
Review by Johnson Kent Wright, Arizona State University.

In 2012, Kent Flannery and Joyce Marcus published a landmark work of modern social science. *The Creation of Inequality: How Our Prehistoric Ancestors Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery, and Empire* set forth a novel theory of social evolution over the last 15,000 years, focused on the way in which changes in “social logic” explained, first, the initial breach in the egalitarianism of hunter-gatherers of the time—the emergence of clans and lineages playing the pivotal role—and then the successive appearance of hereditary social ranking, monarchies, and finally imperial states.[1] Bookending 500 pages of case-studies, drawing on the most up-to-date archeological and anthropological evidence, was an illustrious name from the past. *The Creation of Inequality’s* epigraph is the famous opening line from *On the Social Contract*: “Man is born free, and yet we see him everywhere in chains.” Unsurprisingly, however, it is Rousseau’s “Second Discourse” that has pride of place in Flannery’s and Marcus’s book. The second chapter of *The Creation of Inequality* examines four highly egalitarian foraging societies through the lens of Rousseau’s analysis of the “state of nature.” Its brief epilogue, “Inequality and Natural Law,” begins with a section entitled “Updating Rousseau,” considering the latter’s own proposals for stemming, if not reversing, social inequality.

If Flannery’s and Marcus’s appeal to Rousseau is largely ornamental, it nevertheless suggests the prestige that still attaches to the Second Discourse, written more than a century before modern archeology and social anthropology were launched. For all its fame, however, the *Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men* remains a bit of an orphan among classics of social thought, a loose fit even within Rousseau’s oeuvre.[2] Lacking the fireworks of the First Discourse, the Second is often regarded as mainly a stopping point on the way to *On the Social Contract*. In terms of wider comparisons, the Second Discourse occupies a kind of liminal zone between the works of the great seventeenth-century natural rights theorists whom Rousseau criticizing in Part One of the text, and the vaulting historicist narratives of the nineteenth century that he anticipates in Part Two. Nor are these the only reasons why Rousseau’s essay has so often seemed hard to place. As Frederick Neuhouser points out in the introduction to his remarkable book, the Second Discourse, though brief, is “a torturous maze, whose argumentative thread is extremely difficult to keep track of” (p. 1). It was indeed the formidable complexity of Rousseau’s essay that inspired *Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality*: “I decided to write this book one day when, teaching the text to undergraduates for what could have been the hundredth time, I realized that neither I nor any of my students was able to give a concise reformulation of Rousseau’s responses to the two apparently straightforward questions he takes himself to be answering, namely, what the source of inequality among humans is and whether it is justifiable” (p. 1).

Few scholars are as well-positioned to undertake such a “reformulation” of Rousseau’s answers to these questions as Neuhouser. *Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality* is his fourth book, preceded by *Fichte’s Theory of...*
Neuhouser’s analysis of the argument of the Second Discourse extends across four chapters, two devoted to the question of the origins of inequality, two to its justification. The first addresses Rousseau’s “negative” answer to the problem of origins—possible explanations to be eliminated—which is essentially set forth in the course of Part One of the Discourse. At its start, Rousseau of course draws a sharp distinction between “natural” inequality—physical and mental differences between human beings—and “moral or political” inequality, which Neuhouser proposes we call “social” inequality. For Rousseau, he insists, the latter is invariably a matter of privileges of one kind or another over other people, and just as invariably rests upon belief or opinion. As for the notion that the origins of social inequality might lie in “natural” differences between human beings, that Rousseau dismisses scathingly. The topic itself “may perhaps be good for slaves to debate within hearing of their masters, but is not suitable for reasonable and free men who seek the truth.”[^4] That does not exhaust the possibilities of a “naturalist” answer to the question of origins, however. Might not certain features of human nature explain the emergence of “social” inequality? Neuhouser in fact devotes the bulk of his first chapter to a fine-grained analysis of Rousseau’s conception of what he calls “original” human nature. This comprises, first, two “natural faculties,” amour de soi or amour de soi-même and pity—roughly, concern for one’s own existence, needs, and desires, and for those of others, with the former typically trumping the latter, should conflict between the two arise. The second aspect of “original human nature” consist of two “natural capacities,” perfectibilité—not to be understood in terms of “moral” improvement, but rather as the relative “malleability” of human nature, in comparison with that of other animal species—and free will, a “power of choosing” connected with the human capacity for speech. The upshot of Neuhouser’s analysis is that explanations of social inequality gain nothing by appealing to “original” human nature—neither capacities nor faculties, not even amour de soi, provide incentives for the emergence of social ranking and privileges, especially given the relative abundance of the “state of nature.”

