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Lucien Bély, Bertrand Haan, and Stéphane Jettot, eds. *La paix des Pyrénées (1659) ou le triomphe de la raison politique*. Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2015. 571 pp. Illustrations, bibliography, and indexes. 69.00€ (pb). ISBN 978-2-8124-2952-1.

Review by Charlie R. Steen, University of New Mexico.

This volume, which brings together the papers of a colloquium held in Paris in 2009, provides a wide range of articles that cover virtually every aspect of negotiations leading to a major treaty at the very moment when the face of political life was changing in France. Twenty-six contributors with wide interests and varied fields of expertise participated and examined every facet of the long struggle between France and Spain, the divisions that plagued both realms, and the long years of negotiations. In general, the essays sustain the argument that the negotiations marked the moment when rational politics in Europe began to dominate, pushing aside lingering ideas of peace and order based on a common sense of unity in Christendom. Every part of the study reflects the best modern scholarship and an admirable depth of research into both recent scholarship and primary sources. The book has an introductory essay followed by four separate sections and then concludes with a summary essay.

Lucien Bély opens the volume with “Le triomphe de la raison politique,” a detailed overview of the issues, events, military undertakings, and negotiations following the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War. He clearly lays out the unresolved differences between France and Spain, the problems posed by the Fronde, and the diplomatic and military steps that led to the peace. He offers a positive view of rational politics and diplomacy, that is, achieving the goal of peace through a reasoned examination of all people and issues involved. The grand objective is to reinforce the idea that reason in politics commits people to achieve peace, using the method of Descartes to put an end to violence among nations.

Pablo Fernández Albaladejo in “Entre la Razón Católica y la Razón de Estado” argues for the exceptional character of Spanish politics based on its intense relationship with Catholicism. He discusses the wide debate regarding the issues provoked in Spanish ruling circles and how it gradually came to embrace the idea of rational political action as part of a modified relationship between the crown and the church.

María Victoria López-Cordón Cortezo’s contribution, “Diplomatie et introspection,” springs off a play by Calderón on universal peace and reconciliation and also describes the distinct paths toward peace and the complex maneuvering before swords could be sheathed and pens deployed. She discusses the wide range of political tracts inspired by the negotiations and the struggle to separate religion from political reasoning.

Heinz Schilling, in “La représentation du pouvoir à l’époque de l’émergence d’un système européen d’états souverains” argues that cultural communication, in this case symbols of power, was vital to successful international relations. In his view, images become actors and he supports his ideas with a

selection drawn from the time of Charles V but put to use by Philip II in his quest for power. He also discusses the various political uses of religious images.

Alexandra Merle's study, "Guerre et paix dans la pensée politique espagnole après 1659," is based on a close examination of Juan Alfonso de Lancia's *Comentarios políticos* of 1687 when the impermanence of the Peace of the Pyrenees was obvious. Lancia cautioned that the realm was in danger and based his views on Tacitus, converting the discussion of disorder in Rome to an analysis of the decline of Spain and the growing strength of France as it discarded friendship in favor of *raison d'État*, a concept that sponsored a "silent war" against Spain.

Peter Schröder's "Un politique peut dire ce qu'un prince devoit faire" is a closely reasoned study of the ideas of peace and equilibrium advanced by Leibniz and how they related to the Peace of the Pyrenees. To Leibniz, proper political order included a moral basis that sought balance between power and justice. He argues that Leibniz sought to check Louis XIV's aggression in order to establish an international order based on law codes and treaties. The author emphasizes the gulf between the moral policy dear to Leibniz and the acts and policies of Louis XIV.

Françoise Bayard's carefully crafted chapter, "La souffrance des peuples, le retrait financier et la gloire du roi: trois raisons de faire la paix," with its close analysis of primary sources, offers a clear description of the creation of misery. The court's three reasons for peace were widespread suffering, financial collapse, and the opportunity to negotiate an honorable settlement. The disastrous financial state of the crown forced it to create new taxes despite the angry renunciation of the *Parlements*. Only *financiers* thrived, as was revealed in the later trial of Fouquet. The final part discusses Mazarin's determination to secure glory for the king in the peace that was made possible by improved conditions in military and diplomatic affairs.

Paul Sonnino's contribution, "Une grande Mazarinade avortée," is another example of his tireless dedication to finding every possible document when researching a subject. He examined many different collections of the correspondence relating to the negotiations leading to the Peace of Westphalia and found multiple copies made by Théodore Godefroy and his son Denis, both of whom were in the retinue of the French plenipotentiary at Cologne. Denis Godefroy also prepared a memoir on the secretaries of state, and Sonnino argues that he obtained secret correspondence from the Count of Brienne. Brienne had a long relationship with France's foreign affairs through attachment with Anne of Austria despite the active dislike of Richelieu and then Mazarin. The documents revealed parts of the negotiations that were embarrassing to Mazarin and Sonnino argues that only Brienne's attachment to Anne prevented him from publishing "the mother of all Mazarinades" based on the documents he accumulated. This article explores all parts of a very complex and dangerous political balancing act.

