
Review by Gregory Jones-Katz, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen.

"Oui, surtout. Rien de ce que je tente n’aurait été possible sans l’ouverture des questions heideggeriennes.... Mais malgré cette dette à l’égard de la pensée heideggerienne, ou plutôt en raison de cette dette..."[1]

For a not insignificant portion of Jacques Derrida’s readers, a clear understanding of his stance toward history is elusive. To be sure, Derrida rather explicitly announced his philosophy as a historical enterprise in essays and interviews during the late 1960s and early 1970s.[2] After those essays and interviews, however, he drastically reduced the number of references to history.[3] Partly as a result, readers find it difficult to conceive of Derrida’s philosophy as a form of historical theory or practice. In fact, many have come to view Derrida’s thought as outright ahistorical. This view is also a consequence of Derrida’s alignment with the Yale School of Deconstruction, a group of literary critics, theorists, and philosophers of literature based at Yale University from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. While Derrida was a visiting professor in the humanities at Yale, techniques of reading influenced by his thought spread throughout the American literary-critical scene. Literary critics’ uses of Derrida, motivated more by the desire to discover new ways of interpreting prose and poetry than by an interest in new considerations of the history of philosophy, contributed to the occlusion of Derrida’s earlier announced historical stance.

The University of Chicago Press’s publication of Geoffrey Bennington’s translation of Derrida’s seminar, “Heidegger: The Question of Being and History,” certainly (re)familiarizes Anglophone readers with the essentially historical orientation of Derrida’s philosophical project.[4] Given at the start of his remarkable career, at the age of thirty-four, and originally delivered over the course of nine sessions during the 1964-1965 academic year at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS), Derrida’s seminar offers a wealth of insights into the ways his published views on history fundamentally emerged out of a critical engagement with the introduction and the final sections of Martin Heidegger’s 1927 *Being and Time*.

It is not a stretch to use the words “essentially” or “fundamentally” here. Derrida explained in 2001 that he deemed Heidegger to be his *contremaître*, his work supervisor, the authoritative thinker who policed him and did so critically.[5] Derrida even once confessed to having written 10,000 unpublished pages on Heidegger. Though Derrida published prolifically on a wide range of thinkers and writers, most of his seminars, as J. Hillis Miller observed in 2015, “sooner or later” came back to his *contremaître*.[6] The most poignant example of Derrida’s habitual homecoming was perhaps in his 2002-2003 seminar, the last he gave before his death in 2004. There, Derrida divulged that, “late in my life of reading Heidegger, I have just discovered a word [*Walten*] that seems to oblige me to put everything in a new perspective.”[7]

Heidegger was the philosopher from and against whom Derrida labored. And, Derrida’s penetrating interrogation of his *contremaître*’s masterwork *Being and Time* in his 1964-1965 ENS seminar provides key
insights into the workshop out of which emerged the historical stance of Derrida’s philosophical project. Since this stance oriented all of his subsequent texts, the seminar also offers insights into the very course that his oeuvre took. Put differently, Derrida’s seminar captures an early moment in his life-long Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger. Auseinandersetzung here means not simply “debate,” “quarrel,” or “settling of accounts,” but a “placing” or “setting” (setzen) things “apart from one another” (auseinander). Derrida’s seminar captures a moment when Derrida directly confronted his contremaitre for the eventual goal of disengagement and the delineation of a different stance toward history. Ultimately, if one wants to understand the academic and popular reception of Derrida’s thought as ahistorical, then Derrida’s ENS seminar is indeed a good place to start.

Let’s first examine Derrida’s confrontation with Heidegger in De la grammaïologie. Derrida’s 1967 book opened with a resounding rejection of the “catégories classiques de l’histoire”; he aimed to write a new history of metaphysical concepts. By metaphysical, Derrida, repeating Heidegger’s position, meant ahistorical. For Derrida, a metaphysical concept signified either an otherworldly essence or a natural permanence; it signified “présence.” But, Derrida claimed that his history of metaphysical concepts that signified presence could not be reduced to a traditional historicism. This was so, Derrida argued, due to the trembling of the metaphysical way of thinking, the “signes” of which were detectable “à travers le monde.” The trembling of metaphysical thinking exposed “le thème unique d’une métaphysique”: a privileging of presence that, by favoring the first term of certain oppositions, constructed “[ceux les dualismes] (present/absent, nature/culture, truth/falsity, voice/writing, male/female, etc.). One could no longer ignore that any moment of presence is always supplemented by absence, that notions of nature were already supplemented by the cultural, that the identity of truth relied on and was thus constituted by falsity, and so forth. In a 1971 interview, Derrida called the overturning of a hierarchical opposition and “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept’” that escaped the hierarchy: the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence.