If both “nature” and “human nature” are off the hook, what then explains the arrival of social inequality? The answer is provided in Neuhouser’s second chapter, entitled “Amour Propre is the Origin of Social Inequality.” Here he naturally builds on Rousseau’s Théodicy of Self-Love, which is by far the most incisive analysis of the concept in the scholarly literature, in any language. Paradoxically, the term itself is missing from the body of the text of the Second Discourse. But Rousseau’s “supremely important” Note

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[^2]: For modern thinkers, committed to the fundamental moral equality of human beings, things could no longer be that simple. “Distilling and reconstructing” Rousseau’s own theory of the relations between origins and justification, Neuhouser warns his readers, will involve reaching beyond the Second Discourse to On the Social Contract and Emile. As for complaints that his approach risks exaggerating the connections between Rousseau and Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, he concedes the point. For accounts of Rousseau’s debts to Plato and the Stoics, Machiavelli and Montesquieu, readers can look elsewhere. But his umbilical connection with the founders of German Idealism is real, and vital for understanding the essential unity of Rousseau’s philosophical oeuvre (p. 14).

[^3]: More crucial is to explain Rousseau’s understanding of the relation between the two questions posed by the Dijon Academy—specifically, why an account of the origins of social inequality is relevant to its justification. For ancient thinkers, the connection was too obvious. Plato and Aristotle, in their different ways, both regarded “natural” and “social” inequality more or less as one. For modern thinkers, committed to the fundamental moral equality of human beings, things could no longer be that simple. “Distilling and reconstructing” Rousseau’s own theory of the relations between origins and justification, Neuhouser warns his readers, will involve reaching beyond the Second Discourse to On the Social Contract and Emile. As for complaints that his approach risks exaggerating the connections between Rousseau and Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, he concedes the point. For accounts of Rousseau’s debts to Plato and the Stoics, Machiavelli and Montesquieu, readers can look elsewhere. But his umbilical connection with the founders of German Idealism is real, and vital for understanding the essential unity of Rousseau’s philosophical oeuvre (p. 14).

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XV, on the other hand, provides the most extensive definition of *amour propre* in all of his works. There it is contrasted with *amour de soi* along four axes: their *objects*, *amour de soi* typically focused on material well-being, *amour propre* on the sort of non-material goods that Hegel would later label the “recognition” of other people; their *consequences*, those of *amour de soi* mostly benign, those of *amour propre* often, though not exclusively, malign; thirdly, the fact that *amour propre* is *relative*, focused on comparisons with other people, and their judgments in turn, in a way that *amour de soi* is not; and lastly, the fact that it *artificial*, an artifact of “consent” in a way that *amour de soi* is not. If *amour propre*, thus defined, is to be blamed for the emergence of social inequality, is this not to revert to a “naturalist” explanation after all? Yes, in a sense, although Neuhausser here introduces a distinction between “original” and “extended” human nature—between, as he puts it, “human nature” and “human nature.” *Amour propre* is a feature of the latter alone. At the same time, its development, though necessary for any explanation of social inequality, is not sufficient. Rousseau’s own metaphor, in which *amour propre* is described as the “leaven” that permits flour to rise in the presence of heat and moisture, is to be taken seriously. Thus a series of six “auxiliary conditions” were necessary for *amour propre* to give rise to social inequality, whose interaction with the latter Neuhausser analyzes in their rough order of appearance—leisure, luxury, “individual differentiation,” the division of labor, private property, and the state.

With this inventory of the “auxiliary conditions” of social inequality, the answer to the question of its origins is complete. It remains to tackle the issue of the justification of inequality, to which Neuhausser turns in the next two chapters. In one sense, the task is an easy one. What the Dijon Academy had asked, specifically, was whether inequality was “authorized by natural law.” As all readers know, Rousseau ends the Second Discourse ends with what appears to be a resoundingly clear answer to the question: “It follows, further, that moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to natural right whenever it is not combined in the same proportion with physical inequality.” But this is an implausibly simple flourish, Neuhausser argues at the start of Chapter 3—and not merely because Rousseau sometimes makes gestures in the direction of a Lockean justification of private property. More important is the fact that on the whole, Rousseau prefers to speak, not of the “authorization” of inequality, but of its “foundations.” In Neuhausser’s view, this points us on to the possibility of providing social inequality with normative foundations far beyond those envisaged by the Dijon Academy. If these foundations will only fully be set forth in *On the Social Contract*, their basic shape can certainly be glimpsed in the Second Discourse.

