts; that they might delve deeper and more systematically into primary texts and engage more diligently with secondary ones; and that they might, in so doing, develop models out of the evidence rather than fit the evidence into pre-set models. Such attentiveness might prevent their narratives from running through a black-and-white world toward an end all too readily predictable.

Notes


[6] [Jones], The Principles of Government; in a Dialogue between a Scholar and a Peasant. Written by a Member of the Society for Constitutional Information [n.p., 1782], p. 7.


[9] See the passage famously considered as the founding comment of comparative linguistics and Indo-European studies, in Jones, Discourses Delivered before the Asiatic Society: And Miscellaneous Papers, on the Religion, Poetry, Literature, etc., of the Nations of India (London: C.S. Arnold, 1824), p. 28.


Augustine, *City of God*, XIV, 7.