Derrida explained, albeit circuitously, that because his projected history of metaphysical concepts was subject to the trembling of the metaphysical manner of thinking, his planned history could not be reduced to a conventional historicism. Oriented toward the deconstruction of presence, we glimpse “la clôture”—not “la fin”—of “une époque historico-métaphysique.” Or, as Derrida put it in the aforementioned interview, metaphysics fashioned a “metaphysical concept of history,” which “is not only linked to linearity, but to an entire system of implications (teleology, eschatology, elevating and interiorizing accumulation of meaning, a certain type of traditionality, a certain concept of continuity, of truth, etc.).” For Derrida, the deconstruction of the metaphysical concept of history, of which traditional historicism was but one instantiation, liberated “histories different in their type, rhythm, mode of inscription.” That is, the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence uncovered narratives hidden by the metaphysical concept of history structuring Heidegger’s (and Derrida’s) histories. And from Derrida’s perspective, any purpose, design, finality, continuity, or even tradition located in these uncovered narratives was subject to further deconstruction.

Derrida wrote his projected history and continued his Auseinandersetzung with his contremaitre in the second half of De la grammaïologie. There, Derrida employed a terminology that not only parodied Heidegger’s jargon but also accounted for and performed the deconstruction of metaphysical concepts that signified presence and could not be reduced to a customary—that is to say, metaphysical—historicism. Whereas Heidegger offered the terms Ereignis, Llichkeit, and the like in his works to signal the presence beyond metaphysics, Derrida used terms fashioned in the first part of De la grammaïologie, such as the archiécriture, différence, réserve, supplément, trace, to pinpoint the deconstruction of metaphysical concepts of presence in the writings of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For example, Derrida closely read the “leçon d’écriture” that Lévi-Strauss gave to the Brazilian indigenous Nambikwara people, as narrated in his 1955 travelogue Tristes Tropiques. Derrida maintained that Lévi-Strauss’s study of the Nambikwara mirrored in its structure Rousseau’s presentation in his 1755 Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes of an ahistorical state of nature because
Lévi-Strauss nostalgically portrayed the Nambikwara as a “cristalline” and “authentique” culture prior to miscommunication, violence, and social hierarchies that was spoiled by the appearance of the white man (the appearance of Lévi-Strauss) and the sudden insertion of history and civilization, as represented by “écriture.”[18]

But, according to Derrida, Lévi-Strauss’s “discours ethnologique” used the metaphysical opposition between speech/writing.[19] And Lévi-Strauss’s metaphysical privileging of speech, his belief that the Nambikwara existed in an ahistorical state of nature in which the presence of meaning occurred without deferrals and differences, obscured the different kind of writing at work in Nambikwara culture. Though Lévi-Strauss observed that the Nambikwara prohibited the use of proper names, he overlooked that this prohibition demanded the deletion of the “propre” link between a name and its reference, just as writing resisted immediate referentiality. “Il y a écriture dès que le nom propre est raturé dans un système,” Derrida provocatively claimed.[20] Such a mode of writing prior to speech was even empirically documented by Lévi-Strauss himself, who observed that the Nambikwara, before Lévi-Strauss’s “leçon d’écriture,” had drawn “pointillés” et “zigzags” sur les calebasses,” while, after Lévi-Strauss’s tutorial, the Nambikwara clearly possessed the resources to grasp the power of writing.[21] Lévi-Strauss’s use of the metaphysical opposition between speech/writing thus concealed the different manner of writing at work for the Nambikwara, covering over the history—indeed, the miscommunication, violence, and social hierarchies—before and after the coming of European man. For his part, Derrida called this general writing, archi-écriture, a writing itself originary and not derivative of an original presence but that structured history by way of delays and differences.

This “history lesson” that Derrida read in Lévi-Strauss’s writings on the Nambikwara is but one example of what became his forty-year performance of his deconstructive history of metaphysical concepts that signified presence. From De la grammätologie or thereabouts on, Derrida found/fashioned an ever-proliferating web of historical terms—pharmakon, spectre, and others—in and with the writings of an immense array of thinkers and writers.[22] But, Derrida’s historical justifications for these terms disappeared. He perhaps assumed that, because his readers shared with him, like Gianni Vattimo has suggested, “the consciousness of the historical situation in which they live,” he did not have to explain the historico-factual rootedness of the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence.[23] Or Derrida may have felt that, while historical references and explanations were appropriate during the late 1960s and early 1970s, they were unwarranted a mere decade later, as the very concept of “metaphysics” and its traditions of thinking had undergone deconstruction. Being an academostar in America during the 1980s and 1990s meant that, if he historicized his project in a conventional way, he would have to gather diverse acts of deconstruction under some sort of grand narrative, a gesture that smashed of the control Derrida believed metaphysics exerted over history and which he aimed to deconstruct.[24] From Derrida’s perspective, the “signs” of the trembling of metaphysical thinking were his and others’ deconstructions of presence, which was evidence enough.