To that work, the “reconstruction” of Rousseau’s arguments now definitively overtaking their “distillation,” the remainder of Chapter 3 is devoted. Neuhausser’s first move is to return to the distinction he earlier drew between “original” and “extended” human nature, reworking it into a contrast between an “explanatory” conception and a “normative” one: “original” versus “true” or “essential” human nature. This involves only a little forcing of Rousseau’s own words: “Even though the term ‘human essence’ appears neither in the Second Discourse nor, as far as I know, in Rousseau’s other texts, there is undeniably a version of the idea of the human essence at work in his thought” (p. 117). Evidence for what Rousseau believed to be essential to human beings can in fact already be found in his depiction of the “state of nature” in Part One of the Second Discourse, where man is described as “a free being whose heart is at peace and whose body is healthy;” and in that of the “golden age” early in Part Two, in which men “lived as free, healthy, good, and happy as their nature allowed them to be.” Starting from these fleeting references, Neuhausser makes a case for two fundamental components of human good à la Rousseau: *freedom*, understood largely as corresponding to Philip Pettit’s notion of freedom as “non-domination,” though still more inflected in the direction of “self-determination”; and *well-being*, which is made up of two distinct sub-components, *happiness* and the *satisfaction of needs.* That is a just a start, however. Turning his attention toward “expanded human nature,” and admitting that the textual evidence for them is “scant and largely implicit” (p. 142), Neuhausser proposes adding two further components to Rousseau’s normative conception of human nature: *social recognition*, seen as the respect from others sought by *amour propre*; and “the robust development of latent human capacities” (p. 143). Though the evidence for the latter is scantest of all, at least in the Second Discourse, Rousseau
definitely had gone some distance toward joining Marx’s critique of capitalism of a century later, on similar grounds.

Freedom, well-being, recognition, development of capacities—such are the component parts of Rousseau’s “normative” conception of human nature. A form of naturalism, to be sure—but a far cry, Neuhouser insists, from the teleological naturalism of ancient philosophers and modern natural-rights theorists. The “silence” of nature, once the threshold of civilization has been passed, is one of the most memorable themes of the Second Discourse. Nor was Kant wrong to warn that there might be fundamental tensions or trade-offs between human ends. But this does not mean that the “normative” conception of human nature is without all purchase on social inequality, the subject to which Neuhouser turns in his fourth chapter. He begins with a fundamental point. For Rousseau, inequality is not an intrinsic evil or wrong in and of itself, but only in light of its consequences—his approach to economic inequality is basically “instrumentalist.” What then are its relevant consequences for Rousseau’s “normative” conception of human nature? Neuhouser concentrates on the first two of these. The threat that high levels of social inequality pose to human freedom is relatively straightforward—the norm at work in the famous claim in On the Social Contract that “no citizen should be so rich that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled to sell himself.” [8] The effect of social inequality on well-being is a more complicated issue, mostly because this involves not so much the “absolute” deprivations associated with poverty, as the more “relative” tares of status and rank. Here Neuhouser again has recourse to a concept that does not appear in the Second Discourse en toutes lettres, that of a society under the grip of “inflamed amour propre”—which, he argues, looks back to Plato’s “fevered polis” and forward to modern conceptions of “alienation.” As for the actual means of avoiding the baleful consequences of social inequality, for freedom and well-being alike, those are to be sought, of course, in the just social pact, founded on the “general will” of all citizens, described at length in On the Social Contract. But the basic idea is already sketched, a contrario, in Rousseau’s depiction of the illegitimate contract that led to the creation of states at the end of the Second Discourse.[9]

Neuhouser concludes Chapter 4 with a clear statement of his “reconstruction” of Rousseau’s response to the Dijon Academy’s second question: “[S]ocial inequality is contrary to right whenever it is incompatible with securing the life, freedom, and the basic social conditions of the well-being of each member of society” (p. 198). Applying the “normative constraints implicit in the idea of the social contract” to freedom-as-non-domination in particular yields a further specification: “[E]conomic inequality is permissible only to the extent that it is compatible with the absence of regular relations of domination among its social members” (p. 200). The ethical intuition between these claims was shared by thinkers otherwise as various as Smith and Marx. But Neuhouser in fact ends Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality by fast-forwarding to a brief comparison with John Rawls. The latter, “an insightful appropriator of Rousseau’s views,” was the first to acknowledge the debt: “In fact, Rawls seems to have incorporated Rousseau’s reflections on the relation between economic equality and the satisfaction of amour propre to such a degree that it is difficult to find a fundamental difference between them on that score” (pp. 214–216). Freedom was another matter, at least initially. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s justification of the Difference Principle had more to do with “fairness” in distribution than fears of domination. But this gap eventually closed. By the time of Rawls’s late-career turn in a putatively “anti-capitalist” direction, with his endorsement of “property-owning democracy,” he and Rousseau were more or less at one in this respect as well.[10]