Olivier Poncet's article, "La monarchie et les offices royaux de 1648 à 1665," clarifies the complex relationships involved in the selling of offices, the suppression of others, and the imposition of forced loans, all part of financing war. All the forces of disorder in the financial affairs of the regime were on display in this process, and there are excellent graphics and documents to support and elaborate on the text. He also studies the effect of the Fronde as well as the war effort to make the processes even more intricate. Documents offer the justification for each step of this manipulation of public and financial affairs, and the finance ministers are examined closely, particularly Fouquet, who paid dearly for some of the dealings after the transfer of power to Colbert.

Alain Tallon argues in "Les dévots français et la paix des Pyrénées" that the *dévots'* response to peace was complicated by the crown having compromised itself with Protestants while prosecuting the war. Jansenism added additional confusion to all Catholic relationships. The article examines the difficulties encountered in opposing Louis XIV and relates how the *dévots* had to confine themselves to criticizing

courtesans. They lamented their place in a disordered world in which ultra-Catholics suffered under a *Roi Soleil*.

Jacques Poumarède's article, "Le roi de paix en son bonne ville," is an interesting consideration of the relationships involved in a royal visit to the old and very privileged city of Toulouse. Louis made a state visit in 1659-1660 when Toulouse became the center for peace and his marriage. For these events, every part of the city participated in elaborate displays and ceremonies. Louis did his part by curing and pardoning, but carefully ignored the financial plight of the city caused by war debt even as he requested large sums to support the peace and his marriage.

Guido Braun's "Les formes de la négociation franco-espagnole à Münster," examines the many participants in mediation at Munster, but gives closest attention to the activities of the Dutch. Various forms and procedures were required for success in the maze of religious and political discussions. The Dutch would adopt the voice of neutrality when needed and would offer arbitration whenever their efforts at mediation failed. He also comments on Mazarin's careful avoidance of direct negotiations.

In "La paix des Pyrénées, une paix à découvrir," Daniel Séré examines all of the steps in the long process of the treaty's negotiation. Séré discusses how the negotiations lasted as long as the war itself and reflected all of the chaotic events of the twenty-five years of struggle. The author concentrates on the less well known negotiations in Madrid in 1656 and in Paris in 1659. The great number of issues addressed in each episode are carefully detailed, particularly the intricate maneuvering over the marriage, which was to be the symbol of lasting peace.

In "Louis (XIII) II de Catalogne," Daniel Aznar argues that the Catalans made a dangerous commitment when they changed princes, thus challenging beliefs and fundamental feelings. The author reviews the rationale for the revolutionary act, including the province's strong association with religious practices and the issue of Spanish misrule. Louis XIII was presented as a gift of providence, but he still had to be cast properly in the role of king and to appear as a spiritual force and a leader against heresy. Harkening back to Carolingian times, the Catalans wanted to have Louis represent a warrior king and a restorer of liberties. The process was long and later interrupted by Louis's death, which halted the messianic process and introduced a mortuary reverence that sanctified him and created a *eucharistie royale*, associating Christ with Louis.

According to Klaus Malettke in "La paix des Pyrénées, l'empereur et l'empire," the French-Spanish war deeply influenced French-Imperial and French-German relations. The ultimate peace introduced complicated relations between France and the various German states. The Treaty of Munster tried to keep German states from becoming engaged in France's war with Spain. Also, Mazarin became involved in the imperial election in 1658, trying to advance the candidacy of the Elector of Bavaria in long, complicated, and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations. However, the League of the Rhine gave France greater influence in Germany for a time. The Peace of the Pyrenees included French concerns over the Burgundian Circle and thus continued the close involvement in German affairs.

Bertand Haan argues in "D'amitié ou de raison?" that the peace defined both of the kings while also resetting the order of diplomacy throughout Christendom. The marriage was to give peace depth and permanence. Both parties participated in ceremonies and displays to affirm that notion. However, Louis XIV acknowledged that enmity between France and Spain was a permanent feature and that other forces had to intervene and bind them together in peace. Louis wanted to follow maxims based on reason and interests to create a new equilibrium for all Christian Europe, thus reviving time-honored dreams to the advantage of the French crown.

Venetian diplomats viewed the greatness and ultimate decline of Spain almost obsessively, showing a fascination for what they clearly regarded as the decline of evil. Sylvio Hermann de Franceschi begins

“La pensée politique des diplomates” with Botero’s evaluation of state power and weakness as well as his caution against believing in the appearance of power. The early Venetian ambassadors ignored that warning when they overestimated Spanish power. Later, the ambassadors altered their view, presenting a more realistic view of power while also offering a candid appraisal of the crown’s exploitation of religion in maintaining authority. Like Campanella, they witnessed the sharp decline in Spanish military force. Once again, this article is a reminder of how astute the Venetian ambassadors were.

According to Alain Hugon’s “La révolution napolitaine dite de Masaniello (1647-1648),” of the four episodes of revolt against Spanish rule at that time, this was the only one with a personality cult. However, the revolt lasted much longer than Masaniello. It had very broad and changing motives, starting out as a protest against taxes but quickly moving to attack bad government. The crown finally negotiated a settlement with the people, but did so in bad faith and ultimately reestablished the old order.

