A rose, the bard wrote, by any other name would smell as sweet. This works for a noun that refers to a thing or object, but not for a noun that refers to a concept. In Cohen’s case the noun-concept is community and the context in which it is used is the movement toward European unity. Before the European Union there was a European Economic Community and before that a European Coal and Steel Community. There was no odor of the fascist era associated with the term “community,” as used here. It referred simply to a bond tighter than a simple association, as in the European Free Trade Association of the same era, which was limited to the simple elimination of tariffs between its members on industrial goods, or as in an organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was a military alliance.

The European Economic Community, as in the case of its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, was a community in the sense of eliminating tariffs on all trade between its members, industrial and agricultural, and further, establishing a common market with a joint common tariff against the rest of the world. This brought with it, in the case of the EEC, the creation of a Commission to oversee the internal market and implement the common external tariff; in the case of the Coal and Steel community, the EEC’s predecessor, there was a “High Authority,” so named because nobody could think of anything more specific on which everyone would be able to agree, and because there was a model at hand, the American Tennessee Valley Authority. Community thus implied a degree of supranationalism. There was much talk at the time of European unity in the sense of a federation, for some, or a confederation, for others, but these words were politically loaded, and the term the parties later settled on to replace the word community was “union,” the parameters of which remain undefined to this day. If “community” was dropped in favor of “union,” that was because few thought there really was, or should be, a European “community” in the organic sense of the term. The EU strives today for a common European “identity” today rather than community among its members.

Cohen reminds us that “community” was never an anodyne term, however, and he argues that those who used it could not have done so casually. Sociologically, everyone at the time was aware of Tönnies and the distinction between community and society, a distinction that became basic in the construction of fascist ideology. Those who pressed for a European community in the postwar had studied and written about the term during the fascist epoch from 1919 to 1945; in France, without getting into the argument of whether or not the Vichy regime was fascist, it is sufficient to recall that the concept of community was basic to the nationalist and populist ideology that underlay the National Revolution. There is a continuous line, moreover, from Vichy’s use of the term community to its reappearance in the postwar period. Many of the same people who theorized community under Vichy reappeared in the postwar, some of them very close to Jean Monnet; in particular Pierre Uri who, with Etienne Hirsch and Monnet, constituted a troika that came up with the idea for the European Coal and Steel Community. Other names, like Uri, had been associated with the Ecole d’Uriage, a kind of early Vichy think tank, and were important in formulating the idea of community, in particular François Perroux. Perroux seemed
to be everywhere in the intellectual life of France during the occupation, which did not prevent him from enjoying a postwar academic career at the Collège de France. He and his cohort gave impulse to the movement for a federation of Europe in the postwar period and they were a strong presence at the Council of Europe established under the auspices of Winston Churchill in December 1948. Their communitarianism, Cohen points out, remained a kind of corporatism, implicitly anti-parliamentary, authoritarian and technocratic, very much on the model of Vichy’s National Revolution. Cohen thinks it was much like the house that Monnet built in the ECSC.

Cohen’s method is to first debunk the myth of Jean Monnet as the Founder of Europe. The early historiography of the EU focused on the men who gave it birth in an atmosphere of postwar idealism, their motivation the conviction that Europe must never again be the scene of destructive war like the one just concluded. If such a war happened again in an atomic age it was clear that Europe might not even survive. Other than Monnet they were democratic, parliamentary politicians, the top tier of them: Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Alcide de Gasperi, being Christian Democrats, along with the Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak, who was a Socialist. First and foremost, however, was Monnet, whose place is enshrined by a considerable historiography, not to mention his own memoirs.

To be sure, there has developed a considerable interpretive historiography about the movement for a united Europe since (much of it in the tradition of Alan Milward), devoted to the idea that the movement for European unity was designed to preserve the nation-state, otherwise too small to survive on its own. Self-interest, not idealism, was the motive that gave rise to the movement for European unity for Milward. There are other views more in the line of Milward: Andrew Moravcsik stresses economic interdependence among the original six founding nations, while John Gillingham celebrates the EU as a triumph of Austro-Liberal economics. Perry Anderson has penned a devastating Marxist critique of an integrated capitalist enterprise. Cohen now offers us another interpretive tool in the strong impulse of the corporatist and technocratic ideology of Vichy; after all, did Hitler not establish a crude sort of economic union during his conquest of Europe, its model, to be sure, more a neo-colonial one? Cohen complains that because they dislike Vichy, today’s historians, Paxton notwithstanding, too often try to write it out of French history.