If this is largely where the “contemporary relevance of Rousseau’s critique” (the title of the fifth chapter) lies, Neuhouser nevertheless concludes the book by expressing two reservations about Rousseau’s theory, both of which point “in the direction of Marx.” One is the possibility that inequality alone “may be too coarse a concept to pick out the specific economic features of society that produce the Ills Rousseau is worried about,” especially in regard to our “actually existing capitalist societies” (pp. 224–225). The other anxiety is that Rousseau’s concentration on outright “domination” might tend to obscure the effects of other kinds of “illegitimate social power” common in advanced societies today,
including “violence, marginalization, exploitation, and treating others with contempt.”[11] Nevertheless, “even if domination, strictly defined, plays a less important role in capitalism than in pre-modern class societies, it remains a real and important phenomenon in our current globalized capitalist system” (p. 227).

A brief summary can only hint at Neuhouser’s achievement in Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality, which derives from an extraordinary mastery of the texts at hand, scrupulous care with the definition and interrelation of concepts, and exceptionally clear and crisp writing. But it is perhaps enough to suggest that a “substantial philosophical introduction” might not make for the best initiation to the Second Discourse, even for those who have read it once or twice. In total command of the text, Neuhouser makes not the slightest concession to context in “reconstructing” its argument. There is no hint of the biographical background to the Second Discourse or where it might fit in the sequence of Rousseau’s writings; nor a word about natural law theory in general or the Enlightenment. Rousseau’s intellectual interlocutors in the essay, so crucial to Part One, are effectively missing from Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality—a handful of fleeting references to Hobbes and Locke, one apiece to Grotius and Barbeyrac, none to Pufendorf. Nor does the overall shape of the text itself come fully into view, as a totality. As we have seen, Neuhouser cites the bewildering complexity of the Second Discourse as an inspiration for his book. Yet never once does he describe and differentiate its main component parts in sequence: Dedication to Geneva, Preface, prize question, Exordium, Part One, Part Two, Notes. Citations from the text are voluminous in number, but invariably short and fragmentary. Scant attention is paid to rhetoric, voice, and other literary aspects of the Second Discourse. For all that, as Neuhouser warned, readers will have to look elsewhere.

But that is no criticism of Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality—merely confirmation that the author is a philosopher, rather than a Cambridge-style intellectual historian. For the same reason, there is no point in complaining that Neuhouser has made a notion like amour propre, which actually makes few appearances in the Second Discourse, a pivot of its argument; introduces concepts Rousseau never used at all, such as “extended human nature,” “human essence,” or “inflamed amour propre”; and assumes rather than demonstrates the “essential unity of Rousseau’s philosophical oeuvre,” thereby dismissing any possibility of discrepancies or contradictions within it. That too would be to mistake Neuhouser’s purpose and ambition for Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality. It often happens, of course, that a philosopher will use commentary on or analysis of a classic text in order to make a substantive statement of his or her own. Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality certainly belongs to that class of books in general. But if a still more precise comparison were needed, there is one readily to hand. Few of Neuhouser’s readers, at least of a certain age, will fail to be put in mind of a celebrated book published nearly forty years ago, but very similar in temper, aim, and ambition—the late G. A. Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense. There are differences. Cohen ranged across all of Marx’s works rather than focusing narrowly on just one—though he did, of course, make a single paragraph, from the “1859 Preface,” the lodestar for his “reconstruction” of Marx’s theory of history. Otherwise, Cohen’s and Neuhouser’s methods and aims are remarkably similar—the effort to bring the resources and clarity of analytic philosophy to bear on the grandest social theory from the Continent. Cohen actually described his book as a “reconstruction” of Marx’s theory; Neuhouser could as easily have characterized his own as a “defense” of Rousseau’s.[12]

If we are lucky, Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality may have the same galvanizing effect on the study of Rousseau that Cohen’s did for that of Marx. In any case, the comparison between the two books is all the more pertinent given the frequency of Neuhouser’s own gestures in the direction of Marx. It is strange that writing on the relations between the two should be as rare et espacé as it apparently is. The topic once attracted attention within certain currents of Western Marxism—central to an Italian tradition in particular, a juxtaposition that never quite occurred in Althusser’s work. But, a couple of exceptions aside, it has never figured very centrally in Anglophone political thought.[13] At all events, the analogy with Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History suggests that contrast between the two would be
equally illuminating as comparison. In his reconstruction of Marx’s theory, Cohen famously granted explanatory primacy to the “productive forces,” resulting in what was widely seen as a “technologically determinist” interpretation of historical materialism. Neuhausser, by assigning the same kind of primacy to the stadial development of *amour propre* across history, might be seen as offering a “psychologically determinist”—though emphatically not “teleological”—interpretation of Rousseau’s critique of inequality.