The northern Italian states became involved in the general European conflict after 1635 and their troubles only ceased with the Peace of the Pyrenees. The small states of the north, particularly Modena, Mantua and Savoy, tried constantly to negotiate but were excluded from the center of diplomatic activity and were in constant fear of being marginalized. They also continued to compete with one another over precedence. Anna Blum notes in “Les ambassadeurs nord-italiens en France et la négociation de la paix des Pyrénées (1658-1659)” that the politics of reason dictated final terms and that issues concerning the minor states involved, particularly Modena and Savoy, would remain in flux for years after the settlement.

Éric Schnakenbourg’s article, “Au lendemain du Déluge,” clearly presents the complicated international relations in the north with Denmark and Sweden in a permanent contest, Poland invaded by Sweden, and Holland, England, and Russia being drawn into the Baltic as a consequence of all the issues involved in trade and contested lands. The turmoil was calmed in 1661, but that resolution actually introduced fresh unresolved issues that became a permanent part of European diplomatic concerns, drawing Russia fully into the business of trying to maintain peace and concord in Europe.

Jean Bérenger’s “Une exception à la pacification générale” is an excellent account of the activities of the Turks in southeastern Europe. The region became a theater of war just as the rest of Europe established peace. The conflict troubled all affairs in Eastern Europe and those problems increased when Vienna made an unsuccessful attempt to retake Transylvania. There was a major struggle in 1664, and for France, a hypocritical organization against the Turks. Montecuccoli achieved a major success in Hungary, but the Turks turned defeat into victory by engaging in a skillful diplomatic effort leading to the Peace of Vasvár, which restored their losses. The peace was but an intermission in the endless conflict that resumed in 1680.

Françoise Hildesheimer emphasizes, in “La paix des Pyrénées au Parlement,” the important place of the *Parlement* of Paris in the operations of the crown. Its procedures and language established the public tone of the monarchy and was therefore engaged in announcing the peace with a long series of pronouncements and formalities. Louis XIV was fully aware of the important place of the court but clearly regarded it as an abnormality spawned by the *Fronde*. Thus the king had the records of its secret chamber destroyed and the documents of the other chambers excised of any references to “public affairs” that included the delays the court caused in registering the Peace of Westphalia. In 1668, Louis thought that the *Parlement* had a level of control over registrations and ceremonies that was dangerous to the crown. This article continues with an appendix including documents from the AN on registration and procedures.

According to Marianne Cojannot-Le Blanc’s “Une grande nécessaire,” Mazarin became closely involved with establishing relations between the arts and royal power after 1650. Fouquet was closely involved

and began organizing projects. The work on the Louvre recommenced as soon as the peace was signed. Mazarin also busied himself, reestablishing the royal art collections. He commissioned Le Vau to complete the plans for the Tuileries as well as the Louvre, the Pont de la Paix, and galleries in the palaces to house the royal collections. Mazarin acknowledged the great expense but claimed that it was a necessity of state. Mignard, Le Brun, and several Italian artists were engaged, as were people active in theater production and in writing.

In “Figurer la paix,” Gérard Sabatier examines the formal rejoicing of the city as recorded by Claude Ménestrier, a native of Lyon who delighted in describing the festivals each part of the city organized and the edifices each constructed. All were emblems of required reverence, made more agreeable by music and wine, which were also the proper antidotes for bad memories and grievances. The article includes maps and illustrations showing many of the mechanical and fireworks devices that citizens constructed.

José Manuel de Bernardo Ares’s “La succession de la Monarchie Hispanique” is dedicated to giving good order to the complex and long lasting debate over the issue of succession to the Spanish throne. The author points out that there was constant attention to the matter on three different levels, including diplomatic approaches, legal discussions, and the posturing of claimants to the throne. He regards many of the conflicts between 1660 and 1700 as being related to the determination of Louis XIV to maintain the claim to Spanish possessions that he felt the Peace of the Pyrenees had given him.

Despite the best hopes and plans, strife triggered by the Spanish succession consumed the beginning of the eighteenth century. Throughout “La paix des Pyrénées,” Joaquim Albareda follows the claims and actions of Archduke Charles and the challenge that he mounted against the succession and the treaty that had fostered it until his dying day. While his actions were not the only forces at play in the war, they provided a theoretical and polemical basis for action.

Géraud Poumarède’s “Paix des princes et paix des peuples” praises peace and its benefits for those who craft the resolution of strife and also for the people who had to endure years of horror. The establishment of peace in the case of this treaty included redefining Europe and its diplomatic enterprises. This contribution also provides a summary of the twenty-five articles that were first part of the colloquium in Paris and now make up a fine and thoughtful book that explores all of the facets of old regime diplomacy. The volume is remarkable for its breadth and the skill that so many authors brought to the task. The articles provide a fine review of current research and previous studies on the subject and the result is an exceptional compilation of great value to historians.

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Charlie R. Steen
University of New Mexico
csteen@unm.edu

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