Under the impulse of Paul Reuter, Alexandre Marc, and François Perroux, among many others (Cohen too often gives us lists of people and books), community underlay the entire curriculum at Uriage, and when Uriage proved too experimental for the regime (most of its students ended up in the Resistance by 1943), its successor, the École des Cadres du Mayet-le-Montagne, where Pétain’s future bureaucrats continued to train for the duration of his regime. Community was in the first instance, by German example, based on race, with its associated ideas of exclusion of the unfit (the Jews) and its obsession with purity. But community extended beyond race and nationality to labor and work; there were communities based on occupation, much like the medieval guilds. But Vichy’s corporate theorists posited communities that could include entire categories of industry uniting labor and management. Thus community underlay the idea of corporatism, the corporation a community based on industrial organization uniting management and labor in a benevolent hierarchy based on competence (Saint-Simon’s engineers) and devoted to the benefit of all. The initial community was the family, the next of work, the next of fatherland, Vichy’s counterrevolutionary reply to the Republican liberty, equality, and fraternity. There were communities of sport, occupation, leisure, the entire gamut of human activity, to be sure. But the community of industrial organization, with its associated ideas of authoritarianism and technocracy gave rise to corporatism as an entire socio-organizational model for the economy and society.

This in turn suggested, based on the many right-wing variants of nationalist ideology of the 1920s and 1930s, a European Third Way between totalitarian Marxism and Liberal Capitalism, represented by the twin enemies of fascism, the Soviet Union and the United States. Right-wing movements in the 1930s (not to mention their progeny today in the form of the National Front) made an issue of being neither
Right nor Left on the political spectrum. They, too, theorized a great deal about community and integrated it into their ideologies, the Nazi community of the Aryan race often being imitated. Corporatism followed logically as the expression of communities of labor and management that could overcome and eliminate class conflict in favor of class collaboration. Vichy, if not itself tied to any of the multiple fascist or fascistic sects in France in the 1930s, incorporated much of their ideology in its National Revolution. In an interesting twist, Vichy’s conception of corporatism opened the way to the easy acceptance of Keynes, who offered a capitalist model based on state intervention and regulation, the state assuming responsibility for full employment and prosperity. For Cohen, Keynesianism and corporatism were entirely compatible with one another, and could be joined together in a statist model of the economy between liberalism, meaning free markets in the European sense, and communism on the Soviet model, although I am not sure that fascist movements of the 1930s thought of Keynes’ general theory being used in this way.

Cohen is right to call our attention to the continuity of Vichy in French history. Indeed, President Hollande has just done so rather dramatically in his speech during the commemoration of the roundup of the Jews and their incarceration in the Vel d’Hiv before deportation to Auschwitz—he called it a “French crime, committed by France.” Nor need we be surprised at the surprising number of civil servants in France who served the Republic in the 1930s, Vichy in the early 1940s, and the Republic again in the postwar period. It is a truism that 90 percent of the French supported Pétain in 1940 and 90 percent supported de Gaulle in 1945. French judges, it has often been noted, applied the laws of the Republic and the anti-Semitic laws of Vichy often with equal vigor. But it is a stretch to argue that community under Vichy meant the same thing, even to the same people who used it, under Vichy and under the Fourth Republic. In the postwar period, it became the concept it had been before Vichy and fascist movements had appropriated it; it no longer had the odor of Vichy, it smelled once again like a rose. If there was a technocratic, even corporatist cast to the European Coal and Steel Community, there was not to its immediate successor, the projected European Defense Community, also a project of Monnet’s fertile brain. And that ill-fated project was endowed with an assembly that was to be elected on a democratic basis. Similarly, a European parliament was written into the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community.

Communautarisme, by which the French tend to mean what we call “multiculturalism,” has a pejorative connotation in France today and the European Union is widely assumed to have a “democratic deficit,” despite the direct election of the European parliament. Cohen begins his book by calling our attention to that democratic deficit as if to imply (assuming that it exists) that it has its origins in the corporate philosophy of the EU’s founders. And that philosophy, he appears to be saying, was honed in some manner under Vichy. The problem is that corporatism, like community, has a history independent of Vichy and fascism. It was authoritarian under Vichy, but corporations exist in democracies too, where they are more or less, as the case may be, regulated by democratic governments. The American New Deal, Cohen himself notes, was corporatist, but it did not stink of either fascism or Vichy. Without gainsaying Cohen’s research, which does a great deal to show us how Vichy theorized the concept of community, it is not at all apparent that today’s European Union need be tarred with the Vichy brush. The European Union is an entity like no other. That may be its problem. It bears the heritage of the epoch of fascism, and indeed the legacy of communism, no more nor less than the democratic governments that compose it.

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