The symmetry of the opposition between Cohen’s Marx and Neuhausser’s Rousseau looks virtually complete, pointing to characteristic areas of uncertainty in both. What the primacy of productive forces called into question was the exact role played by the “relations of production” in general and class struggle in particular, the latter often seen as a prime mover in historical change, in rival interpretations of Marx. In Neuhausser’s reconstruction of Rousseau, the equivalent neuralgic zone is what he designates the “auxiliary conditions” for the development of *amour propre*, which would appear to englobe “productive forces” and “relations of production” alike. Casting these in no more than a supporting role is perhaps related to Neuhausser’s insistence that Rousseau’s depiction of the “state of nature” should be regarded as merely “hypothetical” rather than actual, his account of human development “analytic” rather than “historical.”[14] Given the uses that archeologist-anthropologists such as Flannery and Marcus can make of the Second Discourse, this might seem like proceeding with one hand tied behind one’s back. Similar considerations apply to another dangling thread in *Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality*, of equal moment. Just before taking up those “auxiliary conditions,” Neuhausser notes that in the Second Discourse, the initial divergence between *amour de soi* and *amour propre* is closely related to relations between the sexes. “This is not the only place,” he adds parenthetically, “in which Rousseau suggests, without really articulating, a deep connection between sexuality and *amour propre*; in *Emile*, too, the two passions emerge in tandem, and it is clear there as well that this connection is not accidental” (pp. 86-87).

It would appear, then, that there is a certain amount of work left to do, in fleshing out the exact shape of the “struggle for recognition” that forms the centerpiece of Rousseau’s account of the development of social inequality—not to mention articulating it with Marx’s theory of history. Neuhausser is no doubt correct to suggest that any attempt to render the Second Discourse relevant to the social world of advanced capitalism would mean abandoning an exclusive focus on “domination,” among forms of “illegitimate social power.” For a certain kind of classical Marxism, it is “exploitation” that is to be privileged instead.[15] What then of remedies for social inequality that might have met with Rousseau’s approval? On the left, hopes seem to have moved on from the “property-owning democracy” to which Rawls turned late in his career, to “universal basic income.” Although Rousseau does not figure in the most developed and attractive version of the latter proposal, it seems perfectly congruent with his stricures about citizens “buying” and “selling” one another.[16] In any case, in addition to the question of the institutions that might characterize a genuinely egalitarian society, there is the equally thorny issue of the agents who might plausibly bring it about. Flannery and Marcus have their own ideas on the subject. At the end of *The Creation of Inequality*, they cite the injunction of their colleague Scotty MacNeish: “Put the hunters and gatherers in charge.”[17] Finding the right foragers will not be easy. The one thing that might safely be predicted is that movement in the direction of a different social world is impossible to imagine without tackling both economic exploitation and political domination. What Rousseau, a supremely political thinker, adds to Marx is the necessity of imagining some kind of planetary “general will,” impossible as that seems at the moment. For that reason, it is to be hoped that the next stop on Frederick Neuhausser’s itinerary is a distillation and reconstruction of *On the Social Contract*.

NOTES

Following Neuhouser’s use of the convention, this review will refer to the *Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men* as the Second Discourse.


For this list, Neuhouser acknowledges Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” *Ethics* 109 (January 1999), pp. 287-337)—the key text in launching the notion of “luck egalitarianism.”

G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978): “The reconstruction given here is less ambiguous than the theory in its original state. I do not regret that” (p. ix). On the same page, Cohen wrote: “Marx was a restless and creative thinker, who developed many ideas in many directions. He did not have the time, or the will, or the academic peace, to straighten them all out. It is not an arrogant claim to offer a less untidy version of some of his major ideas than he himself provided”—words Neuhouser might have used to describe Rousseau.


For these claims, see pp. 33-34 and pp. 208-212, respectively—though Neuhouser does concede that “real history is not completely irrelevant to Rousseau’s genealogy,” since it at least serves to “demonstrate the contingency of our own social arrangements.”


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