Derrida’s writings continued his Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger, though not by way of explicit engagement, as in De la grammaologie. Certainly, many might reject the suggestion that Derrida’s nullification of references to and apparent subsumption of his stance toward history was evidence of his Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger. Nevertheless, Derrida’s writings after De la grammaologie were not only performances of his historical stance but also attempts, each in its unique way, to answer the same philosophical question asked by his contremaitre: “mon débat interminable avec Heidegger concerne le sens à donner à la déconstruction, à l’usage de ce mot. Quel est le concept de ce mot ? Explication sans fin.”[25]

The significance of Derrida’s readings of the introduction and the final section on temporality and historicity of Heidegger’s Being and Time in his 1964–1965 ENS seminar may now be made clear.[26] Pivotal to his Auseinandersetzung with his contremaitre, Derrida’s seminar was where he first affirmed Heidegger’s philosophical project while at the same repeating Heidegger’s positions in order to launch himself into a distinct orientation toward history. Considering the centrality that Derrida’s position on
history assumed in every text that came after his foundational essays and interviews of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Derrida’s seminar was also of seminal importance for the course of Derrida’s œuvre, and, by extension, its reception in the United States.

Key parts of Derrida’s published stance toward history are traceable over the seminar’s nine sessions. As he progressively engaged the conceptual tension between temporality and historicity in Being and Time, Derrida advanced pieces of what became his own historical notion of Heidegger’s Destruction. In the seminar of November 16, 1964, which focused on Heidegger’s “Introduction,” we hear Derrida’s first ever use of “deconstruction”: “Heideggerian destruction is neither the critique of some error, nor the simply negative exclusion of some past of philosophy. It is a destruction—that is, a deconstruction, a de-structuration, the shaking that is necessary to bring out the structures, the strata, the system of deposits” (p. 9). If they were not already, ENS students were disabused of the notion that Heidegger’s “destruction” of the metaphysical way of thinking aimed to inter the past in a void. Heidegger’s “destruction” made philosophical inquiries tremble so as to construct the thinking of the temporality of being buried underneath factual existence. Heidegger’s “destruction” of metaphysics was “positive”—the word is emphasized in Derrida’s lecture notes (p. 10). It was this “positive,” this productive act of “a deconstruction” that, besides being overlooked during his American reception, was staked out with and through Heidegger’s masterwork over the next eight class sessions.

By midway through his ENS seminar, Derrida’s position on history began to approximate what became its published shape in De la grammaçologie. It was his engagement with Heidegger’s investigations into the historicity of Dasein (German for “being-there,” which is often translated into English as “existence”) before its metaphysical determination as spirit (in the case of Hegel) or consciousness (in the case of Husserl) that provided Derrida with the platform. On February 8, 1965, Derrida stated: “this absolute privileging of the Present and the Presence of the Present that Heidegger must destroy or shake up in order to recover the possibility of historicity cannot be destroyed by him the way one criticizes a contingent prejudice.... [W]hat he is going to solicit (I prefer the word to ‘destroy’: comment)...is the self-evidence...of the totality of metaphysics itself; it is philosophy itself” (p. 138). But, Derrida noted during his last session—and this was one of the decidedly original conclusions of his course—when Heidegger “solicited” metaphysics’s “privileging of the Present” in order to recover the possibility of historicity, he reached an impasse. Heidegger perceptively identified metaphysics and interrogated its privileging of the temporal present, but he made the questioning of historicity secondary to his questioning of temporality.

Heidegger saw time as the only and correct way into the question of the temporality of being, not history in other words. And, by having “grafted” the “problem of historicity...onto that of temporality,” Heidegger failed to “concrete” explain what differentiated the theme of temporality from the theme of historicity (p. 186). In the end, Heidegger’s treatment of historicity as a subordinate mode of temporality was a function of the very metaphysical presence that he himself aimed to destroy. “Ultimately, in spite of appearances,” Derrida unequivocally stated on February 22, 1965, “it is a metaphysical attitude not to take seriously and not to insist on the rootedness of historicity in temporality” (p. 153). Hence, Derrida concluded, Heidegger, despite himself, was not only unable to positively account for the historicity of Dasein, but also to deconstruct metaphysical historicism.¹²⁷

But Derrida aimed to do precisely that, to question the hierarchical opposition that Heidegger enforced between temporality (or time) and historicity. In his last session, on March 29, 1965, Derrida stated his grand goal to “slowly” and “patiently” destroy, or, as Derrida retranslated it here and there, deconstruct, not just “the signification history,” but also “the whole of language, of sciences, of the human, of the world” so as to generate the “question of being as history” (p. 229). That was the task Derrida laid out at the end of his seminar. And this task would no longer set aside the historicity of Dasein in order to grasp the temporality beyond metaphysics, but deconstruct the metaphysical opposition—or impasse—between historicity and temporality in order to perform the historical enterprise of deconstructing the metaphysics of presence. Unlike Heidegger, Derrida’s deconstructive history of metaphysical concepts that signified
presence would not discount historicism so as to unearth one correct way into the question of the temporality of being. Rather, Derrida deconstructed historicism in order to find different ways into the question of the temporality of being, as evidenced not only by his stance toward history in De la gramma\-tologie, but also the wide range of thinkers and writers with whom he historically engaged thereafter.

Derrida’s 1964–1965 ENS seminar on Heidegger does not simply help readers understand Derrida’s Auseinandersetzung with his contremaître and, more generally, the essentially historical orientation of Derrida’s philosophical project. It also helps redirect us toward different ways of thinking about and practicing history.\(^{[28]}\) Two recent thinkers have explored the possibility that the shape of our temporal experience—a form different from the deconstruction of metaphysics’s privileging of the present—has changed.\(^{[29]}\) Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht argues that near omnipresent technologically mediated experiences, threats of catastrophic climate change, unpredictable eruptions of terrorist violence, and unstable global geopolitics have fashioned a new form of temporal experience—the “Broad Present.” This “ever-broadening present of simultaneities” offers access to a plethora of pasts with varying degrees of accuracy while also foreclosing the likelihood of a future other than one colored by dread and angst.\(^{[30]}\) Meanwhile, François Hartog maintains that the “modern regime of historicity,” which roughly lasted from 1789 to 1989, has yielded to the contemporary “presentist” regime of historicity, in which “the distance between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation [has] been stretched to...”\(^{[31]}\) breaking point...with the result that the production of historical time seems to be suspended.”\(^{[31]}\) Their meditations differ. But Gumbrecht and Hartog both theorize that a crisis in temporality led to a focus on “the present.”

How might this different experience of time affect our reading and writing about the past? James Kloppenberg has stressed: “Intellectual historians have only particular, not universal, perspectives and purposes. Those perspectives and purposes inevitably inform and enrich our distinctive form of creative action, the production of new historical interpretations for our own cultural moment.”\(^{[32]}\) Like Gumbrecht and Hartog argue, our own cultural moment, structured by a new configuration of time, is likely reorienting our stance toward history. But precisely how the sense of what Hartog describes as “a permanent, elusive, and almost immobile ‘present’” affects the basic features of our historical theories and practices remains an open question.\(^{[33]}\) Still, one tool that may help in this undertaking is Derrida’s 1964–1965 ENS seminar, particularly his questioning of the hierarchical opposition Heidegger drew between temporality and historicity in Being and Time. For if our experience of temporality has changed, then, like Derrida underscored fifty years ago, so might our understanding of historicity. And with our different understanding of historicity we can perhaps glimpse and explore new ways of being historical.

NOTES


\(^{[4]}\) This is not to say that Derrida’s stance on history has been completely forgotten. Joshua Kates concluded in his excellent 2005 study that, while Derrida “defends” it in his 1964 essay “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” he abandoned it in his 1967 De la


[8] Heidegger explained his own Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche as “a fundamental position that steps out of the initial position in such a way that it does not cast aside the latter, but first allows it to rise in its uniqueness and conclusiveness, in order to erect itself upon it.” Heidegger, quoted in Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger: Thought and Historicity (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), f. 2, p. 56.


[26] Heidegger scholars will likely object to Derrida’s limiting of his discussion to the “marginal” parts of Being and Time; but Derrida’s sidelining of Heidegger’s entire analytic of Dasein, the “center” of Heidegger’s masterwork, in order to concentrate on Heidegger’s ruminations on history is a classic Derridean deconstructive move.


Gregory Jones-Katz
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
joneskatz@wisc.edu

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